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A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
l ohn C. l effries, Jr.* 
James E. Ryan** 
Now pending before the Supreme Court is the most important 
church-state issue of our time: whether publicly funded vouchers may 
be used at private, religious schools without violating the Establish­
ment Clause.1 The last time the Court considered school aid, it over­
ruled precedent and upheld a government program providing comput­
ers and other instructional materials to parochial schools.2 In a 
plurality opinion defending that result, Justice Thomas dismissed as 
irrelevant the fact that some aid recipients were "pervasively sectar­
ian. "3 That label, said Thomas, had a "shameful pedigree."4 He traced 
it to the Blaine Amendment, proposed in 1875, which would have al­
tered the Constitution to ban aid to sectarian institutions. At the time, 
"it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic.' "5 Of 
course, said Thomas, the word could describe schools of other relig­
ions, but the Court "eliminated this possibility of confusion" by coin­
ing the phrase "pervasively sectarian" - a term applicable almost ex-
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Elizabeth Magill, William Lee Miller, and participants in workshops at the University of 
Virginia and the University of California, Davis. Carter Burwell, Charles Marr, Elizabeth 
Polzin, and Matt Traupman provided valuable research assistance, as did the staff of the 
University of Virginia Law School Library. 
l. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, No. 00-1751, 2001 WL 576235 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001). 
2. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
3. The phrase originated in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (noting that none 
of the four colleges allowed to receive federal aid in Tilton v. Richardson was "pervasively 
sectarian"). Reliance on this factor can be seen, for example, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589, 610 (1988) (explaining that a factor in determining whether aid has the impermissible 
effect of advancing religion is "whether, and to what extent, the statute directs government 
aid to pervasively sectarian institutions"); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985) (strik­
ing down a program because aid was provided "in a pervasively sectarian environment"); 
and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 636-37 (1971) ("A school which operates to commin­
gle religion with other instruction plainly cannot completely secularize its instruction. Paro­
chial schools, in large measure, do not accept the assumption that secular subjects should be 
unrelated to religious teaching."). 
4. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828. 
5. Id. 
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elusively to Catholic parochial schools.6 The exclusion of "pervasively 
sectarian" schools from otherwise permissible aid to education was, 
Thomas concluded, not a neutral interpretation of constitutional 
command but a doctrine "born of bigotry."7 
Justice Thomas did not attack the ban against aid to "pervasively 
sectarian" schools merely as a misunderstanding of text or original in­
tent. He charged, rather, that the hostility to "pervasively sectarian" 
institutions reflected political conflict and popular prejudice. This is 
not the usual stuff of Supreme Court debate. Perhaps for that reason, 
Justice Souter's dissent did not so much answer the accusation as 
make fun of it, noting only that some "pervasively sectarian" schools 
are not Catholic and that some Catholics oppose school aid.8 Never­
theless, Thomas's account is at least partly true. The constitutional dis­
favor of "pervasively sectarian" institutions is indeed a doctrine born, 
if not of bigotry, at least of a highly partisan understanding of laws 
"respecting an establishment of religion."9 The first and narrowest 
ambition of this Article is to document that assertion. 
More broadly and more importantly, we contend that the entire 
body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence can profitably be viewed 
from a political perspective. The title of the Article signals the intent. 
We analyze Establishment Clause decisions as if they were political. 
More fully, we analyze Establishment Clause decisions as if they were 
products of political contests among various interest groups, both re­
ligious and secular, with competing positions on the proper relation of 
church and state. The "as if they were" qualification is important, as 
we do not claim that the justices thought of themselves as political ac­
tors, still less as representatives of religious interests, or that they con­
sciously desired to conscript the Constitution to such ends. On the 
contrary, we believe that many justices would be shocked by this de­
scription of their work and would protest, in all sincerity, that they 
tried to elucidate, without favoritism or prejudice, the principles that 
they understood to be enshrined in the First Amendment. We accept 
that representation completely. But it requires no flight of imagination 
to believe that the justices' views of what the Constitution should 
mean powerfully inform their views of what it does mean, and that 
normative beliefs often reflect prevailing attitudes. In this Article, we 
6. Id. at 828-29. 
7. Id. at 829. 
8. Id. at 912-13 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The plurality nonetheless condemns any en­
quiry into the pervasiveness of doctrinal content as a remnant of anti-Catholic bigotry (as if 
evangelical Protestant schools and Orthodox Jewish yeshivas were never pervasively sectar­
ian), and it equates a refusal to aid religious schools with hostility to religion (as if aid to re­
ligious teaching were not opposed in this very case by at least one religious respondent [a 
Roman Catholic]) . . . .  ") (footnotes omitted). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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assume that mechanisms exist by which political id.eology and domi­
nant attitudes find their way (after the generational delay occasioned 
by age and longevity of the justices) to the Supreme Court We make 
no effort to probe the subjective motivations of individual justices. In­
stead, we aim to reveal the correspondences between constitutional 
doctrine and popular sentiment in the area of church-state relations. 
Put crudely, this is an exercise in post hoc, ergo propter hoc, which is 
famous as a fallacy only because it is so often true. 
Looking at the Establishment Clause in this way yields a more 
complete and coherent account of modern constitutional doctrine than 
can be derived from the conventional sources of text, history, and 
structure. Indeed, one good reason to analyze the Establishment 
Clause in this way is the lack of plausible alternatives. Whatever the 
modern decisions may be thought to represent, whether for good or ill, 
they cannot persuasively be attributed to original understanding, ex­
cept perhaps at a level of generality largely devoid of meaning. They 
do not derive from the "intent of the Framers" or from any "constitu­
tional moment,"10 such as the Civil War, that might be thought to have 
replaced the original understanding. In terms of the conventional 
sources of "legitimacy" in constitutional interpretation, the Supreme 
Court's Establishment Clause decisions are at least very venturesome, 
if not completely rootless. It makes sense, therefore, to look at estab­
lishment cases as the products of a subconstitutional - which is to say, 
political - contest among religious and secular interests with (often 
self-serving) ideological commitments on separation of church and 
state. 
To preview the argument briefly, the modern Establishment 
Clause dates not from the founding but from the mid-twentieth cen­
tury. At that time, the Supreme Court adopted a rhetoric of radical 
separation of church and state. That rhetoric had as its defining appli­
cation and chief consequence a constitutional ban against aid to relig­
ious schools. Later, the Court also moved to purge religious obser­
vances from public education. These two propositions - that public 
aid should not go to religious schools and that public schools should 
not be religious - make up the separationist position of the modern 
Establishment Clause. 
We begin with the ban against aid to religious schools. The modern 
no-aid position drew support from a broad coalition of separationist 
opinion. Most visible was the pervasive secularism that came to domi­
nate American public life, especially among educated elites, a secular­
ism that does not so much deny religious belief as seek to confine it to 
a private sphere. This public secularism appears on the face of 
Supreme Court opinions and is deeply embedded in Establishment 
10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 409 (1998). 
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Clause doctrine. Additionally, the ban against aid to religious schools 
was supported by the great bulk of the Protestant faithful. With few 
exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and believers vigor­
ously opposed aid to religious schools. For many Protestant denomi­
nations, this position followed naturally from the circumstances of 
their founding. It was strongly reinforced, however, by hostility to 
Roman Catholics and the challenge they posed to the Protestant he­
gemony, which prevailed throughout the nineteenth and early twenti­
eth centuries. In its political origins and constituencies, the ban against 
aid to religious schools aimed not only to prevent an establishment of 
religion but also to maintain one. 
Today, much has changed. Anti-Catholic animosity has faded, and 
the crucial alliance between public secularists and Protestant believers 
has collapsed. Public secularists, whose devotion to public schools has 
declined in recent decades, now divide over the question of funding 
religious alternatives. More importantly, so do the Protestant faithful. 
While mainline Protestant denominations continue to demand strict 
separation of church and state, fundamentalist and evangelical opinion 
has largely deserted that position.1 1 Today, fundamentalists and evan­
gelicals have moved from the most uncompromising opponents of aid 
to parochial schools to its unlikely allies. 
In origin, this about-face had less to do with theology than with 
politics and self-interest. The defection of fundamentalist and evan­
gelical opinion from the separationist coalition flowed initially from 
their embrace of the private schools that sprang up throughout the 
South (and elsewhere) in the wake of court-ordered desegregation. 
Originally, these schools were secular. They were created purely and 
simply to escape integration. Most of them, however, were soon trans-
11 .  By "mainline" Protestants, we refer chiefly to Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyte­
rians, and most Baptists until the 1980s, when fundamentalists gained control of the South­
ern Baptist Convention. See infra text accompanying notes 397-415. Fundamentalists and 
evangelicals refer generally to those who share a core set of beliefs that include faith in Jesus 
Christ as their personal savior; the need for a conversion in order to be saved; and the need 
to proselytize. Evangelicals also regard the Bible as an infallible source of religious author­
ity, and for some, this means interpreting the Bible literally. Most, but not all, evangelicals 
are conservative. Fundamentalists, a strictly conservative subset of evangelicals, also believe 
in the literal truth of the Bible, including belief in the devil, miracles, and hell. They also (or 
at least used to) adhere to the Biblical command from 2 Corinthians 6:17 to "come out from 
among them and be ye separate." For a particularly insightful description of fundamentalists 
and evangelicals that captures the complexity of both movements, see GEORGE M. 
MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 1-6 (1991). For 
additional discussions of fundamentalists and evangelicals, see ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET 
AL, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 37-
41 (2d ed. ] 999) [hereinafter FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS]; GODFREY 
HODGSON, THE WORLD TURNED RIGHTSIDE UP: A HISTORY OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
ASCENDANCY JN AMERICA 159-61 (1996) [hereinafter HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE 
ASCENDANCY]; and A. James Reichley, The Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt, in 
PIETY AND POLITICS: EVANGELICALS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS CONFRONT THE WORLD 72 
(Richard J. Neuhaus & Michael Cromartie eds., 1987). 
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formed into, or succeeded by, Christian academies specializing in 
faith-based education. Today, virtually all of these schools say that 
they practice nondiscrimination, and many - perhaps most - enroll 
African-American students. Nonetheless, private academies remain 
havens for whites seeking to avoid minority status in public school sys­
tems dominated by persons of color. 
Additionally, Christian academies are energized by antipathy to 
the triumphant secularism of public education and by the desire to 
maintain or recreate in the private sphere the unselfconscious Protes­
tant establishment that once dominated public life. Allegiance to these 
schools and sympathy for the financial burden that they place on de­
vout parents have moved many fundamentalist and evangelical Chris­
tians to rethink their traditional opposition to aid to religious schools. 
As a consequence, strict separationism is opposed today by true be­
lievers of many faiths, not just Roman Catholics (and a few other sects 
with a history of religious schools), but also by the nation's largest 
Protestant denomination (Southern Baptists) and by the great weight 
of opinion among the variety of churches called fundamentalist or 
evangelical. 
Against this new coalition, we predict, the constitutional barrier 
against financial support of religious schools will not long stand. We 
see the current judicial uncertainty on this subject not merely as a con­
tinuation of the blurred and shifting margins that have plagued the 
field for years, but as a crack that goes to the core. We see the Court 
and the nation in the midst of a sea-change that ultimately will contra­
dict past practice as clearly and fully as Brown rejected Plessy. This 
prediction does not depend (except in timing) on a guess about future 
appointments to the Supreme Court. It arises rather from the current 
realignment of the political forces historically arrayed against constitu­
tional toleration of aid to religious institutions. Old coalitions have 
collapsed, and new alliances are demanding change: We think it likely 
that the emerging political combination in favor of government aid to 
religious education will prove, sooner or later, to be irresistible. 
We do not, however, foresee an end to secularism in public educa­
tion. In contrast to the political revolution on school aid, no new coali­
tion has formed to overturn the Court's decisions outlawing school 
prayer and Bible reading. Religious exercises in public schools are en­
dorsed today, as they were forty years ago, by the Catholic leadership 
and by conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists. They are op­
posed today, as they were forty years ago, by public secularists, main­
line Protestant clergy, and most Jews. Moreover, increasing religious 
pluralism reinforces the secularist position. While the growing relig­
ious diversity of private schools makes government funding seem 
more "neutral" and hence more acceptable, the growing religious di­
versity of public school students makes it more and more difficult to 
envision any religious exercise that would not favor some faiths and 
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offend others. We therefore predict that the constitutional prohibition 
against religious exercises in the public schools will remain intact. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I describes the two 
policies that have dominated the modern Establishment Clause. Part 
II places those doctrines in historical context. It traces the political an­
tecedents of the separationist policies and identifies the constituencies 
of their support. Part III addresses the current instability in Estab­
lishment Clause doctrine and analyzes the underlying realignment of 
political forces that are now deploying in favor of radical change. 
The reader will notice in the pages that follow the little heed paid 
to the internal structure and logic of Establishment Clause decisions. 
That does not mean that we think such questions unimportant. We do 
not doubt that precedents matter or that reason and doctrinal analysis 
are forces in the law. We largely ignore such matters not because they 
are unworthy of attention, but because they have already received sus­
tained attention from every conceivable point of view in a literature 
too varied to summarize and too voluminous to cite in full. 12 We aim 
here to examine the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions 
from an external (or political) perspective, which has not yet been 
done in any comprehensive manner.13 We think - and hope to show 
- that this approach yields an explanatory and predictive account of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is useful and informative re­
gardless of general jurisprudential commitments on the relative 
autonomy of law. 
I. THE MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The modern Establishment Clause dates from Everson v. Board of 
Education,14 decided in 1947. In the preceding century and a half, the 
Supreme Court decided only two cases under that provision, and nei­
ther cast a long shadow.15 Everson, in contrast, set the course of Es­
tablishment Clause decisions for t"".o generations. 
12. For those interested in a sampling of this literature, see infra notes 64-81. 
13. Michael Klarman recognized as much when he expressed bewilderment that a thor­
ough "social and political history of the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine" 
had yet to be written. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions]. 
This Article responds to that invitation. 
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
15. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding federal administration of an 
Indian trust fund that used tribal money to support education of Native Americans at sec­
tarian schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding federal appropriations 
for construction of new hospital wards in the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the re­
ligious affiliation of a recipient hospital). See also Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Edu­
cation, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), which upheld state provision of textbooks to students in all 
schools, including private sectarian schools, against the claim that taxation to support that 
program constituted a taking of private property for a private purpose. The Establishment 
Clause was not mentioned, perhaps because it was not yet clear that it applied to the States. 
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At issue in Everson was the validity of a New Jersey statute 
authorizing school districts to provide transportation to and from pub­
lic and private schools, so long as the latter were not for profit.16 Pur­
suant to this statute, Ewing Township, which operated public schools 
only through the eighth grade, reimbursed parents for bus fare to and 
from schools in neighboring communities, including both public and 
Catholic parochial schools.17 In many States, plaintiffs could have 
challenged that action under state constitutions explicitly prohibiting 
aid to parochial schools,18 but New Jersey had no such provision. 
When the highest state court found no state-law problem,19 the issue 
came to the Supreme Court for an interpretation of the federal Consti­
tution. The justices held, five-four, that the township's action did not 
violate the Establishment Clause, but the division of opinion on the 
result proved far less consequential than the commonality of ap­
proach. Both majority and dissent agreed that the Establishment 
Clause bound the States to a policy of strict separation of church and 
state, that the policy condemned neutral support of all religions as well 
as favoritism of any one of them, and that, as the defining application 
of that policy, no tax dollars could be used to aid religious activities or 
institutions.20 
The Everson Court not only ascribed to the Establishment Clause 
separationist content; it imagined a past to confirm that interpreta-
See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (regarding all clauses of the First 
Amendment as applicable to the States). 
16. New Jersey Laws, 1941, c. 191, at 581, N.J. Stat. Cum. Supp., tit. 18, c. 14, § 8 (1937), 
quoted in 330 U.S. at 3 n.1 .  
17. In an aspect of the case that preoccupied Justice Jackson, the township resolution 
authorized reimbursement of bus fare to "Trenton Catholic Schools," without provision for 
similar treatment of other nonprofit schools. Record at 8, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. , 330 U.S. 1 
(1947). From all that appears, Trenton Catholic schools were the only nonpublic, nonprofit 
schools attended by township students. Certainly, no challenge was raised by anyone who 
wanted to go elsewhere. Nonetheless, Justice Jackson characterized the resolution as specifi­
cally and exclusively aiding students attending Catholic schools and excluding schools of 
other faiths. 330 U.S. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Thus, under the Act and resolution 
brought to us by this case, children . . .  are to be aided if they attend the public schools or 
private Catholic schools, and they are not allowed to be aided if they attend private secular 
schools or private religious schools of other faiths."). On this interpretation, the resolution 
was obviously invalid. 
18. The prototype was the Blaine Amendment of 1875, which failed to pass at the fed­
eral level. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 
38, 47-57 (1992) [hereinafter Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered] (describing ori­
gins of the proposal). By 1890, however, twenty-nine States had incorporated similar provi­
sions in their state constitutions, often as a condition for admission to the Union. See Joseph 
P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional 
Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 672-75 (1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's Wake] 
(describing Republican response to Senate's failure to approve the Blaine Amendment). 
19. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 44 A.2d 333 (1945). 
20. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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tion.21 Both majority and dissent treated the history of the United 
States as if it were the history of Virginia. Despite dissimilarity of lan­
guage, the justices equated the Establishment Clause with Virginia's 
statute on religious freedom,22 thereby appropriating for the federal 
provision the separationist message and rhetoric of the state enact­
ment. It was "sinful and tyrannical," wrote Jefferson, "to compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions 
which he disbelieves."23 To avoid that evil, "no man shall be compelled 
to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry what­
soever. "24 This language and Madison's soaring Memorial and Remon­
strance against Virginia taxation to support the Episcopal Church25 
provided an impressive pedigree for the separationist philosophy that 
Everson now engrafted onto the First Amendment. On the fundamen­
tal point, there was no dissent. Writing for the Court, Justice Black 
said that the Establishment Clause meant "at least" that "[n]o tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac­
tivities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. "26 Speaking for the four 
dissenters, Justice Rutledge agreed that "the Amendment forbids any 
appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any 
21. "Imagine the past" comes from Sir Lewis Namier by way of Alexander Bickel. See 
LEWIS B. NAMIER, CONFLICTS: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 69-70 (1942) 
("[W]hen discoursing or writing about history, [people] imagine it in terms of their own ex­
perience, and when trying to gauge the future they cite supposed analogies from the past: till, 
by double process of repetition, they imagine the past and remember the future."); see also 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13 (1970) 
(quoting Namier). 
22. Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, enacted January 19, 1786, 12 Hening, Statutes of 
Virginia 84 (1823), quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947) ; see also 330 
U.S. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Both opinions focused on Virginia. See id. at 11-13 (de­
tailing the "great stimulus and able leadership" provided by Virginia in arousing the "senti­
ment that culminated in adoption of the Bill of Rights' provisions embracing religious lib­
erty"); id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing the "long and intensive struggle for 
religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of which the Amendment was the 
direct culmination") (footnote omitted). 
23. The language quoted in Justice Rutledge's dissent, Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
I, 28 (1947) , reads as follows: 
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; ... that to compel a man to fur­
nish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful 
and tyrannical; .... 
We, the General Assembly, do enact, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, mo­
lested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his relig­
ious opinions or belief .... 
Justice Black quoted somewhat more. Id. at 12-13. 
24. See id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting the Virginia provision). 
25. 2 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (1900) (quoted in its 
entirety in an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72). 
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
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and all religious exercises."27 No one stumbled over the fact that the 
history relied on was not directly applicable. The origins and purposes 
of the Virginia statute were adopted for the Establishment Clause, and 
on that borrowed foundation, Everson began the modern edifice of 
separation of church and state. 
For half a century, the Supreme Court followed Everson's lead. 
The years 1947-1996, inclusive, provide a convenient survey of the 
modern Establishment Clause, both because that period covers the 
great majority of all Establishment Clause decisions and because it 
stops just short of the first clear signal of change in 1997.28 From 1947 
through 1996, the Court decided fifty-two cases under the Establish­
ment Clause. More than half involved education. In six cases the 
Court considered - and in all six cases upheld - government aid to 
religiously affiliated institutions or activities in higher education.29 This 
hands-off attitude contrasts sharply with the rigor of the twenty-six Es­
tablishment Clause cases concerning elementary and secondary educa­
tion. The number of Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions 
concerning elementary and secondary schools during these fifty years 
exceeds the total of decisions from all other sectors of society, includ­
ing prisons, the military, selective service,30 employment,31 taxation,32 
27. Id. at 41. 
28. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 
402 (1985)). 
29. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding, inter alia, 
that the Establishment Clause does not bar disbursement of funds from student activity fees 
to religious organizations); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 
(1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar state aid in the form of voca­
tional assistance to a blind student seeking to become a pastor); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 
263 (1981) (holding, inter alia, that the Establishment Clause does not bar religious groups 
from meeting on state university property); Roemer v. Md. Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 
(1976) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar state funding of religiously affili­
ated institutions of higher education); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (holding that the 
Establishment Clause does not bar state issuance of revenue bonds for construction of new 
facilities at religiously affiliated institutions of higher education); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672 (1971) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar federal funding of new 
facilities at institutions of higher education). 
30. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding statute according con­
scientious objector status to persons whose religious beliefs led them to oppose all war but 
not to persons who opposed only a particular war). 
31. E.g. , Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding civil rights 
act provision exempting religious organizations from prohibition on religious discrimination 
in employment); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating state law 
that gave employees an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath). 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), held that the NLRB did not 
have jurisdiction over parochial schools, on the grounds that extending such jurisdiction 
would constitute an impermissible entanglement with religion. This case is included in the 
census of decisions dealing with elementary and secondary education. 
32. E.g. ,  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) 
(upholding state sales tax as applied to religious articles); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 
680 (1989) (upholding IRS policy of disallowing income-tax deductions for payments made 
to churches for training services); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invali-
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church governance,33 Sunday closing laws,34 zoning laws,35 religious 
displays in public places,36 public prayer in noneducational institu­
tions,37 and all the other practices that might be interpreted as gov­
ernment endorsement of religion. 
These cases show that the strict separationism of Everson did not 
apply universally or uniformly. On the contrary, Establishment Clause 
invalidations coalesce around two specific themes: one that flowed di­
rectly from Everson, and another that Everson may have influenced. 
The Supreme Court's first concern during this period (1947-1996) 
was to inhibit aid to parochial schools. In thirteen cases, the Court 
considered various programs that would have eased the financial bur­
den on parents who sent their children to church schools. The Court 
allowed reimbursement of transportation expenses,38 loan of approved 
textbooks,39 reimbursement for the costs of state-mandated testing and 
record-keeping,40 state income tax deductions for private-school ex­
penses,41 and provision of a sign-language interpreter for a disabled 
child in parochial school.42 None of these programs offered much more 
than incidental support to church schools.43 Perhaps for that reason, 
dating a state law that exempted religious periodicals from generally applicable sales tax); 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state property tax exemption 
for religious organizations). 
33. E.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (disapproving 
state court intervention in a dispute between church and a dismissed bishop); Presbyterian 
Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that state courts cannot consider eccle­
siastical doctrine in resolving property disputes arising when a local congregation secedes 
from its national organization). 
34. E.g. ,  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law). 
The Court upheld similar provisions in companion cases decided the same day. Gallagher v. 
Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two 
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
35. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating state law that 
gave schools and churches the power to prevent issuance of liquor licenses to establishments 
located within 500 feet of the school or church). 
36. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding 
that state was not barred from granting a group's request to display a cross on the statehouse 
grounds); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (allowing city 
display of Nativity scene if accompanied by non-Christian symbols); Lynch v. Donnelly, 475 
U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing city display of Nativity scene). 
37. E.g . ,  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing legislature to begin every 
session with prayer by state-paid chaplain). 
38. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
39. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
40. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
41. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
42. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
43. The only arguable exception to this statement is Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 
which approved state tax deductions for parochial school tuition. If it had been extended to 
federal taxation, with its much higher marginal rates, deductibility of tuition would offer 
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they survived Supreme Court scrutiny, but just barely. Only the text­
book loan program had a vote to spare; the others, like Everson, di­
vided five-four. More often, the Court struck down attempts to help 
church schools. Specifically, the Court prohibited state supplements 
for the salaries of nonpublic school teachers,44 tuition reimbursement,45 
maintenance and repair of schools serving low-income students,46 re­
imbursement for expenses of state-mandated and nonmandated test­
ing,47 provision of school services and educational equipment,48 aid for 
instructional materials and field trips,49 and loan of public-school 
teachers to teach secular subjects in parochial schools (twice ).50 
As has often been remarked, including by the justices,51 the consti­
tutional line between the permissible and the impermissible was thin 
and wavering. It would take an exceptionally nimble intellect to dis­
cern the difference between transportation and textbooks, which were 
permitted, and field trips and instructional materials, which were not. 
Nevertheless, the blurred margins of the no-aid policy should not dis­
guise its effect. Everson drew the line between permissible support for 
education and impermissible aid to religion very far to one side. None 
of the programs struck down in this period could convincingly be 
characterized as endorsing religious belief, which the Court now 
stresses,52 and none explicitly favored one religion over another. Al-
substantial aid for high-income taxpayers. For low- and middle-income taxpayers, deducti­
bility of parochial school tuition would be much less valuable. It seems likely, however, that 
the result in Mueller flowed not so much from the (probably correct) perception that the aid 
would be insubstantial, but from the fact that settled doctrine permitted deduction of contri­
butions directly to churches, seminaries, and religious missions. Tax deductibility of paro­
chial school tuition could scarcely be disapproved without calling into question the entire 
structure of deductibility of charitable contributions. See 463 U.S. at 396 n.5 (noting that 
state law allowed deductions for direct contributions to religious institutions and that Walz v. 
Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), approved that practice). 
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
45. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
46. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (also invalidating tuition re-
imbursement for income-qualified families). 
47. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
48. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
49. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
50. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 
(1985). 
51. E.g. , Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) ("It is not at all easy, 
however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing the [Establishment] Clause to 
governmental programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and the parents of chil­
dren attending those schools."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) 
("Candor compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of 
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."). 
52. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) ("[O]ur cases have prohibited government 
endorsement of religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not 
citizens were coerced to conform."). 
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though there was always a constituency, both on and off the Court, for 
a more nearly absolute approach, the wall of separation between gov­
ernment funds and church schools remained high. Legislatures 
searched for exceptions to the constitutional prohibition and occa­
sionally found one, but in the main they had to live with it. The cases 
prohibited direct and substantial government support of religiously af­
filiated primary and secondary education. 
The Court's second policy complemented the first. If aid to relig­
ious schools was (more or less) strictly proscribed, public schools had 
to be suitable for persons of all faiths. Of course, there was no way to 
make public schools suitable for all faiths if some of them demanded 
faith-based instruction, but at least public education should not play 
favorites. Given the increasing diversity of religious practice in 
America, the only way to avoid choosing sides was to remain silent. 
Thus, the Court's second great project in the years 1947-1996 was to 
make the public schools secular. In ten nonaid cases, the Court struck 
down laws dealing with primary and secondary education. These deci­
sions directly promoted public secularism as an accommodation to re­
ligious pluralism. Specifically, the Court disallowed religion classes in 
public schools53 and prohibited officially sponsored student prayer,54 
graduation prayer,55 Bible reading,56 and silent meditation.57 The Court 
also barred display of the Ten Commandments58 and struck down laws 
banning the teaching of evolution59 and mandating the teaching of 
creationism.60 In all these decisions, the Court severed ties between 
the public schools and particular religious beliefs or practices.61 
Today, change is underway. Although the Court remains commit­
ted to secularism in public education and shows no signs of wavering 
in its hostility to school prayer,62 the no-aid policy is faltering. Four 
53. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
54. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
55. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
56. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
57. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating law mandating a daily minute of 
silence for meditation or voluntary prayer). 
58. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
59. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
60. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
61. The other nonfunding invalidations involving primary or secondary education were 
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down a state law 
that created a new school district for a single religious community), and NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1 979) (holding that NLRB jurisdiction did not extend to 
teachers in parochial schools). 
62. E.g. , Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down student­
initiated and student-led prayer at school-sponsored football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down officially sponsored prayer at graduation). 
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justices have rejected it outright and declared their willingness to ap­
prove any secular aid uniformly available to adherents of all faiths and 
none.63 Two additional justices have chosen narrower grounds to allow 
some forms of aid that would have been forbidden only a few years 
ago.64 The question is whether the recent decisions merely continue 
the small-scale inconsistencies that have long characterized Establish­
ment Clause jurisprudence or whether they signal something more. As 
noted, we think the current uncertainty reflects a radical realignment 
of political opinion that is already well advanced and that is likely -
sooner or later - to overturn the separationist project begun in 
Everson. This necessarily speculative claim about the future is ad­
dressed in Part III. 
In Part II, we look to the past. Stated most simply, the questions 
we address are: Where did the modern Establishment Clause come 
from? What are the ideological and political antecedents of the ban on 
aid to religious schools? And what moved the Supreme Court to 
secularize public education? Though the Court attributed both poli­
cies to the Framers, we think they are better explained by modern po­
litical history. In particular, we believe, as Justice Thomas charged, 
that the constitutional prohibition against aid to religious schools is in 
some measure the sanitized residue of nativism and anti-Catholic ani­
mosity. As we hope to show, the modern Establishment Clause aligns 
less closely with the constitutional text and history of the framing than 
with the political conflict and sectarian rivalry of the more recent past. 
To that task we now turn. 
II. THE POLITICAL HISTORY 
A. Pre-History 
The Everson Court embraced three propositions about original in­
tent: first, that the Establishment Clause mandated a substantive pol­
icy of separation of church and state; second, that the policy con­
demned neutral support of all religions as well as favoritism among 
them; and third, that the Fourteenth Amendment extended that policy 
63. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("[I]f the govern­
ment, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, 
without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say 
that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular pur­
pose."). 
64. Id. at 838-39 (O'Connor, J., with whom Breyer, J., joined, concurring) ("I do not 
quarrel with the plurality's recognition that neutrality is an important reason for upholding 
government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges . . . .  Nevertheless, we 
have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because 
of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid."); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 225 (1997) ("[W]e have departed from the rule . . .  that all government aid that directly 
aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid."). 
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to the States. Given these premises, the only question was whether 
reimbursing the expenses of parents who chose to send their children 
to parochial schools constituted aid to religion. On this issue - and in 
many subsequent disputes about degrees of indirection - the justices 
divided. In fact, however, none of the three propositions that united 
the Court in Everson can confidently be said to be true. Each step is 
debatable. By founding its thinking on three historical assertions, each 
of which can be challenged, the Court has cumulated improbability 
past the point of any meaningful connection between the modern Es­
tablishment Clause and original intent. 
Begin with the bedrock proposition that the Establishment Clause 
requires separation of church and state. The provision bars Congress 
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion."65 
The phrasing suggests that Congress can neither establish nor dises­
tablish religion. On this reading, the Establishment Clause adopts no 
substantive policy regarding separation of church and state but merely 
divests the national government of authority on the subject. Contem­
porary practice confirms this interpretation. At the time the First 
Amendment was adopted, seven of the fourteen States maintained 
government-sponsored churches, and several others used various 
means to advance the Christian religion.66 With the barely arguable 
exception of Rhode Island, no American state could have been found 
in compliance with the modern understanding of separation of church 
and state.67 It seems odd to think that the States would have adopted, 
with little discussion and less dispute, a constitutional provision con­
demning their current practices.68 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
66. GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 13 (1987) 
(hereinafter BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS] ("Each of the thirteen original 
states generously aided and promoted religion and should therefore . . .  be called establish­
ment regimes."); id. at 20 (reporting that contemporary scholars agree that several estab­
lished churches existed when the First Amendment was adopted but noting discrepancy as to 
numbers); LEONARD w. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 76 (1986) [hereinafter LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE] ("In 1791, when the 
First Amendment was ratified, the addition of Vermont to the Union brought the number of 
states authorizing establishments of religion to seven."); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on 
the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1,  2 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, 
Notes] ("In 1789, at least six states had government-supported churches."). 
67. LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 74 (noting that neither as a col­
ony nor as a state did Rhode Island ever have an establishment of religion). However, 
Rhode Island did exclude Catholics and Jews from full citizenship, which, under modern 
conceptions, would be struck down as an establishment of religion. See BRADLEY, CHURCH­
STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 29 ("If one accepts the Supreme Court's definition 
of establishment, then Rhode Island, that polar star of religious liberty, maintained an es­
tablishment at the time it ratified the First Amendment."). 
68. See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 113-14 (noting 
that the records of state ratification debates, which are almost completely silent about the 
Establishment Clause, "speak in loud, unmistakably clear voices that in ratifying the Estab­
lishment Clause, they forbade sect preference by the national government and in no way im-
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It may be, therefore, that the original Establishment Clause em­
braced no substantive conception of the proper relation of church and 
state, but merely reflected a determination that the issue be settled lo­
cally. This was the understanding of Joseph Story,69 and it has been 
endorsed by competent scholars,70 though of course opposed by oth­
ers.71 Although Everson made no mention of the states'-rights inter­
pretation of the original intent, that view of the matter remains his­
torically plausible. The foundational premise of the modem 
Establishment Clause thus turns out to be irreducibly speculative. 
Even if it were clear that the original Establishment Clause man­
dated church-state separation, it would remain questionable whether 
that policy, as originally conceived, possessed anything like the sub-
paired the government's authority to aid, encourage, and support religion on a non­
discriminatory basis"). 
69. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1873, at 731 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833) ("Thus, the whole power over the 
subject of religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to 
their own sense of justice and the state constitutions."); id. (noting the denominational diver­
sity among the States and concluding: "It was impossible that there should not arise perpet­
ual strife and perpetual jealously on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendancy, if the national 
government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security was in extir­
pating the power."). 
70. E.g. , STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17, 18 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, 
FOREORDAINED FAILURE] (arguing that the original meaning of the religion clauses was 
"purely jurisdictional," that is, that they were "simply an assignment of jurisdiction over 
matters of religion to the states - no more, no less"); Amar, Notes, supra note 66, at 3 ("The 
original establishment clause . . .  is not anti-establishment but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic 
on the substantive issues of establishment versus non-establishment, and simply calls for the 
issue to be decided locally."); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment 
Clause, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088-89 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Second Adoption] ("[T]he 
original Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit federal power over the subject of 
religion, reserving the same to the states. In this way, the original Establishment Clause ex­
pressed the principle of federalism: The federal government could neither establish religion 
at the federal level, nor disestablish religion in the states."); William K. Lietzau, Rediscover­
ing the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1 191 (1990) [hereinafter Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause] ("[T]he es­
tablishment clause embodied a structural safeguard to . . .  preserve religious liberty by fos­
tering local decisionmaking authority on church/state issues."); Michael A. Paulsen, Relig­
ion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 ,  317 (1986) ("The original intention behind the 
establishment clause . . .  seems fairly clearly to have been to forbid establishment of a na­
tional religion and to prevent federal interference with a state's choice of whether or not to 
have an official state religion."); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Four­
teenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 379 ("[T]he establishment clause was meant to 
reserve powers to the several states."). 
71. E.g. , Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About 
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1986) (arguing that the Establishment 
Clause embodied a substantive conception of church-state separation); Douglas Laycock, A 
Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 411-14 (1986) [herein­
after Laycock, Survey of Religious Liberty] (arguing that the legislative history shows that 
the Framers intended to prohibit the federal government not only from favoring one religion 
over another but also from nonpreferentially aiding religion in general). 
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stantive reach of modem decisions. The kind of religious "establish­
ment" familiar to the Framers involved direct governmental financial 
support of a favored church.72 Modem school-aid cases are twice re­
moved from that paradigm. For one thing, the benefits of school-aid 
programs flow indifferently to all private schools, not exclusively to 
adherents of one faith. The Framers might have intended, contrary to 
modem doctrine, to forbid government sponsorship of a favored 
church while allowing neutral support of education affiliated with re­
ligion. 73 We can only speculate, because the Framers did not focus on 
schools. They did not live in a world of government-funded education, 
so positing what they would have thought of school aid requires ex­
trapolation of reasoning beyond its historical foundation. The point is 
not that the Court was necessarily wrong in expanding the original 
meaning of establishment to reach (some forms of) indirect aid to re­
ligious education, but only that the historical record does not demand 
that result. In moving beyond the historically grounded concept of "es­
tablishment" to forbid lesser connections between church and state, 
the Supreme Court has further attenuated the connection between 
modem doctrine and original intent. 
Finally, the Everson Court's assumption that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Establishment Clause and made it ap­
plicable to the States compounds these eighteenth-century indetermi­
nacies.74 Perhaps the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to 
incorporate some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, or per­
haps not.75 For the Establishment Clause, this familiar dispute has a 
72. At the time of ratification of the First Amendment, paradigmatic "establishments" 
still existed in Massachusetts and Connecticut, where a formal structure supported general 
taxation of the public and disbursement of revenue to churches and ministers. Originally, 
these systems supported only Congregationalist churches and ministers, but gradually this 
restriction was softened to allow disbursal of some funds to other state-certified Protestant 
denominations. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 20; LEVY, 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 29-42, 45-49. 
73. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at xiii ("The intuitively 
plausible conclusion - that government interaction with religion be conditioned on a neu­
trality among sects - is the historically demonstrable meaning of nonestablishment, and 
represents the fundamental alternative to what the Court has wrought."); id. at 135 ("A rig­
orous historical inquiry into the adoption of the Establishment Clause has shown that it pro­
hibits sect preference . . . .  "). 
74. Though Everson was the first Supreme Court decision to apply the Establishment 
Clause to the States, the Court's opinion does not specifically address that issue beyond 
noting that prior cases had incorporated the First Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 15 & n.22 (1947). 
75. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138-39 (1949) (arguing that the legislative history of the Four­
teenth Amendment disproves an intention to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the 
States); cf RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 134-35 (1977) (supporting Fairman's analysis); William 
Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Constillltional Limita­
tions on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1954) (disputing Fairman's conclusion). 
But see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
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special twist. If the original Establishment Clause aimed to confirm 
the exclusive authority of the States over religion, invoking that provi­
sion to disallow state aid to religion is paradoxical and perverse. In the 
words of Akhil Amar, "to apply the clause against a state government 
is precisely to eliminate [the state's] right to choose whether to estab­
lish a religion - a right clearly confirmed by the establishment clause 
itself. "76 In this respect, incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
presents difficulties additional to, and distinct from, those that attend 
the general issue.77 
Recognition of the special difficulty of incorporating the Estab­
lishment Clause has spawned inventive attempts to recover a suitable 
pedigree for modern doctrine. Although conceded originally to have 
been concerned with states' rights, the Establishment Clause is said by 
some to have acquired a substantive meaning in the years before Re­
construction, when the separationist philosophy that by then had be­
come engrafted onto that provision was applied against the States.78 
As an attempt to specify historical antecedents for current doctrine, 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-91 (1986) (rejecting Berger's analysis); Michael 
Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor 
Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 100-01 (1980) (same). But cf RAOUL BERGER, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 45-142 (1989) (rejecting Curtis' 
analysis). See generally Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 58-61 (1993) (summarizing the academic debate over incor­
poration and concluding in its favor). 
76. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33-
34 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS) . 
77. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 41-42, which distinguishes the Estab-
lishment Clause from other First Amendment guarantees on the following ground: 
The First Amendment, then, was not agnostic on whether speech, press, petition, assembly, 
and free exercise were liberties of citizens and good things. By contrast, the amendment was 
indeed agnostic on the issue of establishment. Congress had no more authority in the states 
to disestablish than to establish. Both actions were equally beyond Congress' delegated 
powers; and the unfettered choice between establishment and dis-establishment was given to 
the states. As a more pure federalism provision, then, the establishment clause seems con­
siderably more difficult to incorporate against states. 
See also Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 1 113, 1 142 (1988) ("The language of the fourteenth amendment, coupled with the 
federalistic motivation for the establishment clause, make it exceedingly difficult to argue 
that the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended to incorporate the es­
tablishment clause for application against the states."); Lietzau, Rediscovering the Estab­
lishment Clause, supra note 70, at 1210 ("While many specific Bill of Rights incorporations 
have been criticized, none are so thoroughly contradicted by the historically discernible in­
tentions of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause."). 
Of course, if the Establishment Clause was not a purely states'-rights provision but in­
stead adopted a substantive policy of church-state separation, then incorporation would be 
less problematic. See Laycock, Survey of Religious Liberty, supra note 71,  at 414-16. 
78. The best presentation of the story of the reinvention of the Establishment Clause is 
Lash, Second Adoption, supra note 70, at 1 135-37 (arguing that the "popular interpretation" 
changed from federalism to personal freedom). Something in the same direction appears in 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-55 
(1963) (Brennan J., concurring) (asserting that freedom of state involvement in religion was 
among the "panoply of new federal rights" created by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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such reasoning is plausible and ingenious. It may even be true. But 
equally plausible arguments can be made the other way, starting with 
the fact that Congress in 1876 approved (though not by the required 
supermajorities) a constitutional amendment that repeated the words 
of the Establishment Clause and explicitly made them applicable to 
the States.79 This would have been unnecessary if the Fourteenth 
Amendment had already accomplished that result. The point may not 
be conclusive, but it compounds the difficulty of applying a straight­
forward incorporation theory to the original prohibition of federal 
laws respecting an establishment of religion. 
All these historical issues are debatable, in part due to changed cir­
cumstances and in part due to the uncertain evidence regarding origi­
nal intent. The Framers said almost nothing about the Establishment 
Clause, and the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment even less.80 
Perhaps the safest inference that can be drawn from the historical rec­
ord is a "lack of interest amounting virtually to apathy toward the es­
tablishment clause. "81 Against this background, historical assertions of 
the sort made in Everson remain essentially speculative. 
The conclusion that we draw from this prehistory is modest and 
(should be) uncontroversial. When the Everson Court reached back to 
Virginia for the pedigree of modern separationism, the justices were 
not obeying a command from the Framers. They were making a 
79. The Blaine Amendment began, "No State shall make any law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion . . . .  " Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 60. 
The full text is quoted infra note 1 15. 
80. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 59-62 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (revealing only a few exchanges over the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause in the House and none in the Senate). Even scholars who find 
meaning in the shards of original history admit its inadequacy. E.g. , LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 79 ("The debate [as unreliably reported] was sometimes irrele­
vant, usually apathetic and unclear."). For the lack of record from the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1 131, 1 158 & 
n.132 (1993) (noting that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment often omitted any ref­
erence to the Establishment Clause in their discussions of individual rights); and Leitzau, 
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause, supra note 70, at 1208 (noting that the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment consistently ignored the Establishment Clause). 
81 .  DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: MAKING 
SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 71 (1991): 
In fact, all of these suggestions about how to interpret the establishment clause based on the 
framers' intentions are just short of complete speculation because they are based solely on 
the extremely sparse and highly questionable historical records. The records simply contain 
too little evidence. To the extent that we can broadly read the sense of the secondhand his­
torical documents, they most clearly show a lack of interest amounting virtually to apathy 
toward the establishment clause. 
Others have suggested, however, that the evidence is thin only if one is seeking support 
for a substantive interpretation of the Establishment Clause. If, however, one is open to the 
possibility that the original meaning protected only states' rights, the evidence may be more 
than sufficient. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 70, at 47-48 ("(Tjhe original 
meaning is not relevant in principle but unknowable in practice, as scholars like Drakeman 
suppose; it is, rather, knowable but unresponsive to present demands."). 
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choice. The past they imagined in Everson seemed obvious, natural, 
and clear to them because it fit so readily what they expected the Con­
stitution to say. The opinion itself suggests as much. It displays little 
research and zero interest in conflicting evidence, competing infer­
ences, or alternative interpretations.82 The casualness of the Court's 
history and the confidence of its pronouncements signal the lack of 
dependence between the two. In our view, Everson reflects less a clear 
directive from the Framing than the conventional understanding in 
mid-twentieth century America. The real origins of the modern Es­
tablishment Clause lay not so much (or at least not only) in the utter­
ances of Madison and Jefferson but in the political experiences and 
values that made aid to religious schools so problematic. 
B .  The Protestant Establishment 
The immediate reality faced by the Supreme Court in the mid­
twentieth century was the collapse of the Protestant establishment. 
For most of its history, public education in America had been un­
abashedly patriotic and unmistakably Protestant. Whatever the state 
of faith at the time of the Framing, by the middle third of the nine­
teenth century, when the common-school movement took hold, the 
nation had experienced a massive evangelical resurgence.83 Protestant 
ministers and churchmen led the common-school movement and took 
for granted "a congruence of purpose between the common school 
and the Protestant churches. "84 Civic leaders assumed "that Ameri­
canism and Protestantism were synonyms and that education and 
Protestantism were allies."85 Early common schools featured Bible 
reading, prayer, hymns, and holiday observances, all reinforced by the 
82. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 70, at 5 (dismissing Everson as a 
"dismal historical performance"); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Ex­
ercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1991) ("As a matter of judicial craftsmanship, it is striking 
in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court demon­
strated in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states, lan­
guage that had long served to protect the states against the federal government."); Note, 
Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1700, 1702 (1992) ("Significantly, Everson is devoid of any analysis justifying the incor­
poration of the Establishment Clause . . . .  "). 
83. 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 242 (1950) 
[hereinafter STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE] (describing the importance of the Great Awak­
ening); David B. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the American Common 
School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 212, 217 
(Paul Nash ed., 1970) [hereinafter Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers] . 
84. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 217. 
85. Timothy L. Smith, Protestant Schooling and American Nationality, 1800-1850, 53 J. 
AM. HIST. 679, 680 (1967) [hereinafter Smith, Protestant Schooling]. 
298 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:279 
exhortations of the teacher and the pervasive Protestantism of the 
texts.86 
The problem was that Protestantism was not one religion but 
many. In an age when genuinely secular public education was "simply 
inconceivable,"87 common-school advocates had to find a way to keep 
religion in the public schools but keep controversy out. They did so by 
promoting least-common-denominator Protestantism and rejecting 
particularistic influences. The architect of this strategy was Horace 
Mann, secretary of the nation's first board of education (in 
Massachusetts) from 1837-1849 and the leading figure in the common­
school movement.88 Mann himself was a Unitarian, and hence person­
ally liberal and latitudinal, but in Massachusetts, he had to contend 
with orthodox Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, and other 
Christian sects.89 Mann waged fierce battle with conservative critics, 
deriding their demands for more pronounced religious content as "sec­
tarian." Under that label, he banned doctrines "peculiar to specific 
denominations but not common to all. "9° Charges of "godlessness" 
were answered with a strategy described as "a stroke of genius."91 
Mann insisted on Bible reading, without commentary, as the founda­
tion of moral education. In his own words, "our system earnestly in­
culcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of relig­
ion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it 
allows it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system - to speak 
for itself "92 
86. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218. The first textbook widely 
used in the United States was the Hornbook, which contained only the alphabet and "the 
prayer the Saviour designed to teach, which children use, and parsons, when they preach." 
Later texts included the New England Primer and Noah Webster's Spelling Book, both of 
which included stories with religious and ethical lessons. 2 MARK SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES: 
THE UNITED STATES 1900-1925, at 88-89 (1927). Even math textbooks contained Christian 
propaganda, asking students, for example, how to ensure that when "15 Christians and 15 
Turks" are caught at sea in a storm and half need to be cast into the sea to save the other. 
half, one could devise a "random" lottery to make sure that all of the Christians are saved. 
PAUL BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 15 (1963) 
[hereinafter BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS]. 
87. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTI­
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY 57 (2000) [hereinafter MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST]. 
88. ROBERT MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 72, 73 n.9 (1970) [hereinafter 
MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL] (summarizing and citing sources on Mann's 
life). 
89. Id. at 71. 
90. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218; see also DONALD E. BOLES, 
THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 23-27 (1965) [hereinafter BOLES, THE 
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS] (describing Mann's role as the "great crusader against sec­
tarianism in the public schools"). 
91. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 69. 
92. Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board of Education, 
TWELFfH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION TOGETHER WITH THE 
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Though Protestants clashed on many questions, they agreed on the 
Bible. Bible reading in public school became the basis for a pan­
Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive Protestantism that, 
when augmented by specific doctrinal instruction at Sunday school, 
proved acceptable to all.93 Consequently, "most Protestant churches 
declared a truce with each other at the doors of the common school. "94 
The instruction behind those doors was nondenominational but em­
phatically not secular.95 A generalized Protestantism became the 
common religion of the common school. From its inception, therefore, 
American public education was religious but nonsectarian. Both char­
acteristics were essential to the consensus of support for the common 
school.96 
Of course, that consensus did not include Catholics.97 At the time 
of the Revolution, 30,000 Catholics lived in the new United States, 
barely one percent of the population.98 By 1830, that number had in­
creased to 600,000.99 By 1850, there were 1 .6 million U.S. Catholics,100 
and twice that many ten years later.101 The number quadrupled to 
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 116-17 (Mass. Bd. of 
Educ., Boston 1849) (emphasis in original). 
93. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 78-79 ("By stressing 
Bible reading in the school Mann detonated the heaviest bombs of his conservative critics. 
Few Protestants opposed that practice. The Bible, then, became a major symbol for common 
religion around which liberal and conservative Protestants could rally."). 
94. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218. 
95. ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
IN AMERICA, 1880-1920, at 15 (1991) [hereinafter HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT] 
("The schools were understood to be nondenominational but certainly not nonreligious."); 
Smith, Protestant Schooling, supra note 85, at 687 ("[I]t was not secularism but nondenomi­
national Protestantism which won the day."). 
96. MACEDO, 'DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 57 ("A remarkably broad 
consensus supported the new common schools, which could only succeed in a religiously plu­
ralistic environment if they were viewed by the vast majority of people as religious but non­
sectarian; that is, as capable of inculcating basic moral precepts rooted in religion while 
avoiding sectarian impulses."). 
97. Timothy L. Smith, Parochial Education and American Culture, in HISTORY AND 
EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 202 (Paul Nash ed., 1970) [hereinafter 
Smith, Parochial Education]. 
98. ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND 
HISTORICAL REALITIES 58 (1971) [hereinafter HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA). See also 
Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY 69 
(Stephan Themstrom et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Gleason, American Identity], who places 
the figure at 35,000. 
99. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 58. 
100. Gleason, American Identity, supra note 98, at 69; see also H. Frank Way, The Death 
of the Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State Relations, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 509, 
521 n.26 (1987) [hereinafter Way, The Death of the Christian Nation] (giving the figure of 1 .7 
million as of 1850). 
101. Gleason, American Identity, supra note 98, at 69. 
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twelve million in 1900, and doubled again by 1930.102 This population 
was mostly immigrant, in the early days mostly Irish, and mostly 
poor.103 They found the public schools unfriendly and inhospitable. 
Unaccompanied Bible reading, which was the cornerstone of the Prot­
estant consensus, was to Catholics an affront. Public school students 
read from the King James Version, which the Catholic Church did not 
recognize. Indeed, the very fact of a direct and unmediated approach 
to God contradicted Catholic doctrine. The Douay Bible provided not 
only the officially approved English translation of the Scriptures, but 
also authoritative annotation and comment. Reading the unadorned 
text invited the error of private interpretation. As one cleric put the 
point in 1840: "The Catholic church tells her children that they must 
be taught their religion by AUTHORITY - the Sects say, read the 
bible, judge for yourselves."104 
Religious conflict over Bible reading grew intense. In Maine and 
Massachusetts, Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for 
refusing to read from the Protestant Bible,105 and crowds in 
Philadelphia rioted over whether Catholic children could be released 
from the classroom during Bible reading. 106 Above the level of the 
street, the most important consequence of Protestant religiosity in the 
public schools was to confirm the determination of Catholics to go 
elsewhere. If the public schools were Protestant, the Catholics wanted 
their own schools, and for that, they needed money. 
The earliest confrontation over public funding came in New York, 
where by 1840 Catholics had considerable sway. Bishop John Hughes 
argued that if the State planned to educate all children under one roof, 
102. MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 24 (1990); Way, The Death of the Christian Nation, supra note 100, 
at 521 n.26. 
103. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 48-49. 
104. VINCENT P. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION 30 (1968), 
quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 69; see also THE BIBLE IN . THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI IN 
THE CASE OF MINOR V. BD. OF EDUC. OF CINCINNATI 64 (1870) ("[T)he Catholic appre­
hends danger from the uncommented and indiscriminate reading of the Bible."), quoted in 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 70. The same point was made in 
1840 by the Fourth Provincial Council of Baltimore, which included among Catholic objec­
tions to Bible reading that each child was habituated to the idea of private interpretation and 
invited to rely on his or her own understanding. RICHARD J. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR 
CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 275-76 (1937). 
105. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 391-92, 398-400 (1 854) (upholding the power of 
school officials to expel a student who refused to read the Protestant Bible); Commonwealth 
v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859) (holding that beating a student who re­
fused to read the Protestant Bible was within the discretion of public school officials). 
106. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 68-69. Anti-Catholic riot­
ing also broke out in Charlestown, Massachusetts, and Louisville, Kentucky, where twenty 
people were killed. Lash, Second Adoption, supra note 70, at 1119-20 (citing sources). 
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then it should exclude religion "in every shape and form. "107 Knowing 
that was impossible, however, he campaigned instead for state support 
of church schools. The Bishop's efforts so outraged Protestant and na­
tivist opinion that in 1842 the New York legislature prohibited funding 
of any school where "any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be 
taught, inculcated, or practiced."108 This episode united Protestants in 
defense of public education and against government funding for 
Catholic schools.109 The two sides refought the funding battle several 
times, until a state constitutional amendment in 1894 squashed a tem­
porary Catholic victory in New York City by banning any public 
money for church-related schools.U0 
For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twenti­
eth, the Protestant position was that public schools must be "nonsec­
tarian" (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and 
other Protestant observances) and public money must not support 
"sectarian" schools (which in practical terms meant Catholic). The 
self-interested underside of these propositions surfaced repeatedly. 
The Know-Nothing Party arose in the 1850s to fight immigration and 
Catholic influence. 1 1 1  Their 1856 platform demanded public education 
free from denominational influence, but simultaneously declared the 
Bible "the depository and fountain of all civil and religious freedom" 
and condemned any effort to remove it from the classroom.112 In 1869 
the National Teachers Association (forerunner of today's National 
Education Association) resolved both that "the appropriation of pub­
lic funds for the support of sectarian schools is a violation of the fun­
damental principles of our American system of education" and that 
"the Bible should not only be studied, venerated, and honored . . .  but 
devotionally read, and its precepts inculcated in all the common 
schools of the land."113 Most revealing is the Blaine Amendment, pro-
107. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 87 (quoting Bishop 
Hughes and citing sources). 
108. JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE 
THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 187 (1967), quoted in MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 88. 
109. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 88. 
1 10. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. 9, sec. 4, quoted in JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION, 
POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 252 
(1967). On receipt of public funds by the Catholic diocese of New York City, see Green, The 
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 42-43. 
1 1 1 .  1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STA TE, supra note 83, at 833-35. 
1 12. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 67-68. In 1854, Know-Nothing 
Party members won the governorship, every state senate seat, and all but two House seats in 
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts legislature then passed laws restricting elected office to 
native-born citizens and requiring the reading of the "common English" version of the Bible 
in public schools. 1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 836-37. 
113.  Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 221. 
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posed in 1875, which in 1876 passed the House of Representatives but 
fell just short of the two-thirds majority required in the Senate.114 The 
final version laboriously attempted to close every possible loophole 
through which public money might flow to religious schools, then 
added that nothing in this elaborately separationist provision should 
"be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or in­
stitution . . . .  "1 15 
The divide between Protestants and Catholics was not merely 
theological; it was also political, cultural, and in some sense racial. 
American Protestants saw their faith as allied with republicanism116 
and feared Catholicism as inimical to democracy. As Stephen Macedo 
noted, Americans 
could see that the still-young republic's core principles of individual free­
dom and democratic equality were at odds with the church's authoritar­
ian institutional structure, its long-standing association with feudal or 
monarchial governments, its insistence on close ties between church and 
state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of individual rights 
to freedom of conscience and worship . . . .  1 17 
Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the 
Church's legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements ideally suited 
to confirm the rankest prejudice. The Vatican "rejected, proscribed, 
and condemned" the possibility of genuinely secular public educa­
tion.1 18 Gregory XVI "greatly deplore[ d] the fact that, where the rav­
ings of human reason extend, there is somebody who studies new 
1 14. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 59-67. On the per­
sonal political background of Blaine's proposal, see Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine 
Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATH. HIST. REV. 15 (1956) 
(discussing Blaine's presidential ambitions and his desire to resolve doubts about his Protes­
tantism). 
115.  Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 60. The full text 
read: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; and no religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office or 
public trust under any State. No public property and no public revenue, nor any loan of 
credit by or under the authority of the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or 
municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to or made or used for the support of any 
school, educational or other institution under the control of any religious or anti-religious 
sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creeds or tenets shall be 
taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or insti­
tution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit; and no such appro­
priation or loan of credit shall be made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, 
or denomination or to promote its interests or tenets. This Article shall not be construed to 
prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution, and it shall not have the effect 
to impair the rights of property already vested. 
1 16. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 57 ("Many people viewed 
Protestantism as inseparable from the American republican idea."). 
1 17. Id. at 61. 
1 1 8. Papal Encyclical of 1864 ("reprobatam, proscriptam atque damnatam"), quoted in 
MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 123. 
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things and strives to know more than is necessary, against the advice 
of the apostle."119 And Pius IX ridiculed freedom of conscience as the 
"liberty of perdition."120 
The perception of Catholics as somehow un-American was forti­
fied by the fact that they were overwhelmingly immigrant, urban, and 
poor. All three characteristics threatened defenders of Protestant, ru­
ral America. For example, Josiah Strong, a prominent evangelical and 
author of Our Country, a best-seller of the 1880s, freely mixed relig­
ious and social issues in his list of seven perils facing the nation. They 
were, in order: immigration, Catholicism, Mormonism, intemperance, 
socialism, wealth, and the city.121 
Finally, the shift in origin of nineteenth-century immigration from 
Ireland to central and southern Europe reinforced the racial element 
in anti-Catholic animosity.122 As the nineteenth century advanced, 
Protestants increasingly trumpeted their Anglo-Saxon heritage. Thus, 
the Reverend James M. King, a Methodist from New York, opined 
that the "most important lesson in the history of modern civilization is, 
that God is using the Anglo-Saxon to conquer the world for Christ by 
dispossessing feeble races, and assimilating and molding others."123 
And the Southern Baptists spoke for white Protestants on both sides 
of the Mason-Dixon line when they said, in 1890, that God had com­
mitted the world's salvation to the "Anglo-Saxon race."124 
All these swirling sentiments came to a point in controversies over 
the public schools. Catholic educational separatism challenged the 
Protestant vision of a Christian America.125 Protestants responded by 
trying to keep Bible reading in the public schools and to interdict 
1 19. Gregory XVI, Singulari Nos, Jun. 25, 1834, quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND 
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 61. 
120. Pius IX, Quanta Cura, Dec. 8, 1864, quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND 
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 61 .  
121 .  JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY: ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS 
30--144 (New York, Baker & Taylor Co., 1885); see also HANDY, UNDERMINED 
ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 95, at 17-18 (describing Strong's views). 
122. See RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 47 (1972) 
[hereinafter MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION] ("The nineteenth century 
was pockmarked by this virulent fusion of hostility to the newcomer and inherited No­
Popery ."). 
123. James M. King, The Christian Resources of Our Country, in NATIONAL PERILS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 272 (1887), quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, 
at 106. 
124. RUFUS B. SPAIN, AT EAST IN ZION 125 (1967), quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA, supra note 98, at 106-07 ("[T]he religious destiny of the world is lodged in the 
hands of the English-speaking people. To the Anglo-Saxon race God seems to have commit­
ted the enterprise of the world's salvation."). 
125. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 104 ("Criticism of the public 
schools seemed to most Protestants to eat away at the foundations of the Christian America 
they envisioned."). 
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funding of sectarian education. These efforts were basically defensive. 
As the nineteenth century advanced and Catholic power grew, Protes­
tants sought to entrench their former dominance in constitutions and 
statutes. 
For Bible reading, such efforts were only marginally successful. As 
early as 1869, the school board in Cincinnati, then one of the most re­
ligiously heterogeneous of American cities, voted to ban Bible read­
ing, hymns, and religious instruction in the public schools.126 The re­
sulting firestorm of protest prompted litigation all the way to the Ohio 
Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the school board was 
permitted to omit religious instruction if it wished.127 Some urban cen­
ters with large Catholic populations followed suit. In the 1870s, New 
York City, Chicago, Buffalo, and Rochester banned Bible reading in 
the public schools.128 Indeed, by the early twentieth century, a few 
state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious obser­
vances in public school as violative of state constitutions,129 though 
most courts continued to approve these practicesY0 In rural areas and 
throughout the South, Bible reading remained commonplace, but con­
troversies in northern cities made many Protestants aware for the first 
time of the assault on their religious and cultural hegemony.131 Where 
they could, conservatives responded with coercive legislation requiring 
daily Bible reading in public school, but Protestant opinion on that 
question was never unanimous,132 and such laws passed in only a mi­
nority of jurisdictions.133 
126. This episode is recounted in detail in MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, 
supra note 88, at 89-98. The school board was said to comprise eighteen Protestants, ten 
Catholics, two Jews, and ten "others." Id. at 93 (citing sources). 
127. Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872) ("The Constitution [of 
Ohio) does not enjoin or require religious instruction, or the reading of religious books, in 
the public schools of the state."). 
128. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 47 (citing sources). 
129. For decisions forbidding assigned Bible reading in public schools, see People ex rel. 
Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 116  
(La. 1915); State ex rel. Freeman v .  Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb. 1902); State ex rel. Finger v .  
Weedman, 226 N.W. 348 (S.D. 1929); State ex rel. Dearle v .  Frazier, 173 P. 35  (Wash. 1918); 
and State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890). 
130. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 102 n.162 
(1989) (citing decisions, approving Bible reading, from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas). 
131. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 47. 
132. I llustrative of the lack of Protestant unanimity on Bible reading were the state Re­
publican conventions held in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont in March 1876. All three 
supported the Blaine Amendment, but declined to take a position on Bible reading in the 
public schools. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 56. 
133. ALVIN JOHNSON & FRANK H. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 33 (1948) (identifying Massachusetts as the only state to legislate manda­
tory Bible reading in the nineteenth century, followed by Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Tennessee, New Jersey, Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Kentucky, Florida, Idaho, Arkansas, and 
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Efforts to lock in the other half of the Protestant position proved 
more successful. Though the Blaine Amendment failed, many States 
incorporated similar provisions in their state constitutions, often be­
cause Congress required them to do so as a condition for admission to 
the Union. By 1890, twenty-nine of the forty-five States had strongly 
worded constitutional prohibitions on the use of public money to sup­
port sectarian schools.134 Long before anyone realized that the Estab­
lishment Clause embodied a rigorous substantive policy against state 
aid to religious schools or that the Fourteenth Amendment had ap­
plied that policy to the States, state courts banned public funding of 
"sectarian" education under their versions of the Blaine Amend­
ment.135 These provisions no doubt reflected many ideas and agendas, 
but prominent among them were religious rivalry and anti-Catholic 
prejudice. In Everson and its progeny, the Supreme Court applied this 
legacy to the nation. At least in its historical antecedents, the constitu­
tional ban against aid to sectarian schools was indeed a doctrine "born 
of bigotry." 
C. Post-Protestant America 
By the mid-1930s, according to historian Robert T. Handy, " [t]he 
Protestant era in American life had come to its end."136 Supplanting 
the informal Protestant establishment of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was the recognition that real Americans now came 
in three varieties: Protestant, Catholic, and Jew.137 Protestants re­
mained the most numerous and continued to dominate many political, 
the District of Columbia in the twentieth); BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra 
note 90, at 51 (same information). 
134. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 18, at 673 (1998). 
135. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 70 (noting that, between 1876 
and 1913, thirty-three States passed constitutional amendments prohibiting state aid to paro­
chial schools). 
136. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 213; see also BLANSHARD, 
RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 86, at 6-7 (describing 1940 as the beginning of the 
"Post-Protestant" period); MARTIN E. MARTY, THE NEW SHAPE OF AMERICAN RELIGION 
72 (1958) [hereinafter MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION] (arguing that Protestant America, by 
the 1950s, had become "as obsolete as the side-wheel showboat, the cigar-store Indian, or 
the Fourth of July oration"). 
137. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955) [hereinafter HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW] (de­
scribing how the three religions became equal parts of a larger, common faith in the "Ameri­
can Way of Life"); MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125 
("In contrast with the 19th century public religion, that of the mid-1940s was increasingly 
referred to as the distillation of 'Three Great Faiths.' "); Klarman, Rethinking the Revolu­
tions, supra note 13, at 53-56 (describing how the influx of Jewish and Catholic immigrants 
eventually dismantled the Protestant consensus and hegemony of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries). 
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social, and economic institutions,138 but the identification of America 
as a specifically Protestant nation was becoming harder and harder to 
maintain.139 For the most part, Protestants understood and accepted 
the new religious pluralism. As one observer reported in 1955, Protes­
tants "are particularly conscious, perhaps, of their coexistence with the 
Roman Catholics, but they are also generally ready to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the Jewish community as a thoroughly American in­
stitution. " 140 
At the same time, many Protestants continued to fear Catholic 
power. 141 By the mid-1940s, Catholics were the country's largest de­
nomination.142 In an increasingly urban nation, they dominated many 
major cities. 143 In addition to growing in number, Catholics also ad­
vanced socially and economically, reaching by the mid-1930s "a posi­
tion of respect and integration in public life in the United States."144 
With this growth and assimilation came newfound confidence, which 
surfaced in the increased assertiveness with which Catholics de­
manded aid for parochial schools. 145 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Catholics had convinced some state legisla­
tures to help parochial schools pay for textbooks and bus transporta­
tion. By the time the Court decided Everson, twenty-two States had 
138. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 227 (reporting that, as 
of 1955, roughly 68% of Americans self-identified themselves as Protestants); Ronald James 
Boggs, Culture of Liberty: History of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
1947-1973, at 5 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with 
the Ohio State University Library) [hereinafter Boggs, History of Americans United] (not­
ing that Protestants maintained a "disproportionate share of economic, social, and political 
power and status in the 1940s. As individuals, they dominated most of the important 
American institutions and established norms for American culture"). 
139. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 206-08. 
140. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 139. Of course, in ru­
ral areas and small towns, Protestantantism remained "virtually identical with the American 
people," id. , and many Protestants continued to identify American culture as essentially 
Protestant. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5-6. 
141.  Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict over Church and State, 14 COMMENTARY 450, 
453-55 (1952) [hereinafter Herberg, Sectarian Conflict]; Boggs, History of Americans 
United, supra note 138, at 11-12. 
142. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 6. 
143. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 168 ("The great cen­
ters of Catholic strength were the cities, some of which (Buffalo, Boston, New York) showed 
an actual majority, or very nearly a majority, of Catholics, and other very strong minori­
ties."); MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 74 ("Catholicism controls the ur­
ban centers with few exceptions outside the South and America is now a nation of urban 
dominance."); cf. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 208 (noting that by the 
end of the 1930s, "there were few American cities in which Protestant forces had a signifi­
cant hold on the larger community to speak for it religiously"). 
144. GEORGE Q. FLYNN, AMERICAN CATHOLICS & THE ROOSEVELT PRESIDENCY: 
1932-1936, at 240 (1968). 
145. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 10-11.  
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authorized transportation for children attending parochial schools.146 
Although even this limited aid caused controversy, it was relatively 
muted, in part because most States enacting aid legislation had size­
able Catholic populations.147 In 1937, the issue became national and 
intensely controversial. In that year, the nascent drive for federal aid 
to education showed signs of strength, and the Roman Catholic 
Church switched from opposing federal aid to religious schools (out of 
fear that it would lead to federal control) to asking for federal tax 
dollars to support parochial schools.148 The Catholic schools question 
would dominate discussion regarding federal aid for nearly two dec­
ades and transmute the issue from one of state choice to one of na­
tional constitutional law. 
The third group in the triad of American religions was the smallest. 
Although the Jewish population increased threefold in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, Jews in the 1930s and 1940s re­
mained a tiny minority, between two and three percent.149 Like Catho­
lics, they made great strides economically and socially during the first 
half of the twentieth century, beginning a march of progress that 
would make Jews "the most successful minority group by almost any 
standard."150 Jewish achievement stemmed in part from their emphasis 
on education. Jewish parents "were passionately concerned with giv­
ing their children an education," and they insisted that the education 
be secular.151 Perhaps as a consequence, Jewish opinion on church­
state relations was intensely separationist, and Jews would play a 
prominent role both in resisting aid to religious schools and m ex­
cluding religion from public education.152 
146. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
OF CHURCH AND STATE 27-32 (1976) [hereinafter SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION]; 
Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54. 
147. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54. 
148. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23. 
149. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 164. 
150. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 47 ("Jews are the most 
successful minority group in America by almost any standard . . . .  By every measure - edu­
cation, income, professional status - Jews are disproportionately well off."); MARTY, 
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 75 ("Jewish culture [by the 1950s] has come [like 
Catholic culture] to take a similarly responsible place in political life, in the entertainment 
world, in literature and the arts, nearly controlling them in many urban centers."); Klarman, 
Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 51-53 (describing social and economic integra­
tion of Jews in first several decades of the twentieth century). 
151 .  On the importance that Jews placed on education, see HERBERG, PROTESTANT­
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 22, 203-04. On Jewish insistence that public education be 
secular, see id. at 254-55. 
152. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 231-35; FOWLER ET 
AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 48-49, 76; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125-26; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 
457-59. 
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Their prominence in these debates sprang not only from their posi­
tion in society and from their commitment to the issue, but also from 
the special weight given Jewish views on religious freedom in the af­
termath of the Holocaust.153 As the enormity of the crimes against 
Jews began to sink in, claims by Jews on issues of religious freedom 
gained special resonance. Jews thus not only were motivated to pro­
tect public schools from religious influences; they also had special 
clout in advocating church-state separation. Even if they did not con­
stitute anything close to a third of America's population, on church­
state issues Jews laid an equal claim to America's conscience.154 
The splintering of a Protestant nation into three great faiths also 
reinforced a growing public secularism, especially among educated 
elites. That secularism usually did not deny or condemn religious be­
lief.155 On the contrary, most persons we would call secularists were af­
filiated with a church.156 But increasingly, many Americans took the 
view that in a nation of diverse belief, public observances and gov­
ernmental policies should respect all faiths. As one prominent Protes­
tant leader asked in 1937: "On what ground can we expect the gov-
153. Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J.L. & REL. 591, 
594-601 (1994-95); Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 54-59. 
154. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 40-55; Klarman, Re­
thinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 56. 
155. Exceptions included John Dewey, an important figure in philosophy and especially 
the philosophy of education, who argued as early as 1908 that religion and morality could 
indeed be separated. For Dewey, morality was properly considered a secular concept, which 
flowed from social interaction rather than divine will. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, 
supra note 87, at 139-45; Harvey G. Neufeldt, Religion, Morality and Schooling: Forging the 
Nineteenth Century Protestant Consensus, in RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN 
SCHOOLING 21 (Thomas C. Hunt & Marilyn M. Maxson eds., 1981). Dewey specifically 
urged that public schools should not teach any religious dogma, but instead should promote 
democratic ideals as if these ideals were themselves religious. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND 
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 142 ("Dewey's great aim, therefore, was to promote a society 
unified around a progressive democratic religion."). Dewey was not alone in his quest; other 
public intellectuals made similar arguments, and in 1933, a number of them signed the Hu­
manist Manifesto, which argued that America should be a strictly secular society. See 
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 23 (1984). As Paul Blanshard, one of the signers of the Manifesto and later quite 
active in Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, 
explained: "We have an obligation to expose and attack the world of religious miracles, 
magic, Bible-worship, salvationism, heaven, hell, and all the mythical deities. We should 
[specifically attack] such quack millenialists as Bill Graham and such embattled reactionaries 
as [the pope] because they represent the two greatest humanist aggregates in our society." 
Id. 
156. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 13-16, 52-54 (de-
. scribing mid-century paradox of pervasive secularism coexisting with sign of pervasive re­
ligiosity, including high church membership and attendance). Even those who were not ad­
herents of any religion were, as one commentator aptly observed, "imperfectly irreligious," 
WILLARD L. SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 256 (1948), insofar as they "tend(ed) to re­
gard religion as vaguely a 'good thing.' " ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 346 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, AMERICAN 
SOCIETY]. 
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ernment of a country in which half the people are not even nominally 
Christians, to lay down policies which are specifically related to Chris­
tianity?"157 
Describing public secularists with precision is difficult, in part be­
cause secularism was (and remains) not so much an articulated phi­
losophy as an underlying, pervasive, and almost unconscious means of 
organizing life and thought. 158 In general, public secularists treated re­
ligious belief as personal and in some sense private. They relegated 
specific religious beliefs to the private sphere, often while endorsing a 
vague public religiosity designed to include all - or at least to offend 
none.159 Polling data round out the picture of this kind of secularism 
and confirm its ubiquity. In a survey conducted in 1948, the vast ma­
jority of respondents indicated that they believed in God and that re­
ligion was "very important" in their lives. Yet 54 % of these respon­
dents also said that their religious beliefs had no effect on their ideas 
of politics and business.160 This paradox exemplified post-World War 
II America. While the overwhelming majority of Americans professed 
religious belief and claimed membership in one of the three American 
religions, many also contributed to a pervasive public secularism. 161 As 
157. Statement of Samuel McCrea Cavert, quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, 
supra note 98, at 212. Cavert was the general secretary of the Federal Council of Churches, 
which was founded in 1908 and at the time the leading and largest Protestant organization, 
representing mainline and some Eastern Orthodox denominations and by extension millions 
of individual Protestants. Id.; see also HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 
95, at 118-21; HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 134. The Federal 
Council of Churches has since been renamed the National Council of Churches and remains 
the largest single organization of Protestants. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, 
supra note 1 1 ,  at 65-67; see also infra text accompanying notes 437-458. 
158. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 13. 
159. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 253-57; Herberg, Sec­
tarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459; Roy Wallis & Steve Bruce, Secularization: The Ortho­
dox Model, in RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION 8 (Steve Bruce ed., 1992); Bryan R. Wilson, 
Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy, in RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION 195 (Steve 
Bruce ed., 1992). For an interesting and informative overview of secularization theory, which 
defends the core idea that religion declined in social significance in the twentieth century, 
see David Yamane, Secularization on Trial: In Defense of the Neosecularization Paradigm, 
36 J. SCI. STUD. OF REL. 109 (1997); see also Wilson, supra, at 210 (observing that "histori­
ans, sociologists, economists [and] psychologists" all "take secularization for granted," and 
suggesting that it is possible that they "could be overlooking a social force of paramount im­
portance" in the fields in which they are expert, "but I doubt it"). For explication of the idea 
that religion has shifted from the public to the private realm, see JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC 
RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 6-40 (1994) [hereinafter CASANOVA, PUBLIC 
RELIGIONS]. 
160. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 85-86. 
161. Id. at 13-14 (describing data indicating that while Bible distribution reached an all­
time high during the five-year period from 1949 to 1953, and four-fifths of Americans polled 
said they believe the Bible to be the "revealed word of God," a majority of Americans could 
not name even one of the first four books of the New Testament). The paradoxical trend has 
continued to the present today. As Godfrey Hodgson said of contemporary society, "deeply 
embedded religious life flourishes in the midst of a society that is in its public, political, busi­
ness, and cultural life firmly secular." HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 
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one commentator described, that secularism essentially involved 
"thinking and living in terms of a framework of reality and value re­
mote from the religious beliefs simultaneously professed."162 
Public secularism also surfaced in a growing faith in what has been 
called the "Religion of Democracy" or "the American Way of Life."163 
Many Americans who self-identified as Protestant, Catholic, or Jew in 
fact subscribed to a common structure of belief, synthesizing 
all that commends itself to the American as the right, the good, and the 
true in actual life. It embrace[d] such seemingly incongruous elements as 
sanitary plumbing and freedom of opportunity, Coca-Cola and an intense 
faith in education - all felt as moral questions relating to the proper way 
of life.164 
Among the ingredients in this secular religion was religion itself. 
Although Americans increasingly disregarded (or transcended) their 
specific religious affiliations, they were expected to profess belief in 
God.165 As William Lee Miller put it, Americans' faith was "not in 
God but in faith itself."166 The differences among religious beliefs re­
ceded before the conviction that all three great religions supported the 
overarching American faith in democracy and in itself.167 For many, 
the three great religions represented simply "different boats heading 
11 ,  at 164; accord ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA 33 (1989); 
Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing 
Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 1 ,  8-10 (1993-94). 
162. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 14; see also MARTY, 
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 76-78. The Lynds' famous Middletown study sup­
ports the secularism that Herberg describes. When they studied Middletown in the 1920s, 
the Lynds discovered a significant gap between religious theory and actual practice; by the 
mid-1930s the gap had developed into a chasm "so wide that the entire institution of religion 
has tended to be put on the defensive." See HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, 
at 208. 
163. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 87-104; MARTY, 
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 78-89. 
164. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88-89; see a/so 
MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 78-83 (describing similar tenets of the 
religion of democracy). 
165. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88, 97-98. 
166. William Lee Miller, Piety Along the Potomac, THE REPORTER, Aug. 17, 1954, 
quoted in HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88 (He continued: 
"[W]e worship not God but our own worshiping."). 
167. OSCAR HANDLIN, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 222 
(1954) ("Creedal differences still divided Americans into more than two hundred and fifty 
distinct sects. But those differences now faded in importance."); HERBERG, PROTESTANT­
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 101 (suggesting that the three American faiths had come 
to be seen by many "as three diverse, but equally legitimate, equally American, expressions 
of an over-all American religion"); WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 156, at 337 
(arguing that Americans had "a marked tendency to regard religion as good because it is 
useful in furthering other major values," and thus the Christian and Jewish faiths were 
prized insofar as they promoted values and standards of behavior that Americans were ex­
pected to share). 
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for the same shore."168 Dwight D. Eisenhower captured this relation­
ship when he said that "[o]ur government makes no sense unless it is 
founded in a deeply felt religious faith - and I don't care what it is."169 
To a European, such a statement would have seemed heretical or silly, 
but Americans understood their leader perfectly. Eisenhower was not 
voicing indifference to religion but rather "the conviction that at bot­
tom the three great faiths were really saying the same thing in affirm­
ing the spiritual ideals and moral values of the American Way of 
Life."17° For many Americans, religion had become merely the 
"handmaiden to democracy."171 Aside from the vague sense that re­
ligion was a good thing, national life was becoming increasingly secu­
lar. 
In this essentially secular concept of the role of faith, no denomina­
tion could demand public support for specifically denominational 
goals; to do so would have been an act of heresy against the common 
religion of democracy.172 This is where the Catholic Church got into 
trouble. To be sure, the secularization of faith and the reality of relig­
ious pluralism influenced the American Catholic Church. The tradi­
tional Catholic endorsement of church-state union remained in place 
in church manuals throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 
but American Catholic leaders increasingly took a different line, re-
168. MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 86. 
169. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before Directors of Freedoms Foundation (Dec. 
22, 1952), in N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1952, at 16. President George H.W. Bush made a similar 
statement years later, when referring admiringly to this "Nation's Judaeo-Christian moral 
heritage and . . .  the timeless values that have united Americans of all religions and all walks 
of life: love of God and family, personal responsibility and virtue, respect for the law, and 
concern for others." Proclamation No. 6508, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2313 (Nov. 20, 
1992). 
170. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 98. 
171. Arthur Mann, Charles Fleischer's Religion of Democracy, 16 COMMENT. 557 
(1954). For further discussion of Mann's article, see MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra 
note 136, at 78. 
172. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 98-99. Herberg argues 
that, by mid-century, the notion that no single church or religion should be favored by the 
state had become 
something quite axiomatic to the American. This feeling, more than anything else, is the 
foundation of the American doctrine of the 'separation of church and state,' for it is the 
heart of this doctrine that the government may not do anything that implies the pre­
eminence or superior legitimacy of one church over another. 
Id. at 99; cf John Coleman Bennett, Patterns of Church-State Relations - Grounds for Sepa­
ration, in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 174 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. 
Drakeman eds., Beacon Press 1987) (1965). Writing in 1958, Bennett, who was president of 
the influential and prestigious Union Theological Seminary in New York City, observed: 
Id. 
Today when Church-State problems are discussed in this country the one concern that ranks 
above all others is the fear that one Church or a group of Churches may finally be able to 
use the state to bring about discrimination against citizens on grounds of religion or to limit 
the freedom of any religious bodies. 
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nouncing any desire to establish Catholicism as the national religion in 
the United States.173 Speaking for the Catholic hierarchy in 1948, 
Archbishop John T. McNicholas declared: "We deny absolutely and 
without qualification that the Catholic Bishops of the United States 
are seeking a union of church and state by any endeavors whatsoever, 
either proximate or remote. If tomorrow Catholics constituted a ma­
jority in our country, they would not seek a union of church and 
state."174 Nevertheless, the Catholic Church during this period aggres­
sively sought aid for Catholic schools. In so doing, they revived Protes­
tant and Jewish anxieties about Catholic domination. Just as impor­
tant, they threatened what had become the high church of the 
Religion of Democracy: the public school.175 
1 .  The New Coalition Against A id to Religious Schools 
In this post-Protestant America, where citizens feared the Catholic 
Church and revered the public schools, the inherited antipathy for aid 
to religious schools commanded wide support. In many ways, the 
Catholic Church's growing strength proved to be a weakness, as it mo­
tivated non-Catholics to oppose the Church's demand for school aid. 
Thus, while the Church had limited success in securing state subsidies 
for some parochial school expenses in the 1920s and 1930s, the effort 
173. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 164-65. 
174. The Catholic Church in American Democracy, press release of the National Catho­
lic Welfare Conference, Jan. 26, 1948, quoted in HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, 
supra note 137, at 165. Earlier Catholic leaders made similar statements, including Cardinal 
Gibbons, who declared in 1916 that Catholics preferred the American form of government 
to any other. "The separation of church and state in this country seems to [Catholics] the 
natural, inevitable, and best conceivable plan, the one that would work best among us, both 
for the good of religion and of the state . . . .  No establishment of religion is being dreamed of 
here, of course . . . .  " 1 JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS, A RETROSPECT OF FIFTY YEARS 210-
11 (1916); see also Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5-6 (describing 
position of Catholic "Americanists," who supported religious pluralism and the separation of 
church and state). Not all Catholic leaders agreed with the "Americanist" position, to be 
sure, and some continued to argue in favor of the traditional Catholic state. See, e.g. , John A. 
Ryan, Comments on the Christian Constitution of States, in THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 
29-39 (John A. Ryan & M.F.X. Millar eds., 1922). Ryan argued that the "State should offi­
cially recognize the Catholic religion as the religion of the commonwealth." Did this mean 
that other religions would not be tolerated? Ryan's response could not have provided much 
comfort to non-Catholics: "Much depends on circumstances," he wrote, "and much depends 
upon what is meant by toleration." Id. at 34-35. 
175. On reviving Protestant and Jewish fears, see, e.g., BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND 
THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 455-59; 
and Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 11-13. On the status of the pub­
lic school as the "church" of the religion of democracy, see MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND 
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 141 (noting that Dewey believed in the religion of democracy 
and that the "high church of this civil religion . . .  was the public school"); and MARTY, 
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 80 (Arguing that the religion of democracy "has 
few temples or churches or synagogues. But it has an 'established church' in the field of pub­
lic education."). 
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to secure federal aid in the late 1930s provoked intense resistance. 176 
During the 1940s and 1950s, certain States and cities (usually with sub­
stantial Catholic populations) provided incidental aid to religious 
schools, but the weight of opinion in the nation as a whole remained 
decidedly hostile.177 Three powerful segments of society opposed the 
Catholic position: almost all Protestants, who remained cohesive on 
this issue; almost all Jews; and public secularists.178 
The first and most important constituency in the anti-aid coalition 
was the Protestant faithful. The demise of the informal Protestant es­
tablishment in the early twentieth century did not cause Protestants to 
rethink their views on school aid. If anything, Protestants became 
more united in their opposition; mainline denominations and funda­
mentalists, leaders and flocks, all came together to oppose public 
funding of religious schools.179 
In 1941, for example, three Baptist groups - the Southern Bap­
tists, the Northern Baptists, and the National Baptists - formed the 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs.180 The Committee organ­
ized to present a unified Baptist position on issues of church and state 
and to combat the increasing power and influence of the Catholic 
Church. 181 From the outset, the Committee took a strictly separationist 
position, opposing the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican, 
lobbying (at least initially) against federal education bills that included 
some aid to parochial schools, and arguing against the use of public 
funds to provide transportation to parochial schools.182 
One year after the creation of the Baptist Joint Committee, fun­
damentalist and evangelical churches formed the National Association 
of Evangelicals ("NAE"), which also favored strict separation of 
church and state, "especially as the state might interrelate with the 
176. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23. 
177. Id. ; Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54. 
178. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 121-23; MORGAN, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 81-88; Wilber G. Katz & Harold 
P. Southerland, Religious Pluralism and the Supreme Court, 96 DAEDALUS 180, 188 (1967). 
179. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5. 
180. Id. at 7; Stan Halsey, The History and Contributions of the Baptist Joint Committee 
on Public Affairs, 20 BAPTIST HIST. & HERITAGE 35, 36-37 (1985); [hereinafter Halsey, 
Baptist Joint Committee]; Walfred Peterson, The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs 
and the Amicus Curiae Brief, 66 MID-AMERICA 121, 122 n.4 (1984) [hereinafter Peterson, 
Baptist Joint Committee]. 
181 .  RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA 54 (1968) [hereinafter MORGAN, POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT]; 
Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 7. 
182. RICHARD V. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE: EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY AND 
POLITICAL CONSERVATISM 67-68 (1970) [hereinafter PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE]; 
Halsey, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 36-37; Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, 
supra note 180, at 122-24. 
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Roman Catholic Church."183 The NAE opposed aid to religious 
schools, as well as the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican.184 
On school-aid issues, the Baptist Joint Committee and the NAE allied 
with the largest of all Protestant organizations, the National Council of 
Churches ("NCC"), which represented the bulk of mainline Protes­
tantism.185 Like its smaller counterparts, the NCC took a separationist 
stance on aid to religious schools.186 Taken together, these three 
groups represented an enormous and diverse constituency, from the 
liberal mainline churches to the conservative fundamentalist ones.187 
All saw the Catholic Church as a potential threat - a threat to Protes­
tants, to the public schools, to religious freedom and, indeed, to de­
mocracy itself. 188 
By the time the Court decided Everson in February of 1947, the 
Protestant-Catholic battle over church and state, and especially over 
the funding of religious schools, was well underway. Protestant groups 
had helped kill a 1945 proposal to provide federal funds to private 
schools, including religious ones.189 In 1946, Protestants protested en 
masse against President Truman's decision to appoint an ambassador 
to the Vatican.190 And in January of 1947, Protestant groups rose in 
opposition to a bill introduced by Senator Taft of Ohio that would 
have provided federal aid to religious schools where such aid was not 
prohibited by state law.191 In explaining why Protestants should oppose 
the bill, the editor of the Christian Century argued that preventing 
" ·  
183. Boggs, History of  Americans United, supra note 138, a t  9 .  
184. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, a t  72-80. 
185. The National Council of Churches, created in 1950, was a successor organization to 
the Federal Council of Churches, which was formed in 1908. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA, supra note 98, at 171-74, 221; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 
138, at 7. 
186. See, e.g. , General Assembly of NCC, Letter to Christian People of America, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1952, at 17 [hereinafter Letter to Christian People] ; see also BOLES, THE 
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 233. 
187. The NCC alone represented approximately thirty-five million Protestants. BOLES, 
THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 233; HERBERG, PROTESTANT­
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 139; Letter to Christian People, supra note 186, at 17. The 
Baptist Joint Committee represented about fifteen million Baptists when founded in 1941, 
and the NAE represented 1.5 million evangelicals and fundamentalists by 1947. Boggs, His­
tory of Americans United, supra note 138, at 7-9. 
188. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 120, 141-42; 
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 87-88; Boggs, History 
of Americans United, supra note 138, at 33-34, 40. 
189. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 21 .  
190. Id. at 14-16; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 
85. 
191. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 22-26. 
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Catholics from getting public funds would help preserve America as a 
Protestant nation.192 
Everson both affirmed and affronted the Protestant position. On 
the one hand, the separationist rhetoric of both majority and dissent 
confirmed the understanding of American Protestants that the Consti­
tution itself condemned school aid. Nothing in the opinions led Protes­
tants to doubt either the historical foundation or the constitutional le­
gitimacy of their position. To the contrary, the Everson opinions told 
Protestants that hostility to parochial schools sprang not from sectar­
ian rivalry or narrow self-interest but from high principle. On the 
other hand, the actual result of the case - in which the Court ap­
proved transportation funding for parochial schools - sparked alarm. 
Protestant periodicals, organizations, and leaders issued dire warnings 
about Catholic inroads on the separation of church and state. Editori­
als in the Christian Century expressed the hope that Everson would 
wake the mass of Protestants to Catholic encroachments on the wall of 
separation,193 while Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian leaders spoke 
ominously of the Catholic Church's "determined and adroit cam­
paign" to alter the traditional American understanding of the proper 
relationship of church and state.194 
Protestant leaders formed a new organization to combat the 
Catholic threat. In May of 1947, leaders of Protestant denominations 
and organizations - including representatives from the Baptist Joint 
Committee and the predecessor of the National Council of Churches 
- launched Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separa­
tion of Church and State ("POAU").195 Its sole purpose was "the 
maintenance of the American principle of separation of church and 
state."196 Although POAU tried (not always successfully) to refrain 
from crass prejudice, it did not shrink from openly criticizing the 
Catholic Church. Shortly after its founding, for example, POAU sent 
the New York Times an "Open Letter" accusing Catholic leaders of 
trying to subvert the Constitution.197 Similarly, POAU helped lead the 
opposition to President Truman's reappointment of an ambassador to 
1 92. CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
(1947) (discussed in Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 25). 
193. Editorial, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 26, 1947, at 262-63. 
194. This statement came from the Reverend Louis Newton, President of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, and is quoted in MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, su­
pra note 122, at 83. For similar statements by Methodist and Presbyterian leaders, see id. at 
82-83; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 28-30. 
195. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 77; SORAUF, WALL OF 
SEPARATION, supra note 1 46, at 33; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 
42-43. 
196. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 59. 
197. PAOU, An Open Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1948, at 20. 
316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:279 
the Vatican and aggressively fought against legislative or judicial ap­
proval of any aid to religious schools.198 
This unified and energized Protestant opposition to school aid was 
strongly supported by American Jewry. Believing that Jewish freedom 
depended on a secular society, Jewish groups were even more ada­
mant than Protestants in demanding separation of church and state.199 
Jews opposed any interaction of church and state when it came to 
schools, and Jewish groups joined Protestants in court and before leg­
islatures in arguing against any aid to religious institutions.200 This po­
sition reflected not only the general Jewish preference for seculariza­
tion of a largely Christian nation, but also a specific fear of the 
Catholic Church and its burgeoning political strength. For Jews, the 
Catholic Church remained the greatest threat to a secular society and 
the source of the historic Christian intolerance of Jews. The Catholic 
Church, in Jewish eyes, remained "the standard form of Christianity 
and the prime symbol of Christian persecution. Deep down, it is 
Catholic domination that is feared. "201 From this perspective, aid to 
religious schools was another example of Catholic assertiveness and 
political strength, and fighting against such aid preserved religious lib­
erty.202 
Protestants and Jews also resisted funding of religious schools in 
order to protect public education. The desire to preserve the public 
schools and their mission of assimilating students from diverse back­
grounds reinforced less lofty reasons for opposing aid to parochial 
education. Leaders of the forerunner of the NCC, for example, often 
argued against aiding religious schools on the ground that doing so 
would encourage more such schools and lead to further fragmentation 
of education in the United States. "Public support for parochial 
schools," said one NCC representative appearing before the Senate in 
1947, "would divide the community into sectarian educational systems 
198. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 47; Boggs, 
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 269-83. 
199. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457. 
200. On the Jewish position and their legislative advocacy, see BLANSHARD, RELIGION 
AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 124; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra 
note 11 ,  at 48; and Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457. As for their activities 
in the Courts, various Jewish groups, such as the American Jewish Congress, have filed ami­
cus briefs advocating the separationist position in a host of cases, including Engel, Schempp, 
Allen, Lemon, and Sloan. See Mueller v. Allen 463 U.S. 388, 389-90 (1983); Sloan v. Lemon, 
413 U.S. 825, 826 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1971); Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 204 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962). In fact, 
the American Jewish Congress has filed more amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court 
advocating separation of church and state than any other group. Dena S. Davis, Ironic En­
counter: African-Americans, Jews, and the Church-State Relationship, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 
109, 1 12 (1993). 
201. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459. 
202. Id. 
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and destroy the unity essential as democracy faces the totalitarian 
threat to freedom."203 A similar statement appeared in the 1960 Doc­
trines and Disciplines of the Methodist Church, which expressed the 
Methodists' unalterable opposition "to the diversion of tax funds to 
the support of private and sectarian schools. In a short time, this scat­
tering process can destroy our public school system and weaken the 
foundations of national unity."204 
In seeking to protect the public schools, Protestants and Jews 
aligned themselves with public secularists of all persuasions who had 
come to identify the nation with its public schools. Many secularists 
objected to aid to religious schools not specifically because it would 
help Catholics, nor even more generally because it would help relig­
ion, but because it would hurt public education. It is difficult to over­
state the widespread support for, and belief in, public schools during 
this period.205 It had become clear that "[t]he school, not the church, 
would now Americanize ethnic minorities and culturally deprived 
groups. The school, not the church, would now give instruction in pru­
dence and morality - the basic niceties that became known as 'citi­
zenship. '  "206 To the many who saw public schools as crucial to Ameri­
can democracy, funding religious schools seemed a dangerous 
diversion.207 In a famous speech delivered in 1946, Dr. James Bryant 
Conant, President of Harvard, argued that federal funds should go 
203. Statement of Samuel Calvert, quoted in LUKE E. EBERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING 
IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL 270 (1951). Similarly, in its Letter to Christian People, published 
in the New York Times in 1952, the NCC stated that funding religious schools would "be a 
devastating blow to the public school system, which must be maintained." Letter to Christian 
People , supra note 186, at 17. Less than a decade later, the NCC released a similar state­
ment, suggesting that funding religious schools would fragment education in the United 
States, which in turn "would destroy the public school system or at least weaken it so gravely 
that it could not possibly adequately meet the educational needs of all the children of our 
growing society." Statement of NCC, Feb. 22, 1961, quoted in BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND 
THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 124. 
204. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 247; see also 
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 89-90 (reporting that 
Catholic criticism of public schools and advocacy of funding for religious schools alarmed 
"wide sectors of the Protestant community and especially . . .  Protestant educators"); Boggs, 
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 11 ("Protestants feared that if aid were 
given the Catholic schools the result would be governmental support for private, church in­
terests and, most importantly, would mean the destruction of the public schools."). 
205. See WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 167, at 290-91 (describing the 
"widespread faith in education" in this country and suggesting that "America's faith in uni­
versal education is its greatest asset"); see also supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing 
status of schools as the high church of the religion of democracy). 
206. Edwin S. Gaustad, Consensus in America: The Church's Changing Role, 36 J. AM. 
ACAD. OF RELIGION 28, 35-36 (1968). 
207. E.g. , MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 85-88; 
Robert F. Drinan, State and Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 7 J. CHURCH & ST. 67 (1965) 
("The argument [against aid to religious schools] today centers . . .  on the asserted indispen­
sability of the public school as an organ of national unity."); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, su­
pra note 141, at 456. 
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only to public schools, because of their distinct contribution to democ­
racy.208 Many educators shared this view.209 Indeed, some believed that 
all children should be required to attend public schools "in order that 
they might be protected against divisive cultural influences and helped 
to acquire a common outlook."210 Leaders of the National Education 
Association accordingly worked to secure money for public schools 
while preventing funding of private schools, sectarian and nonsectar­
ian alike; their support for the separationist position was largely a 
function of their commitment to public education.211 
Against this array of opinion, Catholic support for religious educa­
tion proved ineffective. Given that almost all private religious schools 
were Catholic, it was easy to picture aid to religious schools as a con­
flict pitting Catholics against the rest of America. As described in 1963 
by Paul Blanshard, a leader of the POAU and a strident critic of the 
Catholic Church, the "sectarian financial issue is 99 percent a Catholic 
issue . . . .  Here is joined a Catholic versus American battle, with or­
ganized world Catholicism committed to a program and a philosophy 
of ecclesiastical education . . . while the law and tradition of the 
United States favor support for public schools."212 Blanshard's rhetoric 
may have been extreme, but it did not much overstate the position of 
other Protestants, nor that of Jews and public secularists. As historian 
Richard Morgan observed, on the issue of aid to religious schools, "all 
sorts of Protestants, Jews, and secularists - those politically and doc­
trinally conservative, and those with liberal persuasions . . .  - could 
make common cause. "213 Everson adopted that cause and read it into 
the Constitution. 
2. The Secularization of Public Schools 
The Supreme Court's campaign to oust religion from the public 
schools was never as popular as its ban against aid to religious schools. 
The project of public-school secularization did not begin in earnest un­
til Engel and Schempp in the early 1960s. The project of public-school 
secularization was never as popular as its ban against aid to religious 
schools.214 The Court had glanced in this direction in 1948, when 
208. See MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 88; Boggs, 
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 20. 
209. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 25-26. 
210. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 456. 
211.  Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 26; MORGAN, POLITICS OF 
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT, supra note 181, at 58-59. 
212. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 120. 
213. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 85. 
214. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962). 
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McCollum struck down released-time programs in public school,215 but 
McCollum did not have lasting impact. Just four years later, the Court 
approved released-time programs held off school property, a ruling 
that transformed the released-time controversy from one about relig­
ious instruction in public schools into part of the larger fight over aid 
to religious education.216 Left unanswered was the more inflammatory 
question of prayer, Bible reading, and other religious observances in 
public schools. In the early 1950s, the justices ducked the question.217 
When they finally reached it in Engel and Schempp, they did so in a 
political environment increasingly tolerant of secularization.218 
The political forces arrayed against religion in the public schools 
were roughly the same as the coalition against aid to religious educa­
tion, with one dramatic difference. On this issue, America's Protes­
tants were not united. During the 1940s and 1950s, leading Protestant 
organizations seemed uncertain on the issue. Some groups, including 
Baptist and Presbyterian organizations, publicly opposed school 
prayer and Bible reading.219 Others, including the National Council of 
Churches, expressed the hope that some "constitutional way" be 
found to continue traditional observances.220 Still other groups said 
nothing at all, including POAU, the staunchest opponent of aid to pa­
rochial schools, whose board could not agree whether prayer and Bi­
ble reading in public school classrooms violated their separationist 
principles.221 
Given the prominence of these issues after Engel and Schempp, it 
may seem surprising that Protestant organizations did not stake out a 
clearer position in advance of those decisions. At the time, however, 
there were good reasons for separationists to keep a low profile. In 
most places, public education had already become largely secular, and 
Protestants generally were comfortable with this transformation.222 
215. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
216. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding law that allowed students to 
leave public schools during the day in order to receive religious education in church schools). 
For discussion of Zorach and McCollum, see BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, 
supra note 136, at 80-81; and Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 109-30. 
217. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (deciding, by 6-3 vote, that tax­
payer lacked standing to challenge New Jersey statute providing for the reading without 
comment of verses from the Old Testament at the start of each school day). For discussion 
of Doremus, see BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 86-91 .  
218. LUCAS A .  POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 378 (2000) 
[hereinafter POWE, THE WARREN COURT] (noting that "(i]n the religiously pluralistic soci­
ety of the 1960s, the Court had terrific support" for its prayer and Bible reading decisions). 
219. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 64; BOLES, THE 
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 240-45. 
220. NCC, Letter to Christian People, supra note 186, at 17. 
221. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 196, 267-68. 
222. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 277 (describing how, 
by the time of Engel and Schempp, "[t)he change to a secular public school system . . .  was 
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Moreover, in the 1950s the nation became obsessed with fighting 
communism at home and abroad. In the midst of a national crusade 
against "godless alien communism," those who opposed religious ob­
servances in schools risked being misunderstood as dissenters from the 
American way of life.223 Thus, even those Protestant leaders who fa­
vored completely secular public education had reason not to publicize 
that position. 
After Engel and Schempp, Protestant leaders could no longer 
avoid taking a stand, and the waning passions of domestic anticommu­
nism made it easier for them to do so.224 Accordingly, the vast majority 
of Protestant leaders and organizations announced their support for 
excluding official prayer and Bible reading from the public schools. 
Baptist and Presbyterian leaders had already taken this position.225 
Joining them were POAU, which hesitated briefly before endorsing 
Engel, and the NCC, which eventually embraced both Engel and 
Schempp.226 Protestant periodicals commended the decisions.227 After 
Engel, one liberal publication featured a manifesto, signed by thirty­
one Protestant leaders, arguing that the Court's ruling protected "the 
integrity of the religious conscience and the proper function of relig­
ious and governmental institutions."228 The glaring exception to the 
near-consensus of Protestant opinion was the National Association of 
Evangelicals. Conservative evangelicals decried the Court's decisions, 
complete," and observing that, with "few exceptions, the public schools of this country no 
longer conduct religious exercises"); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 451 (ob­
serving, in 1952, that "public school education . . .  is no longer religious, neither Catholic, nor 
Protestant, nor Jewish; it is, by and large, secularist, even militantly so"). 
223. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 182; SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARA­
TION, supra note 146, at 12-13; Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 60-62. 
224. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 60-62 (arguing that the 
Court was reluctant in the 1950s to appear to be on the side of "atheistic communists" on 
religious issues, but by 1962-63, "domestic anti-communism had become a largely spent 
force"). 
225. See supra text accompanying note 219. The Southern Baptist Convention went so 
far as to issue a statement after Engel, "thank[ing) the Supreme Court for this decision sim­
ply because such a required prayer is using the government to establish religion." Quoted in 
EDWARD L. QUEEN II, IN THE SOUTH THE BAPTISTS ARE THE CENTER OF GRAVITY: 
SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1930-1980, at 109 (1991). 
226. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 63-65; Boggs, His­
tory of Americans United, supra note 138, at 509-11.  
227. The conservative periodical Christianity Today, for example, ran an editorial de­
fending Engel, which argued that the decision was "compatible both with a proper Christian 
attitude toward government stipulation of religious exercises, and with a sound philosophical 
view of freedom." Editorial, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jul. 20, 1962. A similar editorial ap­
peared on July 4, 1962, in the liberal periodical, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY. 
228. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 66. This statement 
was signed by, among others, a former president of the NCC, Methodist Bishops, and the 
President of the Southern Baptist Convention. 
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voicing grave fears over the increasing secularization of schools and 
society.229 
Jews joined mainline Protestant leaders in supporting Engel and 
Schempp.230 Indeed, Jewish commitment to public secularism in an 
overwhelmingly Christian nation led them to oppose school prayer 
and Bible reading with as much intensity as they fought school aid.231 
Jews insisted that public schools be hospitable to all faiths.232 They de­
fended the Court's decisions with powerful claims for religious plural­
ism, arguing that any sort of religious exercise - no matter how pur­
portedly nondenominational - would offend their beliefs.233 
Accordingly, as Paul Blanshard described, "[f]rom the very beginning 
of the prayer controversy, the Jewish response was more articulate 
than that of any other religious group supporting the Court."234 
Separationist Protestants and Jews were joined by public secular­
ists, who also sought to keep the public sch.ools free from religion. 
Public secularists viewed opposition to school prayer and Bible read­
ing as axiomatic, given that one of their defining beliefs was (and is) 
that religion should be largely private.235 This principle applied with 
special force in the public schools, where students were a captive audi­
ence and any religious exercise would potentially be coercive. Ac­
cordingly, public secularists defended the ban on school prayer and 
Bible reading on the grounds of religious pluralism. As Paul Freund 
argued in 1965: "With more than two hundred sects in the United 
States, over eighty of t.hem having more than fifty thousand members 
229. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 82; Boggs, History of Ameri­
cans United, supra note 138, at 509-13. 
230. Indeed, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith filed amicus briefs in both cases supporting the 
secularist position. 
231 .  Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457 (describing Jewish position on 
aid to religious schools and religion in public schools as staunchly separationist). 
232. See Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 58-59 ("To most Jews, 
school prayer and Bible reading remained exclusionary practices."). 
233. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 217-23 (noting that 
most Jewish groups believed that any religious exercises or observances in public schools 
would necessarily discriminate against minority religions); MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125-26 (stating that Jews were not comfortable with any 
religious observances in public schools); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459-
60 (describing how most Jews felt that public religious observances would relegate Jews to 
the margins of society). 
234. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 67; cf Klarman, 
Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 58-59 (suggesting that the prayer and Bible 
reading decisions "can be seen as a symbolic recognition of [Jews'] more complete accep­
tance into American society"). 
235. See Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459 (observing that Jewish lead­
ers shared "the basic secularist presupposition that religion is a 'private matter' "); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 158-161. 
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each, it is not easy to envisage a strictly nonsectarian exercise. One 
man's piety is another's idolatry."236 
If nondenominational religious exercises were truly impossible, 
many secularists concluded, they should be avoided altogether. Both 
the Washington Post and the New York Times argued that religion in 
public schools would spark discord. The Post said that excluding re­
ligious exercises "free[d] the public schools from an observance much 
more likely to be divisive than unifying," while the Times noted that 
"nothing could be more divisive .in this country than to mingle religion 
and government in the sensitive setting of the public schools."237 The 
broad consensus of elite opinion on this issue (as well as the close con­
nection between Jews and public secularists) was demonstrated when 
Leo Pfeffer, counsel for the American Jewish Congress, rounded up 
110 law school deans and professors of law and political science to sign 
a letter to the Senate Jt1:diciary Committee supporting Engel and op­
posing school-prayer amendments on the ground that such obser­
vances in public schools would endanger "the institutions which have 
preserved religious and political freedom in the United States. "238 
Reinforcing the desire to maintain secular education in the public 
schools was the growing faith in the religion of democracy. In the nine­
teenth century, Horace Mann and other common-school leaders 
sought to maintain nondenominational (but Protestant) observances 
because they thought religion essential to moral training. Truly secular 
education would have lacked a moral compass. The desire for a moral 
foundation continued in post-Protestant America, even as the pan­
Protestantism of the early common-school movement became less and 
less successful. But by the mid-twentieth century, many Protestants, 
Jews, and public secularists thought of democracy, patriotism, and 
"the American Way Life" as the moral basis for instruction.239 Just as 
236. PAUL A. FREUND & ROBERT ULICH, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 
(1965); see also BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 89 ("A mo­
ment's reflection will show that in a society which is as pluralistic as ours there is virtually no 
religious or ceremonial phenomenon that is not sectarian to somebody."). 
237. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1962; Editorial, WASH. POST, Jun. 29, 1962. These 
editorials echoed what Justice Frankfurter had argued over a decade earlier in his concur­
rence in McCollum. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter argued against released-time on the ground that 
religion interfered with the democratizing and assimilationist mission of public schools: "De­
signed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a het­
erogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from entan­
glement in the strife of sects." Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
238. The text of the statement appears in Prayers in Public Schools and Other Matters: 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 205, S.J. Res. 206, S.J. 207, S. Con. Res. 81, S. Res. 356 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 167 (1962). A story on the statement appeared in the 
New York Times. See 'Tampering' Seen in Prayer Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11 ,  1962, at 134. 
239. See BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 202; MARTY, 
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 80-82; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, 
at 451. 
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Horace Mann had turned to uncommented Bible reading as a way of 
uniting warring Protestants, his successors in the leadership of public 
schools turned to the civil religion of democracy as a way of uniting 
increasingly divergent faiths. Agnes Meyer, a strong advocate of 
secularization, captured the idea: 
If we bear in mind that the whole future of our democracy depends upon 
moral solidarity, freedom of conscience, and freedom of inquiry, the 
secularization of our schools becomes an act of .sublime courage and 
sublime loyalty to the American faith that our institutions should be of 
the people, by the people, and for the people.240 
The coalition of Protestants, Jews, and secularists produced a re­
markable array of elite opinion in favor of the Supreme Court's 
school-prayer and Bible reading decisions.241 This coalition left out 
conservative evangelicals - who were then Jess numerous, less well 
organized, and far less influential than today - and Roman Catho­
lics.242 The Catholic position requires explication. Historically, relig­
ious observances in public schools had been distinctly Protestant, and 
Catholics objected to them on that ground.243 In the 1940s, the church 
changed its mind and began to call for religious content in public edu­
cation. The switch sprang in part from the elimination of Protestant 
specificity in religious exercises and in part from growing confidence 
that Catholic students would not be "lost to the fold" if they said ecu­
menical prayer.244 Partly, however, the change in position was strate­
gic. Catholic leaders began highlighting the secularization of public 
education in order to bolster the case for church schools. If public 
schools could be portrayed as hostile to the devout, the argument for 
funding religious education would be strengthened.245 This strategic 
240. Agnes E. Meyer, The Clerical Challenge to the Schools, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1952, at 44. The Jesuit publication COMMONWEAL referred to Meyer as "the national 
spokesman" for the emerging religion of democracy. Contra Gentiles, COMMONWEAL, Jun. 
4, 1954, at 212. For further discussion of Meyer, see MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra 
note 136, at 80-81. 
241. E.g. , POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 358 ("There was a dominant 
view shared by the well-educated - and therefore the justices of the Court - that religion 
was a private matter, best left to the homes and the churches."). 
242. The marginal status of conservative evangelicals at the time is confirmed by the fact 
that two contemporary observers, in reviewing the "Protestant" reaction to the prayer and 
Bible reading decisions, said nothing about the reaction of conservative evangelicals. 
BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 62-66, 1 15-18; BOLES, THE 
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 226-50. 
243. Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 96 
(1981) (noting that "before McCollum, practically every suit challenging religious practices 
in the public schools was brought by Catholic parents"). 
244. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125. 
245. E.g. , BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 58-62 (de­
scribing how Catholic leaders and periodicals sought to use the decision in Engel "as a 
weapon in the campaign for parochial school aid"); Editorial, CATHOLIC REGISTER, Apr. 
22, 1962 ("An adverse decision [in Engel) may not be altogether bad. It should shock many 
324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:279 
motivation was not lost on commentators at the time: an editorial in 
the New York Post, for example, suggested that Cardinal Spellman's 
denunciation of Engel was prompted "not by the prohibition of a 
prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value, 
but by the potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education 
battle."246 That Catholic leaders actually cared more about funding 
Catholic schools than they did about keeping religion in the public 
schools became even more apparent when Catholic leaders either re­
mained neutral or testified against constitutional amendments to vali­
date school prayer.247 
The fact that mainline Protestant leaders, Jews, and public secu­
larists supported the Court's decisions against school prayer and Bible 
reading does not mean that a majority of Americans agreed. On the 
contrary, polls suggested that most Americans disapproved of the de­
cisions, and some school districts ignored them.248 In addition, a ma­
jority in Congress - but not the requisite supermajority - supported 
constitutional amendments to authorize school prayer.249 These facts 
would impeach the claim - if anyone were prepared to make such a 
claim - that the Supreme Court slavishly follows popular opinion,250 
but they do not negate the utility of looking at the Establishment 
Protestants out of their old· complacency and dogged opposition of their leadership to any 
aid to the religious school child."). The strategy employed by Spellman was similar to the 
one pursued over a century earlier by Bishop Hughes, who sought ultimately to use the lack 
of religion in public schools as a means of securing funding for Catholic schools. See supra 
text accompanying notes 116-117. 
246. Excerpts from Editorials on School Prayer Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 1962, at 
11 .  
247. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at  361 (explaining that, "in 1963 
Catholic leaders had their sights on far bigger game - federal dollars for parochial schools 
- and were thus less inclined to worry about prayer in public schools"); Tyack, Onward 
Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 246 (noting that the "great majority of Protestant, 
Catholic, and Jewish leaders testifying on [the) prayer amendment[s) argued that the Court's 
decision [in Engel] was a proper interpretation of the American experiment in religious lib­
erty"); James E. Wood, Jr., Religion and Education in American Church-State Relations, in 
RELIGION, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION 32-33 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1984) (noting that 
"Roman Catholicism maintained an unsympathetic neutrality" regarding the prayer 
amendments). 
248. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that polls re­
vealed "that anywhere from sixty to eighty percent of the public favored" the practices out­
lawed in Engel and Schempp); Gallup Poll, Sept. 1964, in Public Opinion Online, Roper 
Center, Apr. 11 ,  1990 (77% of those polled favored a constitutional amendment to legalize 
school prayer); National Opinion Research Center, Oct. 1964, in Public Opinion Online, 
Apr. 19, 1989 (57% of those polled strongly favored - and 26% somewhat favored -
school prayer). 
249. SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 312-13; Ellis Katz, Patterns of 
Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PUB. L. 396, 398-401 (1965). 
250. The most prominent proponent of the view that the Supreme Court's work gener­
ally confirms rather than contradicts majoritarian sentiment is Michael Klarman, and even 
he does not deny that the Court "occasionally plays a limited countermajoritarian function." 
Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 6, 15 (emphasis in original). 
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Clause in political context. At least three factors suggest why a Court 
deeply influenced by societal attitudes would have moved to secularize 
public education despite majority sentiment against that view. 
First, polls and votes likely overstated the depth of support for 
school prayer. The positions of the Catholic Church and the United 
States Congress are especially telling. Catholic leaders strongly de­
nounced Engel and Schempp, but when constitutional amendments 
were proposed to reverse them, Catholic leaders sat on their hands.251 
Similarly, many members of Congress found it impolitic to vote 
against those amendments but recognized privately that reinstating 
least-common-denominator school prayer would not bolster real 
faith.252 Politicians, like the Catholic hierarchy, had reason to cham­
pion the idea of school prayer, but many were not committed to put­
ting that idea into practice. 
Second, and more importantly, the controversy over school prayer 
revealed a huge gap between the cultural elite and the rest of 
America. People generally may have supported school prayer and 
Bible reading, but the leadership class did not. Elite support for the 
Supreme Court's secularization project was clearly visible in the activi­
ties of law professors and deans, in the prominent newspaper editori­
als endorsing Engel and Schempp, and most importantly in the views 
of mainline Protestant leaders, who overwhelmingly supported the 
prayer decisions and opposed efforts to overturn them.253 The contrary 
opinions of many of the Protestant faithful, especially conservative 
evangelicals, were less visible and less influential than the announced 
positions of religious organizations and leaders. 
Just how easily the cultural elite dismissed evangelical opinion is 
captured in a wonderful quotation from Philip Kurland's Foreword to 
the Harvard Law Review's survey of the Supreme Court's 1963 term.254 
Kurland was no fan of the Warren Court. After vehement criticism of 
its work, he admitted that the Court was "fortunate" in its enemies, 
251. See infra text accompanying notes 261-262. 
252. E.g. , BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 52-74 (de­
scribing how members of Congress initially came out strongly against Engel but gradually 
came to accept the decision after reading positions of religious leaders and opinions in lead­
ing periodicals); POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 188-90, 361-63, 377-78 (de­
scribing congressional reactions to Engel and Schempp and concluding that legislative pro­
posals to overrule those decisions had no real chance of passing); Boggs, History of 
Americans United, supra note 138, at 513 (noting that members of Congress were afraid to · 
vote against school-prayer amendments because "it was like voting against God"). As 
Blanshard and Powe point out, part of what initially angered Southern members of Congress 
was the fact that, as in desegregation, the Court was interfering with state control of educa­
tion. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 52; POWE, THE 
w ARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 188-89. 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 224-240. 
254. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative 
and Executive Branch of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964) 
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adding that "it is difficult not to help resist attacks from racists, from 
the John Birch Society and its ilk, and from religious zealots who insist 
that the Court adhere to the truth as they know it."255 As L.A. Powe 
observed, the fact that a noted conservative scholar could so readily 
lump "religious zealots" with racists and Birchers "says far more about 
how mainstream thought . . .  viewed the publicly religious than it does 
about the publicly religious themselves."256 The Supreme Court and its 
intellectual allies readily discounted popular support for school prayer. 
To the justices, the broad consensus among mainline Protestants, 
Jews, and public secularists would have seemed richly confirmatory of 
the need to eliminate religious observances from public schools, even 
if a majority of Americans disagreed. Not surprisingly (and not for the 
last time), the justices championed the dominant views of the nation's 
elite as against popular opinion.257 
Although we have not found polling data from the 1960s that dis­
aggregate school prayer opinion along class lines, subsequent data 
strongly confirm a gap between popular and elite opinion.258 In 1991, 
support for school prayer fell from 73% of those with less than a high­
school education, to 63 % of those with a high school degree, to 44 % 
of those who graduated from college, to only 31 % of those with a 
graduate degree. And while a majority of persons with annual incomes 
below $30,000 favored school prayer, a majority of those with incomes 
above $75,000 opposed it. 
Finally, the Supreme Court's own prior pronouncements influ­
enced its insistence on excluding religion from public schools. The 
Court could not reconcile school prayer with its high-flown separa­
tionist rhetoric in Everson. The justices had only two choices: they 
could either purge religion from the public schools or eat their own 
words. As Edmond Cahn remarked at the time, when seen against the 
background of Everson's version of history, "the Supreme Court's de­
cision in Engel v. Vitale was about as close to predictable as the judi­
cial process becomes. "259 Engel and Schempp not only followed the 
255. Id. at 176, quoted in POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 358. 
256. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 358. 
257. The description also fits the Court's work in obscenity, flag-burning, and other pro­
tections of minority speech. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great Aboltt Constitlttional­
ism, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1997) (describing ways in which the Court's decisions 
reflect elite opinion); cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than 
the villeins - and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the 
lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn."). 
258. National Opinion Research Center, Poll 1991, in Public Opinion Online, Roper 
Center, Jan. 23, 1995. 
259. Edmond Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 981, 986 (1%2); cf 
BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 79 ("The Court, having em­
barked on its present interpretation of constitutional history . . .  could not have reached any 
other conclusion in the prayer case without contradicting its whole recent philosophy."). 
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historical and rhetorical framework of Everson, but also fit comforta­
bly within a broader trend of increasing protection for religious mi­
norities, which was itself a response to the nation's increasing religious 
pluralism. Most prominently, the Court had upheld the right of 
Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to salute the flag or pledge allegiance at 
the start of the school day.260 The sensibility that sought to protect 
Jehovah's Witnesses and other religious minorities from official coer­
cion261 also motivated Engel and Schempp. The Court recognized that 
in a religiously pluralistic society, any public observances were bound 
to offend some believers and, in some contexts, would tend to coerce 
them. Put another way, Engel and Schempp drew not only on the 
imagined history and separationist rhetoric of the modern Establish­
ment Clause but also on a concern for individual liberty of conscience 
more readily identified with the Free Exercise Clause. 
III. THE COMING REVOLUTION 
"It is written in our country's constitution that church and state must be, 
in this nation, forever separate and free." 
Reverend W.A. Criswell, Pastor of 
the First Baptist Church of Dallas, 
the largest congregation in the 
Southern Baptist Convention, 1960262 
"I believe this notion of the separation of church and state was the fig­
ment of some infidel's imagination." 
- Reverend W.A. Criswell, 1984263 
For over three hundred years, Baptists and other Protestants in­
sisted on strict separation of church and state. They unselfconsciously 
tolerated religious exercises in public schools, but insisted on strict 
separation when it came to funding religious schools. From the middle 
of the seventeenth century until the middle of the twentieth, American 
Protestants, with few exceptions, shared a vision of church-state rela­
tions shaped not only by Protestant traditions and principles, but also 
by mutual self-interest and a shared suspicion of Roman Catholics.264 
260. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
261. E.g. , Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding the right of a Seventh Day 
Adventist to receive unemployment benefits after being discharged for refusing to work on 
Saturday); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down Maryland law that re­
quired all public officers to affirm a belief in God). 
262. W.A. Criswell, Religious Freedom and the Presidency, ACTION, Sept. 1960, at 9-10. 
263. Richard A. Pierard, The Historical Background of the Evangelical Assault on the 
Separation of Church and State in the U.S.A., in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CHURCH AND STATE 65 (Menacham Mor ed., 1993). 
264. See supra Sections II.B, ll.C; see also FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, 
supra note 1 1 ,  at 13-14; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 
82-93. 
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Today, much has changed. Protestant opinion is now divided both 
on aid to religious schools and on religious observances in the public 
schools. Leaders of mainline Protestant denominations now take a 
consistently separationist stance, opposing both aid to religious 
schools and religion in the public schools. Evangelical Christians take 
a consistently accommodationist position, advocating both aid to re­
ligious schools and the reintroduction of religion into public educa­
tion. Where there was once a nearly monolithic, if internally contra­
dictory, Protestant position on church and state, there is now a great 
schism, with each side staking out internally consistent but diametri­
cally opposed positions. 
This splintering of Protestant opinion might not have been of ma­
jor consequence but for another change among Protestants: a dramatic 
shift in energy and political power from mainline denominations to 
evangelicals. The former have lost parishioners and political clout, so 
much so that by the 1990s some suggested that the mainline denomi­
nations had become the "sideline" denominations. Meanwhile, evan­
gelical churches experienced explosive growth.265 Newly energized 
evangelicals joined other faiths in alliances that would have been uni­
maginable a few decades ago. Most remarkably, evangelical Christians 
sided with Catholics and Orthodox Jews in supporting aid to religious 
schools. We believe that this coalition will eventually produce a new 
understanding of the Establishment Clause.266 Indeed, as Mitchell v. 
Helms indicates, the transformation may already be underway. 
A. The Supreme Court and Christian Academies 
An irony in modern church-state politics is the Supreme Court's 
unintended role in energizing the political forces that now seek to 
overthrow its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court itself 
planted the seeds of revolution, first in ordering desegregation and 
265. For descriptions of the simultaneous decline of mainline denominations and growth 
among evangelical churches, see FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  
at  42-43; ANDREW M.  GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN  AMERICA 33 (1989); HODGSON, 
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11 ,  at 165-66; and DONALD E. MILLER, 
REINVENTING AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM: CHRISTIANITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 4 
(1997). 
266. Sources for this paragraph include FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, su­
pra note 11,  at 29-148; AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE: AMERICA AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF SCHOOL CHOICE POLICY 138-39 (1993) [hereinafter WELLS, TIME TO 
CHOOSE]; Bruce S. Cooper, The Changing Demography of Private Schools: Trends and Im­
plications, 16 EDUC. & URBAN SOC'Y 429, 437-42 (1984) [hereinafter Cooper, Changing 
Demography of Private Schools]; John Herbers, Activism in Faith: Big Shift Since '60, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1984, at B9 [hereinafter Herbers, Activism in Faith]; William J. Reese, Sol­
diers for Christ in the Army of God: The Christian School Movement in America, 35 EDUC. 
THEORY 175, 177, 194 (1985) (hereinafter Reese, Soldiers for Christ] . 
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later in excluding prayer and Bible reading from the public schools.267 
These two lines of decision caused evangelicals to form their own 
schools.268 The dramatic explosion of evangelical schools, in turn, drew 
evangelicals from the pulpits into politics and helped transform their 
views on separation of church and state. The story of the coming 
revolution therefore begins with the rise of the Christian academy. 
In the early days of this country, many Protestant denominations 
experimented with church schools, but this effort gave way to the 
common-school movement and the proliferation of public schools in 
the late nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century, most Prot­
estants no longer sponsored religious schools.269 A few evangelical 
groups - the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Seventh Day Adventists, 
and the Calvinists (Christian Reformed) - continued to do so, but 
their numbers were always small.270 Additionally, a few fundamentalist 
churches, perhaps 150 nationwide, founded private schools in the first 
half of the twentieth century.271 Overwhelmingly, however, religious 
schools were Catholic schools.272 Until the late 1960s, almost all Prot­
estants - whether liberal or conservative, mainline or evangelical -
attended public schools. These public schools reflected Protestant val-
267. The crucial desegregation decision was Green v. New Kent County School Board, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Court rejected a freedom-of-choice plan, indicated that the 
time for "all deliberate speed" in desegregation had ended, and ushered in the phase of mas­
sive desegregation in the South. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, 78 (1979) [hereinafter 
WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE]. The prayer and Bible reading decisions were, re­
spectively, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963). 
268. That the two sets of decisions were linked in the eyes of some observers is apparent 
from the statement of Representative George Andrews of Alabama, who stated after the 
Engel decision: "They put the Negroes in the schools and now they're driving God out." 
HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11 ,  at 168. 
269. James C. Carper, The Christian Day School, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN 
AMERICA 1 1 1  (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984) [hereinafter Carper, The 
Christian Day School]; Susan Rose, Christian Fundamentalism and Education in the United 
States, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, 
AND EDUCATION 452-53 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) [hereinafter 
Rose, Christian Fundamentalism]; Smith, Parochial Education, supra note 97, at 196-97. 
270. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175. See generally WALTER H. BECK, 
LUTHERAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS AND SYNODICAL EDUCATIONAL POLICIES AND 
PROGRAMS (1939) (describing the creation and growth of Lutheran elementary schools). 
271 .  Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 1 1-12. 
272. Donald A. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools: Dynamics of Supply and De­
mand, in PRIVATE EDUCATION: STUDIES IN CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 82, 86 (Daniel C. 
Levy ed., 1986) [hereinafter Erickson, Choice and Private Schools]; Thomas C. Hunt & 
Norlene M. Kunkel, Catholic Schools: The Nation 's Largest Alternative School System, in 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 1-7 (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1 984). 
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ues, and some continued to sponsor pan-Protestant religious exer­
cises.273 
Enter school desegregation. The South met Brown v. Board of 
Education with massive resistance.274 The ultimate threat in the 
South's arsenal of reaction was to close the public schools altogether 
and/or to create all-white private academies, perhaps with the help of 
state-funded vouchers.275 By 1958, all Southern States except 
Tennessee had enacted school-closing measures.276 Because of the suc­
cess of Southern defiance and the glacial pace of school desegregation, 
few public schools were closed, and correspondingly few segregationist 
academies were opened, in the ten years after Brown.277 Notable ex­
ceptions occurred, including the closing of the Prince Edward County 
public schools in rural Virginia and the opening of private all-white 
schools supported by state vouchers.278 But overall, Southern private­
school enrollment remained nearly level in the decade after Brown.279 
Change began in 1964, when desegregation first became a reality in 
many parts of the South. Private schools began to multiply after the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ensuing increase in 
court-ordered desegregation. In 1964 the Citizens Council (formerly 
the White Citizens Council) opened the first of a chain of private seg­
regation academies in Mississippi, and the first segregationist acade­
mies opened in South Carolina in the same year.280 Over the next three 
273. DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-
1954, at 90-91 (1987); Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 12-119; Reese, 
Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 177-78; Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 
83, at 216-19. 
274. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, supra note 267, at 78-102. 
275. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 248-50, 275, 279, 281-84, 
288-89 (1969) [hereinafter BARTLEY, MASSIVE RESISTANCE]; MATTHEW LASSITER, 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM, THE SEGREGATED PRIVATE SCHOOL MOVEMENT 
IN THE SOUTH 6-7 (Dec. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
LASSITER, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM); WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, 
supra note 267, at 82. 
276. BARTLEY, MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra note 275, at 288-89; LASSITER, 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM, supra note 275, at 8. 
277. BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE 
THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 156-57 (1964) [hereinafter MUSE, TEN YEARS OF 
PRELUDE). 
278. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, supra note 267, at 95-102; Jennifer E. 
Spreng, Scenes from the Southside: A Desegregation Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 327, 340-43 (1997). See generally BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS: 
PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951-1964 (1965). The Supreme Court put an end to 
this form of resistance in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), when it or­
dered Prince Edward officials to reopen and fund racially nondiscriminatory public schools. 
279. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 277, at 156-57; DAVID NEVIN & 
ROBERT E. BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST ACADEMIES IN 
THE SOUTH 6 (1 976) [hereinafter NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT). 
280. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 7; see also 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1974) (noting that, between the 1963-1964 school 
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years, enrollment in segregation academies increased ten-fold, and the 
number of schools grew by nearly two hundred.281 Although some 
were affiliated with churches, most were secular and located in rural 
areas where total resistance to any integration held sway.282 
By the late 1960s, both the rural and the urban South faced immi­
nent desegregation. The result was a dramatic explosion in the number 
of private schools and a turn to church-based education.283 Private 
schools arose in rural areas when it became clear that freedom-of­
choice plans and other means of token compliance would no longer 
suffice. They arose in urban areas as they too faced orders to desegre­
gate, often by forced busing.284 The demise of freedom-of-choice and 
the advent of busing triggered a massive exodus of whites from public 
schools and a scramble to find private alternatives.285 Those fleeing 
public schools, particularly in urban areas, often turned to churches as 
the organizing loci for new schools.286 
The numbers tell the story. In 1954, fewer than 1 % of students in 
the South attended private school. By 1971, that figure had grown to 
6% across the region and 12% in certain States.287 If we narrow our fo­
cus a bit, it becomes clear that the pace of private school enrollment 
tracked the pace of school desegregation. A comparative focus clari­
fies the role of school desegregation. Between 1961 and 1971,  enroll­
ment in private, nonsectarian schools in the twelve-state southeast re­
gion grew by 242.2%, and enrollment in non-Catholic sectarian 
schools grew by 167.7%.288 This dramatic explosion in private educa-
year and 1970, the number of private, non-Catholic schools in Mississippi grew from seven­
teen to 155, with enrollment increasing from 2,362 to an estimated 42,000). 
281. Kitty Griffith, Segregation Academies Flourish in South, SOUTH TODAY, Oct. 1969, 
at 1 .  
282. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at  1 -11 ;  
Georgann Hansen Eglinski, Note, Section 1981 Applicable to Private School Admissions, 25 
U. KAN. L. REV. 247, 251-52 (1977) [hereinafter Eglinski, Private School Admissions]; 
Jerome C. Hafter & Peter M. Hoffman, Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 
YALE L.J. 1436, 1441-48 (1973) [hereinafter Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies]. 
283. LASSITER, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSJONISM, supra note 275, at 6-10; John C. 
Walden & Allen D. Cleveland, The South 's New Segregation Academies, 53 PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN 234, 234 (1971). 
284. See NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 11 .  
285. Eglinski, Private School Admissions, supra note 282, at 251 ;  Hafter & Hoffman, 
Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1441. 
286. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 7-8. 
287. Eglinski, Private School Admissions, supra note 282, at 251 .  
288. The figures in this and the preceding sentence are from the U.S. Office of  Educa­
tion, and are reported in Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1442 
n.45. See also Virginia Davis Nordin & William Lloyd Turner, More Than Segregation 
Academies: The Growing Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 391 
(1980) [hereinafter Nordin & Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools] (describing the 
rapid growth of Christian academies between 1961 and 1979). 
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tion in the South was directly contrary to the contemporary experi­
ence in the rest of the nation. In the five years following the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, while private school enrollment increased tenfold 
in the South,289 it decreased 23% nationwide.290 
The most significant and enduring of the new private schools were 
the Christian academies. Also known as Christian day schools, the 
academies were sponsored by a range of evangelical Protestants; some 
were affiliated with individual churches and others with local Christian 
school societies.291 The most conservative wing of the evangelical 
movement, the fundamentalists, sponsored a significant number of 
academies, then and now.292 Although many evangelical and funda­
mentalist churches do not affiliate with a particular denomination, 
many are Baptist, and independent Baptist congregations sponsored a 
large fraction of the Christian academies.293 The school founders used 
the terms Christian day school or Christian academy to emphasize the 
fundamentalist distinction between those who are "saved" (true Chris­
tians) and those who are not.294 The schools usually had small enroll­
ments, predominately of white children from middle-class and work­
ing-class families. Though they had differing educational qualities and 
facilities, Christian academies shared an emphasis on religion, obedi­
ence to authority, and traditional conservative values.295 
The academies were havens from all that conservative Protestants 
found wrong with public education, and the first complaint was inte­
gration. That desegregation prompted the creation of Christian 
academies is sometimes disputed, perhaps because of lingering reputa-
289. Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation of Private Education 
by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 138-39 (Neal E. 
Devins ed., 1989) [hereinafter Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination]. 
290. Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1442 n.45. 
291. See Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 13; Erickson, Choice and 
Private Schools, supra note 272, at 88-89; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 
453. 
292. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 453-54. 
293. Peter Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., 61 PUB. INT. 18, 21-23 (1980) [herein­
after Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S.]. 
294. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 453. Christian academies 
should also be distinguished from "Christian" schools begun by the Calvinists or Dutch Re­
formed. Although they also refer to their schools as "Christian," Calvinist Day Schools be­
gan.much earlier than the Christian day schools, did not begin primarily as a protest against 
public schools, and generally do not associate with Christian academies or their support or­
ganizations. Id. at 454; see also Donald Oppewal & Peter P. DeBoer, Calvinist Day Schools: 
Roots and Branches, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 58-80 (James C. Carper & 
Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984). 
295. For descriptions of the schools and the families whose children attended them, see 
NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 19-88; PAUL F. 
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 3-110 (1987) [hereinafter PARSONS, 
INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS]; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, 177-87. 
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tional damage,296 but the temporal connection between public-school 
desegregation and the advent of Christian academies is too obvious to 
ignore: Christian academies blossomed in the late 1960s, when deseg­
regation became a reality in the South.297 Many conservative Chris­
tians and commentators point to the prohibition of school prayer and 
Bible reading as the motivations for creating Christian academies. Al­
though these decisions doubtless played a part,298 they came down in 
1962 and 1963, respectively.299 Christian academies - many of which 
were begun quite hastily - did not appear in numbers until late in the 
decade.300 It is implausible to believe that conservative Christians did 
nothing for five or six years in response to the school-prayer and Bible 
reading decisions, then suddenly leapt into action to organize private 
schools, often on shoe-string budgets and in makeshift facilities. The 
more plausible inference is that the precipitating event was the arrival 
of blacks in large numbers in previously all-white public schools. 
Geography reinforces this conclusion. Christian academies began 
in the South.301 Within that region, they tended to be concentrated in 
areas where flight to de facto segregated public schools was impossible 
or inconvenient. In Memphis, for example, where avoiding school de­
segregation meant moving across state lines, Christian academies 
flourished; in Atlanta, where flight to a suburban jurisdiction was easy, 
few private schools blossomed.302 If religion and not race were the 
dominant motivation behind the initial wave of Christian academies, 
both timing and location would have been different. 
296. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 1 16; James 
C. Carper & Jack Layman, Black-Flight Academies: The New Christian Day Schools, 61 
EDUC. FORUM 1 14, 1 15-16 (1997) [hereinafter Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies]; 
Skerry, Christian Schools v. IRS, supra note 293, at 28, 34-35. 
297. A few specific examples help solidify the point. An article in The Nation in 1969, 
described the "opening of 50 new 'Christian Academies' in North Carolina, the year before 
it was clear that North Carolina must 'totally integrate its schools." Harry Golden, THE 
NATION, Dec. 22, 1969, at 697. Another article, which generally downplays the connection 
between school desegregation and Christian academies, nonetheless admits that "there is no 
question that non-public enrollments in Louisville have increased substantially since the im­
plementation of forced busing." Nordin & Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra 
note 288, at 392. 
298. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 26; Skerry, 
Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., supra note 293, at 26. 
299. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962). 
300. On the haste with which Christian academies were erected, see NEVIN & BILLS, 
THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 27-36; and Golden, supra note 297, at 
697. 
301. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at xii. 
302. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 11-12. See 
also PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 124-25 (de­
scribing how a metropolitan desegregation plan in Little Rock, Arkansas, drove white par­
ents from the school and led to the opening of Christian academies "all over the Little Rock 
metropolitan area"). 
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Finally, many of those involved in creating Christian academies 
spoke candidly about their motivations. "I would never have dreamed 
of starting a school, hadn't it been for busing," reported Brother Floyd 
Simmons, who created the Elliston Baptist Academy in Memphis 
during the early 1970s.303 Other pastors admitted that "some parents 
send their kids to Christian schools because they just don't like 
blacks. "304 Some parents spoke with equal frankness. When asked why 
she sent her children to a Christian academy, one parent responded: "I 
am revolting against busing. "305 
To be sure, integration was not the only thing that conservative 
Christians tried to escape. They left public schools for other reasons 
only partly based on racial discomfort: they also disliked the values 
being taught to their children, the lack of discipline, and the danger 
and chaos that many of them came to see in the public schools.306 As 
an early study described, conservative Christians who fled to the 
academies viewed the public schools as "horrid and dangerous places. 
They believe schools are full of drugs, sexual license and fighting; that 
white teachers are intimidated by black students, and black teachers 
can't handle students of either race; that classrooms are chaotic, disci­
pline has vanished and learning has stopped. "307 
They also believed that public schools had become godless.308 Here 
the formative hand of the Supreme Court again emerges. Many of 
those supporting Christian academies pointed to the Court's prayer 
and Bible decisions as their reason for abandoning public schools.309 
North Carolina parents who were asked why they left public schools 
most frequently cited the Court's school-prayer decision.310 That deci­
sion, reinforced by the Court's Bible-reading decision the following 
year, led many evangelicals to conclude that hostility to religion domi­
nated the public schools. 
303. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 30. 
304. See Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S. , supra note 293, at 28. 
305. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 25. We do 
not mean to suggest that all opposition to busing reflected racial animus, but only that deseg­
regation - and the means to achieve it - provoked white flight to Christian academies. 
306. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 19-25; 
Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 177-79; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra 
note 269, at 455-56; Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S. , supra note 293, at 26-28. 
307. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 21. 
308. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 88; Nordin & Turner, 
Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 392; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, 
supra note 269, at 455; David Sikkink, The Social Sources of Alienation from Public Schools, 
78 SOCIAL FORCES 51,  66 (1999). 
309. RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 165-68 (1984); Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 15-
16. 
310. Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S. ,  supra note 293, at 26. 
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In the next two decades, more and more evangelicals came to 
share this disdain for public education. By the late 1970s and 1980s, 
the desire to escape the immorality and godlessness of public schools 
augmented and reinforced the desire to avoid integration. While de­
segregation provided the original impetus for Christian academies, 
opposition to the secularization of public education gave them suste­
nance.311 As conservative Christians came to dislike what their chil­
dren were being taught in the public schools (as well as who attended 
them), they became increasingly pointed in their criticisms. "We be­
lieve public schools are immoral," said one private school activist in 
Kentucky. "The public schools breed criminals. They teach [children] 
they're animals, that they evolved from animals. Christianity has been 
replaced by humanism in the public schools. It's disgusting."312 As this 
statement suggests, conservative Christians often targeted humanism 
- or so-called "secular humanism" - as the cause of moral decline in 
the public schools. "Humanism has turned our public schools into a 
jungle," said one parent from Nebraska, "in which any kind of animal 
can do anything it wants. "313 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity 
of such statements, but there is also no reason to ignore the echo of 
racial unease they contain. 
Growing disenchantment with public schools led evangelicals and 
fundamentalists to seek private altematives.314 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Christian academies constituted the fastest growing segment of private 
education.315 Precise enrollment figures are hard to come by, in part 
because many schools refused to report information and in part be­
cause the federal and state governments did not aggressively seek to 
account for private-school enrollment.316 Nonetheless, estimates exist, 
311. E.g., PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126 
("Clearly, the evidence suggests that the primary motivation for the continued existence of 
Christian schools is religious and not racial."). 
312. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 178. 
313. Id. at 178-79. 
314. The change in position regarding private schools represented not only a departure 
from the traditional Protestant stance, but also a departure from the more recent stance 
taken by fundamentalists toward Christian day schools. As one scholar reported, until the 
early 1960s, "most right-wing Fundamentalist churches were officially opposed to the 'Chris­
tian day school movement,' " insisting that fundamentalists should patronize public schools. 
Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 90. 
315. See Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 454. See generally Nordin & 
Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 391; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, 
supra note 266, at 180. 
316. On reporting and monitoring difficulties, see NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT 
FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 5-9; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 
1 16; Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 89; and Rose, Christian Fun­
damentalism, supra note 269, at 454-55. 
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and all portray explosive growth.317 According to Professor Donald 
Erickson, one of the most respected scholars of private education, in 
1961-1962 no more than 250 or 300 Christian academies existed na­
tionwide.318 By 1982-1983, there were approximate!y 10,740.319 The en­
rollment figures are equally remarkable. In 1965, approximately 
110,000 students attended Christian academies.320 By 1982, that figure 
had grown to over 900,000.321 By 1985, approximately one million stu­
dents - one-fifth of all private school students - attended Christian 
academies. 322 
Though concentrated in the South, Christian academies were not 
confined to that region.323 They arose throughout the country, includ­
ing in areas that never had to confront school desegregation.324 Today, 
Christian academies exist in nearly every state, and their student bod­
ies are increasingly diverse.325 Virtually every such school has adopted 
a nondiscriminatory racial policy, and an estimated 75 % are at least 
nominally integrated.326 In addition, a small but growing number of 
black evangelical congregations have created their own schools.327 
317. Although commentators arrive at different estimates regarding the growth and 
numbers of Christian academies, they uniformly describe the growth as explosive or dra­
matic. JEREMY RIFKIN & TED HOWARD, THE EMERGING ORDER: GOD IN THE AGE OF 
SCARCITY 121-26 (1979); PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 
295, at 186; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 16; Cooper, Changing 
Demography of Private Schools, supra note 266, at 430; Erickson, Choice and Private 
Schools, supra note 272, at 89; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175; Rose, 
Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 455. 
318. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 89. 
319. Cooper, Changing Demography of Private Schools, supra note 266, at 430. 
320. Id. at 432; Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 87. 
321 .  Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 87. 
322. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175; Carper, The Christian Day 
School, supra note 269, at 1 14-15. Growth in Christian academies has slowed in recent years, 
as indicated by estimates of enrollment in the 1990s, which still hover around one million 
students. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 33; Rose, Christian 
Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 454. 
323. Judith Cummings, Non-Catholic Schools Growing Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1983, 
at Al (reporting statistics from National Center for Education that show enrollment in non­
Catholic religious schools grew by 47% in the Northeast during the 1970s, while enrollment 
quadrupled during this period in the South). 
324. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126; Nordin 
& Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 391-92; Skerry, Christian 
Schools v. the l.R.S. , supra note 293, at 18. 
325. Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15-16; see also 
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 186. 
326. Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15-16. 
327. Id. at 1 15-18. 
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Nonetheless, enrollment at most Christian academies remains over­
whelmingly white.328 
Importantly, the surge in Christian academies occurred during a 
period when enrollment in Catholic schools declined dramatically. Un­
til 1965, to say you were enrolled in a private school was to say, essen­
tially, that you attended a Catholic parochial school. In 1965, 6.3 mil­
lion students attended private schools; of that number, 5.5 million -
almost 90% - attended Catholic parochial schools.329 Of those re­
maining, 350,000 attended nonreligious institutions, and slightly more 
than 450,000 went to religious schools not associated with the Catholic 
Church. Thus, while Catholic schools accounted for nearly 90% of all 
private-school enrollment, all other religious schools combined -
including Protestant schools of all denominations and Jewish schools 
- accounted for only 7% of that figure.330 
Over the next two decades, the demographics of private schools 
changed dramatically, with Catholics and Protestants passing each 
other at the schoolhouse door. As conservative Christians led a mass 
exodus from the public schools, many Catholics deserted parochial 
education in favor of public school.331 Between 1965 and 1983, while 
Christian academies grew by over 700%, Catholic schools lost nearly 
half their enrollment, with the number of students falling from 5.6 to 
three million.332 Many causes account for this drop in enrollment, in­
cluding a declining birthrate, the Church's failure to build schools in 
the suburbs, and the growing acceptability of public schools, which 
had lost their Protestant identification.333 Whatever the precise cause, 
the result was clear: By the mid-1980s, private schools were no longer 
overwhelmingly Catholic. Indeed, by 1984, there were 1 ,300 more 
Christian academies than Catholic parochial schools, although the lat­
ter had a majority of private-school students because of higher aver­
age enrollment.334 
The rise of Christian academies and decline of parochial schools 
has had three important consequences for church-state politics. First, 
Catholic schools no longer dominate the private school landscape. In 
328. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126; Carper 
& Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra 
note 266, at 187. 
329. KENNETH A. SIMON & W. VANCE GRANT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. AND WELFARE, D IGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 32 (1968). 
330. Id. 
331. Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 111 .  
332. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at  87. 
333. SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 322-23; JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, 
CHOOSING EQUALITY 81-82 (1999) [hereinafter VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY); 
Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 86-88. 
334. Cooper, Changing Demography of Private Schools, supra note 266, at 430. 
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the 1997-1998 school year, 27,400 private schools existed nationwide, 
serving nearly five million students - approximately 10% of total 
elementary and secondary school enrollment.335 For the first time in 
this century, Catholic schools accounted for less than half of private­
school enrollment. Other religious schools, most of which are Chris­
tian academies, enrolled 34.8% of private-school students. Although 
precise figures on enrollment in Christian academies are not available, 
a conservative estimate puts it at no less than 20% of the total of all 
private-school students.336 This growing diversity among private 
schools opened the door to political alliances that previously had been 
unthinkable and eased the path to doctrinal reform by altering the 
practical effects of government aid to religious institutions. 
The second consequence of the rise of Christian academies was an 
upsurge in political activity as evangelicals and fundamentalists fought 
to protect their fledgling schools. As we discuss below, Christian 
academies played a crucial role in the formation of a politically active 
religious right. The third consequence was that conservative Protes­
tants now had an incentive to rethink their traditional hostility to 
school aid and to soften their stance on church-state separation. Over 
time, and with some limited exceptions, this is exactly what transpired. 
B. The New Politics of Protestantism 
In hindsight, it seems inevitable that the growth of Christian 
academies would lead to a splintering of the Protestant position on 
church-state separation. Evangelicals now had schools of their own, 
which desperately needed financial support. Mainline denominations 
did not. But the disintegration of the Protestant coalition - and the 
shift in political power away from mainline denominations to evan­
gelicals - occurred more gradually than deterministic hindsight might 
suggest. 
335. These figures and the additional ones cited in this paragraph all come from a report 
published by the National Center for Education Statistics. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., 
1997-98 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 1-4 (Aug. 1999). 
336. This estimate derives from commentators' estimates, e.g. , FOWLER ET AL., 
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 33; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 
269, at 454; as well as from the figures reported in the NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., su­
pra note 335, at 3. The latter indicates that non-Catholic religious schools enrolled 34.8% of 
private-school students. Of these, those unaffiliated with any major denomination consti­
tuted 9.4%; those affiliated with a national denomination were 10.9%; and those affiliated 
with a conservative Christian school association were 14.5%.  Not all Christian academies are 
affiliated with a conservative Christian school association; some are affiliated only with a 
national denomination and some are not affiliated at all. Based on the estimates given by 
Rose and Fowler, it thus seems reasonable to conclude that Christian academies enroll about 
one million students. 
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1. Evangelicals and the Religious Right 
The advent of Christian academies did not lead to instant calls for 
government aid, because the initial impulse behind these schools was 
resolutely separationist. Those creating and attending Christian 
academies wanted to separate themselves from the public schools and 
from the dominant secular culture they reflected. To take financial as­
sistance from the government would have exposed Christian acade­
mies to the secular control and influence that had polluted the public 
schools and driven evangelicals away.337 The immediate aim of the 
Christian academies was thus not to secure ; government aid but to 
fight government regulation.338 
Throughout the 1970s, evangelicals sought to secure private fund­
ing and resist government supervision, including accreditation and 
teacher certification requirements.339 Christian academies waged doz­
ens of court battles against state regulators, many of them successful.340 
Evangelicals argued that their schools were an extension of their min­
istries, and that schools and churches could . not be distinguished. As 
Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell said in 1981, when helping to fight 
state regulation of Christian academies in _Nebraska, "to submit to 
state certification is to submit to licensure and the right of the state to 
license a church and its Christian ministry. We believe the church and 
the church school are all the church."341 Falwell, like other evangelical 
leaders, would change his tune (or whistle out of the other side of his 
mouth) when it came to seeking government assistance for religious 
schools. That ambition, of course, required that a religious school not 
be seen merely as an extension of the church. But in the early days of 
the Christian academies, the dominant concern of evangelicals was 
captured by Falwell's statement in Nebraska. Evangelicals resisted 
337. As one Pentecostal minister in Kentucky explained, "(w]e don't want any state 
money," because "[w]e don't want their nose in our business all the time." Reese, Soldiers 
for Christ, supra note 266, at 193. 
338. Perhaps that is why NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 
279, written in the mid-1970s, does not once suggest that these schools were interested in 
securing government aid. 
339. For descriptions of these fights, see Carper, The ,Christian Day School, supra note 
269, at 121-22; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 181-83; Rose, Christian Funda­
mentalism, supra note 269, at 464 (calling this issue a "cause celebre" among evangelicals 
and fundamentalists); and B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Private Schools Provoking Church-State 
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1978, at Al. 
340. These cases are discussed in PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, 
supra note 295, at 146-52; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 121-22; 
Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 182. 
341. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 182; see also PARSONS, INSIDE 
AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 141 (explaining that, to fundamental­
ists, "a church school is not a separate entity from the church, not an agency of the church, 
not an arm of the church. Rather, it is the church itself in action."). 
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government regulation on the ground that their academies had been 
"accredited by the Lord."342 
Their position on school aid began to change when evangelicals 
organized politically. The impetus for that organization came, appro­
priately enough, from a fight over regulations proposed by the epit­
ome of government officiousness, the IRS.343 Spurred by a lawsuit, the 
IRS in 1970 decided to deny tax-exempt status to nonprofit private 
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. In 1975, the IRS ex­
tended this policy to private religious schools. Enforcement, however, 
was notoriously lax. Civil rights advocates pressed for stringent guide­
lines to assure that private schools not only considered black appli­
cants but made special efforts to attract them. In 1978, at the behest of 
the Carter administration, the IRS proposed new regulations that 
would have presumed that schools begun during a period of desegre­
gation were segregationist. The schools could rebut this presumption 
only by actually enrolling a certain quota of African-American stu­
dents or by documenting substantial recruiting efforts. 
The proposal ignited a political firestorm. Christian conservatives 
were outraged, and not simply because the loss of tax-exempt status 
would hurt their schools financially. Perhaps more importantly, they 
saw the government attempting to control the Christian academies. 
They "were shocked to be told that their schools must alter their cur­
riculum or provide special scholarships for minorities to avoid gov­
ernment harassment."344 With the help of Jerry Falwell, at the time a 
relatively unknown televangelist, Christian conservatives mounted an 
assault on the IRS. Falwell supplied the Christian Action Coalition 
with a mailing list of his contributors, and the Coalition organized a 
writing campaign. The IRS received 150,000 letters of protest, many 
342. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 183. For similar statements, see 
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 147-48. 
343. The information in this paragraph comes from NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS 
THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 15-19; PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN 
SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 119-22; Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 139-
47; Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., supra note 293, at 31-40. 
344. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 145. It is difficult to tell whether 
conservative evangelicals were more upset by the prospective loss of tax-exempt status or by 
the symbolic effect of being taxed, but the latter may have been the more irksome. Most 
Christian academies received relatively modest donations from individuals, NEVIN & BILLS, 
THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 13-15, 29-36, who did not receive much 
financial benefit from the deductibility of donations and thus would not likely be deterred 
from giving money by a change in the law. Instead, it seems that conservative evangelicals 
viewed the tax-exempt status of private schools as a neutral baseline and considered the 
proposal to tax such schools as an effort to control them. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S 
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 123 (explaining that "Christian school proponents 
argue that the power to tax is the power to control"). The 1978 IRS proposal surely only 
strengthened this perspective, as it obviously attempted to use the carrot and stick of tax ex­
emptions to induce Christian academies to embrace affirmative action. 
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more than they had ever received regarding any proposal. The opposi­
tion succeeded when Congress prohibited the IRS regulations.345 
Even more important than the victory over the IRS was the culture 
war inspired by that battle. Success against the IRS prompted Falwell 
and Warren Billings, the leader of the Christian Action Coalition, to 
found the Moral Majority.346 A highly publicized and controversial or­
ganization, the Moral Majority launched what we now call the "relig­
ious right" - an affiliation of like-minded conservative religious indi­
viduals and organizations that would influence the Republican Party 
and emerge in the 1990s as a potent force in American politics.347 In 
this way, the Christian academies helped create a political movement 
that increased the influence of evangelicals.348 The Moral Majority, 
and later the Christian Coalition, provided an organizing locus for 
what otherwise might have remained a diffuse collection of mostly in­
dependent churches and schools. Through the major organizations of 
the religious right, evangelicals and fundamentalists could present a 
unified front.349 The political mobilization and growing political influ­
ence of the religious right meant that the conservative evangelical po­
sition on church-state relations suddenly mattered. 
Though the organizational origins of the religious right lay in the 
fight to protect Christian academies, the Supreme Court's decisions on 
abortion helped energize the movement.350 Legalizing abortion, like 
removing prayer and Bible reading from the schools, confirmed evan­
gelical fears that America was deserting Christianity. To the faithful, 
these decisions were ominous signals "that the country had fallen into 
345. For a description of Falwell's participation and the letter writing campaign, includ­
ing the reaction of Congress, see Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 144-45. 
346. Id. at 144. 
347. On the rise of the religious right, see CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 
159, at 135-66; and FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 79-82, 90-91 ,  
142-48. See generally No LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993) (a collection of essays and responses on the growth 
and future of the religious right). 
348. HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11 ,  at 175-78 (arguing that 
government regulation of Christian schools, both threatened and real, was the primary rea­
son why conservative Christians became politically active). 
349. This is not to say that all evangelicals are members of the religious right and sup­
port its goals, nor that the religious right consists only of conservative evangelicals. Although 
identifying with precision those individuals or groups who make up the religious right is im­
possible, the religious right essentially consists of those evangelicals and fundamentalists 
"who participated in or sympathized with the movement [begun in the late 1970s] to bring 
conservative moral and social change to the United States, in line with their religious val­
ues." Robert Booth Fowler, The Failure of the Religious Right, in No LONGER EXILES: THE 
RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 60 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993). 
350. See, e.g., A. James Reichley, The Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt, in PIETY 
AND POLITICS: EVANGELICALS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS CONFRONT THE WORLD 69, 76 
(Richard John Neuhaus & Michael Cromartie eds., 1987) [hereinafter Reichley, Evangelical 
Revolt]. 
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the hands of secular elites who were hostile to traditional faith and its 
norms. "351 
When the Moral Majority began in 1979, therefore, the time was 
ripe for political activism. Conservative evangelicals, especially fun­
damentalists, traditionally viewed politics as a distasteful engagement 
with a sinful world.352 Although many evangelical churches encour­
aged members to vote, they did not invest much effort in politics, be­
yond the occasional fight over alcohol or gambling.353 During the civil 
rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, while mainline 
denominations offered active assistance and support for voting and 
civil rights for African Americans, Falwell and other conservative 
evangelical leaders remained on the sidelines.354 In 1979, however, 
Falwell and compatriots began a campaign to convince fellow believ­
ers to abandon what was now called "the myth" that fundamentalists 
should avoid politics.355 The religious right conducted an intensive and 
largely successful campaign to convince conservative evangelicals that 
their religious commitment to church-state separation did not pre­
clude them from entering the political arena. "The pulpit should be in 
politics," leaders of the Moral Majority argued, adding that "when you 
baptize a child you should register him to vote."356 Falwell and other 
leaders spread their message through publications, such as Falwell's 
book Listen, America!, which urged evangelicals to become active po­
litically.357 They also used their ubiquitous television broadcasts to 
reach literally millions of viewers.358 
351. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 142. 
352. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 147-49; FOWLER ET AL., 
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 40; HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, 
supra note 11 ,  at 159; Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75. 
353. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 40; Reichley, Evan­
gelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75. 
354. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 148-49; HODGSON, 
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11 ,  at 180; RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE 
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 10 (1984). 
355. John Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies Expect Harvest of Votes for Conserva­
tives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1984, at A38 [hereinafter Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies]; 
see also FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 40; Reichley, Evangeli­
cal Revolt, supra note 350, at 88. 
356. Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies, supra note 355, at A38. 
357. JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! (1980). For a thorough exegesis of Falwell's 
book, see CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 150-54. 
358. Evangelicals and fundamentalists cornered the market for religious broadcasting in 
the 1970s. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has always required television 
stations to devote some airtime to religious programming, but in the 1970s the stations, with 
FCC approval, began charging for the time. Mainline denominations declined to enter the 
market, which was quickly dominated by evangelical and fundamentalist preachers. See 
Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75. The importance of television to the 
rise of the religious right cannot be gainsaid. "Had the Religious Right not enjoyed the tech­
nologies of religious television," observed sociologist Robert Wuthnow, "it might never have 
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As Falwell and other leaders of the religious right succeeded 
within the churches, they gained power elsewhere. The reason is not 
hard to fathom: white evangelical Protestants constitute approxi­
mately one-fourth of the American electorate.359 Most evangelicals are 
politically conservative. Despite theological and political differences, 
evangelicals represent a broad coalition that generally supports con­
servative Republican politics.360 As evangelicals mobilized politically 
through various organizations of the religious right, politicians heard 
their call.361 As early as the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan courted 
their support. At a convention of televangelists in 1980, Ronald 
Reagan acknowledged that they, as religious leaders, might be unable 
to endorse a political candidate, but, he declared, "I endorse you."362 
In response, evangelicals abandoned their born-again brother, Presi­
dent Carter, and supported Reagan's victorious presidential bid.363 
Reagan responded by endorsing their agenda and by including promi­
nent evangelicals, such as Gary Bauer, in his administration.364 
Although it stumbled at times, particularly in the late 1980s, the 
religious right has maintained support and influence. The Moral Ma­
jority, which generated a lot of publicity and at one point claimed four 
million members, always rested on shaky financial grounds and dis-
become the powerful movement it did." Robert Wuthnow, The Future of the Religious Right, 
in NO LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (Michael 
Cromartie ed., 1993). 
359. See FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 92; HODGSON, 
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 1 1 ,  at 184; Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra 
note 350, at 72. Though African Americans are overwhelmingly Christian, predominately 
Protestant, and a substantial portion are evangelical Protestants, they do not tend to support 
the Republican Party. In increasing numbers, however, they do support aid to religious 
schools through measures such as vouchers. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, su­
pra note 1 1 ,  at 1 1 1-12. 
360. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 41 ; Robert Dugan, 
Comment, in No LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 82 
(Michael Cromartie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Dugan, Comment] ("evangelicals are more con­
servative, generally, than are most other segments of the population"); Kathleen Murphy 
Beatty & B. Oliver Walter, Fundamentalists, Evangelicals, and Politics, 16 AM. POL. Q. 43 
(1988); Corwin Smidt, Evangelical Voting Patterns, 1976-1988, in NO LONGER EXILES: THE 
RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 97-100 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993). See 
generally PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182 (describing how, by the 1960s, 
evangelical Christians were ideologically in tune with conservative politicians). 
361 .  Dugan, Comment, supra note 360, at 82-83 (describing how, beginning in 1979, 
"Republicans have been actively cultivating evangelicals"). The Democratic Party, by con­
trast, has rebuffed overtures from evangelical groups such as the National Association of 
Evangelicals. Id. at 83. 
362. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 1 19. 
363. Id. at 101; HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11, at 169. 
364. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 473. 
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banded in 1986.365 Despite premature obituaries, however, the larger 
movement did not wither. Instead, the Christian Coalition, led by Pat 
Robertson and Ralph Reed, emerged in the late 1980s as the premier 
organization of the religious right. By the mid-1990s, Reed had helped 
build an organization with over one million members, affiliates in 
every state in the country and in 900 localities, an active lobby in 
Washington, and a budget exceeding twenty million dollars.366 The 
Christian Coalition has since been joined by other groups, including 
the Family Research Council (led by Gary Bauer) and Focus on the 
Family (led by James Dobson), along with the Southern Baptist Con­
vention and the National Association of Evangelicals.367 These organi­
zations help shape the Republican Party's national agenda and exert 
influence in local and state political contests, including placing conser­
vative Christians on local and state boards of education.368 
Just what, exactly, has the religious right been fighting for? From 
the beginning, protecting religious schools and prohibiting abortion 
have topped the agenda.369 Less obviously, given their separationist 
tradition, they also want to restore school prayer.370 More surprisingly 
still, the protection of Christian academies quickly came to include not 
simply shielding them from state regulation but also securing govern­
ment financial assistance. By the late 1970s, Falwell and other leaders 
of the religious right began to flip on church-state separation; where 
they once had argued that financial aid to religious schools violated 
the Establishment Clause, they now clamored for increased govern­
mental assistance, typically in the form of tuition tax credits or vouch­
ers.371 In 1978, for example, a tuition tax-credit bill debated in 
365. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 79-82; BARBARA B. 
GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS: RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION AND 
VALUES 23 (1996) [hereinafter GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS) . 
366. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 142-48. 
367. For a description of the various groups comprising the religious right, see 
CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 146-47; GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS, 
supra note 365, at 17-32; Richard V. Pierard, The Historical Background of the Evangelical 
Assault on the Separation of Church and State in the U.S.A. ,  in INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 65-68 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993); and People for 
the American Way, Who's Who on the Religious Right, http://www.pfaw.org/issues/right/ 
bg_groups.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). 
368. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 81-82, 148; GADDY, ET 
AL., SCHOOL WARS, supra note 365, at 55-61; Dugan, Comment, supra note 360, at 82-83. 
369. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 464; Charles Austin, Religious 
Right Growing Impatient with Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1982, at A13 [hereinafter 
Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient]. 
370. E.g. , FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 19-43 (1999) (describing the religious 
right's campaign to restore school prayer). 
371. See Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193-94; School Tax Credits: Mak­
ing New Converts, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 22, 1978, at 37-38 [hereinafter School Tax 
Credits]. As Reese points out, the new stance on aid to schools taken by evangelical leaders 
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Congress received strong support not only from Catholic groups, but 
also from Jerry Falwell and evangelicals.372 
This is not to suggest that all conservative evangelicals changed 
their minds on school aid. The issue remained controversial within this 
community, and some fundamentalists continued to oppose any form 
of governmental assistance on the ground that it would lead to gov­
ernmental control.373 But since the 1980s, the religious right increas­
ingly has supported government aid for religious schools. In 1982 the 
New York Times reported that allowing school prayer, prohibiting 
abortion, and securing tuition tax-credits topped the agenda of relig­
ious conservatives.374 Similar reports appeared two years later375 and 
continued through the Reagan and Bush Administrations, as leaders 
of the religious right supported tax credits and vouchers.376 Conserva­
tive evangelicals also joined in litigation designed to secure benefits 
for parochial schools.377 By the mid-1990s, the religious right and aid to 
placed them in the awkward position of simultaneously opposing any government regulation 
of Christian academies and advocating for government subsidies. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, 
supra note 266, at 193. The inconsistency of this position - and therefore perhaps the extent 
to which evangelicals had reversed course on church-state separation - was tempered 
somewhat by the fact that evangelical leaders initially confined their support to indirect aid 
through tax credits or vouchers, rather than direct aid to religious schools. Vouchers and tax 
credits, at least formally, aid parents, who then decide how to use them. They may therefore 
not be regarded as equivalent to direct financial subsidies. Nonetheless, as Reese and others 
explain, supporting tax credits and vouchers represented a new stance for evangelicals. Id. at 
193; School Tax Credits, supra, at 37. 
372. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193. As an article in Christianity To-
day described: 
Floyd Robertson, public affairs director of the National Association of Evangelicals, super­
church pastors Robert Schuller and Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson, talk show host and 
head of the Christian Broadcasting Network, all favored the bill. Even evangelist Billy 
Graham voiced loud support for this bill that would give federal income tax credit for school 
tuition. Evangelical support for the bill was an about face for some people who in the past 
would have opposed the bill on grounds of separation of church and state; tax credits - / 
money subtracted from taxes due - would especially benefit students in parochial schools. 
School Tax Credits, supra note 371, at 37. Mainline Protestant groups, including the Baptist 
Joint Committee on Public Affairs, opposed the bill. See Private Education: A Tax Break, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 21, 1978, at 43 [hereinafter Private Education: A Tax Break]. 
373. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193; see also PARSONS, INSIDE 
AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 152 (citing a principal of one funda­
mentalist school who, in the 1980s, refused any government assistance "because government 
intervention always follows government handouts"). 
374. Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient, supra note 369, at A13. 
375. Herbers, Activism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9. 
376. E.g. , PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL 
OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 6-7, 29-30, 65 (1994) [hereinafter COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE] . 
See also VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 92-113. 
377. The Christian Legal Society, for example, which represents the interests of evan­
gelical Christians, has appeared as amicus in numerous court cases, arguing in support of 
prayer at school graduation and aid to religious schools. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992), it filed an amicus brief, joined by the National Association of Evangelicals, in sup-
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religious schools were inextricably linked. Indeed, in 1995, Ralph 
Reed, at a press conference attended by Newt Gingrich and Phil 
Gramm, announced the Christian Coalition's Contract with the 
American Family.378 Following the form of the Republicans' Contract 
with America, the Coalition listed ten goals, the first three of which 
concerned schools. They were, in order: securing a constitutional 
amendment to allow prayer in schools and at other public events, 
eliminating the department of education, and providing vouchers for 
private schools.379 
In fighting for school aid, religious-right political organizations 
such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition were joined by 
conservative religious groups. These included the Southern Baptist 
Convention, which is the leadership organ of the nation's largest Prot­
estant denomination, and the National Association of Evangelicals.380 
For both organizations, these positions represented an about-face 
from their traditional stand on church-state separation. 
Until the 1980s, the Southern Baptist Convention was a faithful 
constituent of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, organ­
ized in 1941 to fight for separation of church and state.381 The South­
ern Baptist Convention and the Baptist Joint Committee played key 
roles in the creation of Protestants and Other Americans United for 
the Separation of Church and State, an organization specifically de­
voted to maintaining complete separation.382 In the 1980s, however, 
fundamentalists won control of the Southern Baptist Convention, and 
the Convention soon began to distance itself from the Baptist Joint 
Committee.383 Throughout the 1980s, the Convention endorsed the 
port of allowing prayer at school graduations. It also filed amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997) and Mitchell v. Helms, 593 U.S. 793 (2000). The NAE joined both. 
378. The Christian Coalition Signs on the Dotted Line, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1995, at 
A45. 
379. Id. In 1998, Randy Tate, who succeeded Ralph Reed as executive director of the 
Christian Coalition, indicated that his organization's members ranked school choice as only 
second in importance to pro-life issues. Ted C. Olsen, Voucher Victory, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY, Sept. 7, 1998, at 2, available at http://www.christianityonline.com/ct/8ta/8ta072.html 
[hereinafter Olsen, Voucher Victory]. 
380. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 65-68; DAVID STRICKLIN, A 
GENEALOGY OF DISSENT: SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
150-51 (John B. Boles ed., 1999) (hereinafter STRICKLIN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST]. 
381. EDWARD L. QUEEN II, IN THE SOUTH THE BAPTISTS ARE THE CENTER OF 
GRAVITY: SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1930-1980, at 102-10 (Jerald c. 
Brauer & Martin E. Marty eds., 1991) (hereinafter QUEEN, SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE]. 
382. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 76-77; Peterson, Baptist Joint 
Committee, supra note 180, at 128-30. 
383. NANCY AMERMAN, BAPTIST BATTLES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 69-72 (1990); Herbers, Moral Majority 
and Its Allies, supra note 355, at A38. 
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Republican Party's positions on church-state issues, including a return 
to organized school prayer and government funding for religious 
schools.384 In the early 1990s, the Southern Baptist Convention severed 
all ties with the Baptist Joint Committee.385 The Convention is now a 
staunch advocate of school prayer and aid to religious schools.386 
Like the Southern Baptist Convention, the National Association of 
Evangelicals ("NAE") traditionally supported strict separation of 
church and state. Formed in 1948 and now representing twenty million 
evangelicals from seventy-four denominations and 50,000 churches,387 
the NAE's original constitution endorsed "the preservation of separa­
tion between church and state."388 With the Southern Baptists, the 
NAE was an early and active supporter of Protestants and Others 
United for the Separation of Church and State.389 In 1979, however, 
the leadership of the NAE linked with the newly founded Moral Ma­
jority.390 In the 1980s and 1990s the NAE publicly supported prayer in 
public schools and government assistance for religious schools.391 The 
384. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 67-68; QUEEN, SOUTHERN 
BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 381, at 112. 
38S. STRICKLIN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST, supra note 380, at lSO-Sl. 
386. E.g. , Agostini v. Felton, S21 U.S. 203 (1997) (appearing as amicus, along with the 
Christian Legal Society, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Catholic League, 
to argue in favor of overturning Aguilar and allowing public school teachers to provide re­
medial instruction in religious schools); Lee v. Weisman, SOS U.S. S77 (1992) (appearing as 
amicus to argue in favor of allowing prayer at graduation ceremonies). 
387. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAE et al. at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, S30 U.S. 793 (2000) 
(No. 98-1648). 
388. EVANGELICAL ACTION: A REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS FOR UNITED ACTION 42-43, 104, 112 (Executive Commit­
tee ed., 1942). 
389. See Editorial, Defending Religious Liberty!, 7 UNITED EVANGELICAL ACTION 12 
(Mar. 1 ,  1948) ("[W]e not only heartily endorse 'Americans United' but we intend to work 
with them to preserve our liberty."). Until the late 1970s, the NAE worked with Americans 
United to oppose aid to parochial schools and diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 
PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 72-80 (identifying anti-Catholic senti­
ment as the main motivation for the NAE's separationist stance). 
390. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 68. 
391. Religious Freedom Protection: Hearing on H.J. Res. 184 Before the House Sub­
comm. on the Constitution & Comm. on the Judiciary, lOSth Cong. 97-180 (1996) (statement 
of Forest Montgomery, Counsel, Office for Governmental Affairs, Nat'I Ass'n of Evangeli­
cals) (supporting amendment to allow school prayer and funding of private religious 
schools); PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 66; William Bentley Ball, Eco­
nomic Freedom of Parental Choice in Education: The Pennsylvania Constitution, 101 DICK. 
L. REV. 261, 262-63 & n.4 (1997); Joyce Price, Wisconsin Wants Parochial Schools in Choice 
Program; Strong Challenges Expected on Church-State Grounds, WASH. TIMES, Jan 16, 199S, 
at Al (quoting the head of NAE's office of Public Affairs in praise of vouchers). An edito­
rial in 1998 in CHRISTIANITY TODAY, a magazine devoted to evangelical positions on 
church-state issues, similarly praised vouchers and argued that including private religious 
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause. See Editorial, Religious Schools Make the 
Grade: Give Wisconsin an A for Saying No to Secularist Nonsense, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 
Aug. 10, 1998, at 28, available at http://www.christianityonline.com/ct/8t9/8t9028.html. 
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NAE has also participated as an amicus in Supreme Court cases, ar­
guing in support of prayer at graduation ceremonies and direct federal 
financial assistance to religious schools.392 
Christian schools themselves joined the phalanx of supporters of 
school aid. They are represented by two leading groups: the American 
Association of Christian Schools ("AACS"), founded in 1972, and the 
Association of Christian Schools International ("ACSI"), founded in 
1978 through the merger of a number of smaller organizations.393 The 
ACSI is the larger and more pluralistic of the associations, while the 
AACS is smaller and more fundamentalist.394 While the AACS has 
tended to keep a low profile in legislative and legal battles, the ACSI 
has been active in both.395 It belongs to the Council for American Pri­
vate Education - an umbrella organization that lobbies for increased 
aid for private schools - whose state chapters filed an amicus brief in 
Helms supporting government aid to religious schools.396 In 1992, the 
ACSI joined with nineteen other secular and religious groups to form 
the National Coalition for Improvement and Reform in Education, 
which supported President Bush's school-choice proposal.397 
Why did evangelicals and fundamentalists switch sides on the ques­
tion of aid to religious schools? The obvious answer is self-interest: as 
Christian academies proliferated and the need for financial assistance 
increased, conservative evangelicals reassessed their earlier opposition 
392. Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793 (2000) (98-1648) (joining Christian Legal Society to argue for including religious schools 
in federal funding program); Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Agos­
tini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (96-552) (joining Christian Legal Society, Catholic League, 
and Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission in arguing to overrule Aguilar); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (90-
1014) (joining brief of Christian Legal Society in favor of prayer at graduation). 
393. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 455. 
394. The ACSI represents over 2,000 schools and close to 400,000 pupils; the AACS 
represents about 1 ,400 schools with approximately 200,000 students. Carper & Layman, 
Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 118; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 
269, at 455. 
395. This is not to suggest that the AACS has been dormant on the issue. In 1988, for 
example, it joined nearly thirty other organizations, including the National Association of 
Evangelicals, the U.S. Catholic Conference, and Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum, to form 
Americans for Educational Choice (AEC). One of the AEC's objectives is to secure gov­
ernment financing of religious schools. See Sidney Goetz, 'Parental Choice' Could Destroy 
Public Education, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at A2 [hereinafter Goetz, Parental 
Choice]. The AACS has been less visible, however, in court cases, not having appeared as 
amicus in any of the recent Supreme Court decisions involving prayer or aid to religious 
schools. 
396. Council for American Private Education, http://www.capenet.org/member.html 
(listing members); Amicus Brief of Arizona Council for American Private Education et al., 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648). 
397. WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 266, at 138-39; Mark Walsh, Private School, 
Religious Groups Join to Back President's Choice Proposal, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 29, 1992, at 
23. 
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to state aid.398 Additionally, the enemy changed. The historic Protes­
tant hostility to school aid sprang, at least in part, from antipathy to­
ward Roman Catholics. Conservative evangelicals were less commit- , 
ted to the abstract principle of separation than to the practical goal of 
preventing Catholics from acquiring political power.399 Beginning with 
the school-prayer decisions, conservative evangelicals came to see 
secularists as their real enemies.400 Catholics joined evangelicals in op­
position to the increasing secularization of American public life, 
seeking tbe reintroduction of prayer in schools, aid to religious educa­
tion, and an end to abortion.401 Thus, the enemy of the enemy became 
a friend, and much of the emotional energy for opposing school aid 
evaporated.402 
Finally, political engagement fed on itself. As conservative evan­
gelicals became more engaged politically, they overcame their 
squeamishness about political involvement in a secular world and be­
came more insistent that the government advance their policies. Not 
only did conservative evangelicals begin to argue for government aid 
to their schools; they also called for a return to school prayer.403 The 
very act of political engagement appears to have helped shape the 
politics of evangelicals, transforming a separatist agenda into one that 
sought government endorsement - of their schools, through financial 
assistance, and of their moral views, through prohibition of abortion 
and reintroduction of school prayer.404 
398. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 65 (arguing that "Fundamentalists 
support vouchers for the obvious reason that they would like to be able to receive state 
funds to subsidize their schools"); Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 76 (argu­
ing that the "financial needs of the [Christian] schools . . .  weakened the Evangelicals' long­
standing opposition to government aid for church-sponsored education"); Interview with 
Forrest Montgomery, Office for Governmental Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals 
(NAE) (Sept. 8, 2000) (suggesting that the NAE went from opposing aid to parochial 
schools to supporting it in the 1980s because, by then, there were a large number of Christian 
evangelical schools). 
399. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 120. 
400. In 1963, for example, the NAE Office of Public Affairs issued a statement criticiz­
ing the Court's school prayer decision, arguing that it "augments the trend toward complete 
secularization." Don Gill, Capital Commentary, 22 UNITED EVANGELICAL ACTION 2 (Aug. 
1963). The NAE then played an active role in supporting various efforts, including a consti­
tutional amendment, in 1963 and 1964 to overturn the school prayer decisions. PIERARD, 
THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 82. 
401. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 70-74; Herbers, Activ­
ism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9; John Herbers, Church Issues Spread to State Races, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1984, at B9 [hereinafter Herbers, Church Issues]. 
402. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 249-51 .  For further 
discussion on the alliance between Catholics and conservative Evangelicals, see infra notes 
460-465 and accompanying text. 
403. Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient, supra note 369, at Al3. 
404. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 480 (observing that, "as fun­
damentalists have reasserted their presence and influence in the last two decades, they have 
become less separatist"). 
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In terms of concrete achievements, the record of the religious right 
has been mixed. Although the movement has begun to have some suc­
cess on the question of aid to religious schools, it has made little prog­
ress in restoring prayer to the public schools. In the legislative sphere, 
the impact of the religious right has been slight. At the federal level, 
none of the various proposals to grant tuition tax-credits or vouchers 
for private schools have been enacted.405 The religious right, working 
in tandem with a diverse group of school choice supporters, has been 
more successful at the state level, where several voucher programs 
have been adopted.406 
But this less-than-impressive legislative record should not mask the 
remarkable success that the religious right has had in setting the 
agenda of the Republican Party on school prayer and aid to religious 
education. Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the Republican 
Party has strongly endorsed the goals of restoring prayer in public 
schools and providing financial assistance to parents who wish to send 
their children to religious schools.407 Reagan supported a constitu­
tional amendment to allow school prayer and various proposals for 
tuition tax-credits.408 Bush, although at first lukewarm to the religious 
right, made amends with that group by introducing a school-choice 
405. The current Bush administration has continued the Republican tradition of sup­
porting vouchers for use at religious schools. The administration proposed a voucher plan of 
its own, which it eventually abandoned in light of opposition from Congress. See Lizette 
Alvarez, Senate Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 
2001, at A26. The Bush administration also filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court 
to grant certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher pro­
gram, and to issue a decision upholding the use of vouchers at religious schools. Linda 
Greenhouse, White House Asks for Voucher Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2001 , at Al9. The 
Court has recently granted the petition and will hear the case in early 2002. See supra note 1 .  
406. Voucher programs, which allow parents to use state-funded vouchers at private, 
religious schools, exist in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida. Evangelicals actively sup­
ported the programs in each state. E.g. , COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 64-
68 (describing Milwaukee program); VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 
92-113 (describing Milwaukee and Cleveland programs, as well as privately funded voucher 
programs); HURBERT MORKEN & Jo RENEE FORMICOLA, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL 
CHOICE 168-93 (1999) (describing political activities of evangelicals regarding school 
choice). 
407. Both goals have been a part of the Republican Party platform since 1980. See Re­
publican Platform 2000, Education and Opportunity: Leave No American Behind, available 
at http://www.expandnato.org/rp2.html; Republican Platform: Prosperity, Self Government, 
and 'Moral Clarity,' 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 021, 032 (1996); The Platform: Party Stresses 
Family Values, Decentralized Authority, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 78A, 80A-81A (1992); Re­
publican Party Issues Detailed, Long Platform, 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 46A, 54A, 57 A 
{1988); Text of 1984 Republican Party Platform, 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 418, 50B (1984); 
1980 Republican Platform, 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58B, 63B (1980). 
408. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 6-7, 17-18, 29-30 (describing 
Reagan's support of funding private school choice); Herbers, Church Issues, supra note 401 , 
at B9 (describing how Reagan embraced both fundamentalist Protestants and conservative 
Catholic positions on abortion, homosexuality, and aid to parochial schools). 
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proposal of his own in 1992.409 And Republicans (and a few Demo­
crats) in Congress have introduced various school-prayer amendments 
and school-choice proposals and, in 1996, sought to amend the Consti­
tution to allow for both.410 
This proposed amendment, entitled the Religious Freedom 
Amendment, shows just how far conservative evangelicals and the 
Republican Party have moved on aid to religious schools.411 In the 
1870s, the Republican Party, backed by Protestants of all stripes, sup­
ported the Blaine Amendment, which would have explicitly prohibited 
any and all forms of financial assistance to religious schools. More 
than a century later, a different Republican Party again sought to 
amend the Constitution, only this time to ensure that religious schools 
would be entitled to any and all government benefits that would flow 
to similar institutions.412 Like the Blaine Amendment, the Religious 
Freedom Amendment failed to pass despite majority support in the 
House.413 But just as the Blaine Amendment expressed Republican 
and Protestant hostility toward religious (meaning Catholic) schools in 
the nineteenth century, the Religious Freedom Amendment captured 
the fervor with which conservative evangelical Protestants now sup­
ported aid to religious schools.414 It also revealed the extent to which 
evangelicals managed · to influence the Republican Party, at the ex-
409. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 7; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND 
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 120, 143; VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 
87-88. As Fowler describes, Bush, an Episcopalian, did not like to talk much about his relig­
ion and when forced to do so, sometimes appeared awkward. Retelling his experience of 
being shot down as a Navy pilot in World War II, for example, Bush said that, while floating 
in the Pacific Ocean: "I thought of my family, my mom and dad, and the strength I got from 
them. I thought of my faith and the separation of church and state." FOWLER ET AL., 
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 120 (quoting Bushisms: President George 
Herbert Walker Bush, in His Own Words (New Republic ed., 1992)). 
410. On school prayer amendments, see, e.g., Steve Benent, Injudicious Committee: 
Istook Religion Amendment Clears House Judiciary Panel, Heads for Floor, 51 J. OF CH. & 
ST. 4 (1998) [hereinafter Benent, Injudicious Committee]; and Rep. Delay Attacks Church­
State Separation, 53 J. OF CH . & ST. 19 (2000). On school choice proposals, see, e.g., 
VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 88; and Rob Boston, Congressional 
Alert, 52 J. OF CH. & ST. 13 (1999) [hereinafter Boston, Congressional Alert]. 
411 .  For background on the Religious Freedom Amendment, also called the Istook 
Amendment after its main sponsor, Representative Ernest Istook (R-Okla.), see Benent, 
Injudicious Committee, supra note 410; and Rob Boston, Istook Amendment Defeated!, 51 J. 
OF CH. & ST. 8 (1998) [hereinafter Boston, Amendment Defeated]. 
412. The Amendment would guarantee the right to pray "on public property, including 
schools," and would prohibit denying "equal access to a benefit on account of religion." The 
intent of the latter provision, according to supporters of the amendment, was to guarantee 
that religious schools would "be treated the same as secular schools are treated" and would 
be entitled to receive public funding. See Benent, Injudicious Committee, supra note 410 
(quoting Henry Hyde). 
413. The vote was 197 Republicans and twenty-seven Democrats in favor, twenty-eight 
Republicans and 175 Democrats against. See Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411. 
414. Religious right organizations such as the Christian Coalition strongly supported the 
Amendment. See id. 
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pense of mainline denominations, which saw their political influence 
wane.415 
2. Other Protestants: From Mainline to Sideline 
Over the past four decades, the experience of mainline Protestant 
denominations has been the opposite of that of conservative evangeli­
cals. While conservative evangelicals have become more accommoda­
tionist on church-state issues, mainline Protestants - or at least their 
leadership - have become more consistently separationist. And while 
conservative evangelicals have seen their political influence grow, 
mainline Protestants have seen theirs diminish. 
In Part II, we described the origins of the three leading Protestant 
groups on church-state issues - the Baptist Joint Committee, Protes­
tants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and 
State, and the National Council of Churches. The subsequent histories 
of these groups all demonstrate increased commitment to separation 
of church and state and (perhaps partly as a consequence) decreased 
political clout. 
As noted above, in 1941 the Southern Baptist Convention, the 
Northern Baptist Convention, and the National Baptist Convention 
formed the Baptist Joint Committee. The founders organized the 
Committee to present a unified position on issues of church and state 
and to counter the growing political power of the Catholic Church. 
From the outset, the Committee took a strictly separationist position 
on church-state issues, opposing both aid to religious education and 
prayer in public schools.416 With slight deviations - including its even­
tual endorsement of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, which provided some aid to religious schools - the Baptist Joint 
Committee has maintained a separationist stance.417 The Committee 
415. Some opponents in Congress described the vote on the Amendment as a Republi­
can Party payback to aggressive religious right groups like the Christian Coalition, Focus on 
the Family, and the Family Research Council. As Representative Boehler! (R-N.Y.) as­
serted: "The Religious Freedom Amendment has nothing to do with acknowledging the 
power of God and everything to do with asserting the power of special interest groups that 
are all too human and flawed." Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411. 
416. See supra text accompanying notes 182 and 219. 
417. For descriptions of the role played by the Baptist Joint Committee in assisting the 
passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"), including the 
Committee's acceptance of religious schools as beneficiaries of federal financial aid, see 
PHILIP MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN 1965, at 72-74; 
Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 131-32. Also, see generally Dean M. 
Kelley & George R. Lanoue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Education 
Act, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 110-65 (Donald A. Gianella ed., 1965). Despite 
eventually supporting the inclusion of religious schools within the act's provisions, the 
Committee became an early critic. In 1966, for example, the Committee argued that the law, 
as applied, violated principles of church-state separation. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Bap­
tist Joint Committee at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648). The Com­
mittee's criticism of the act continued for the next three decades, culminating in an amicus 
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publicly supported the Court's school-prayer and Bible reading deci­
sions and opposed efforts to overturn those decisions by constitutional 
amendment.418 The Committee has since appeared as amicus advocat­
ing separatist positions in cases involving religion in the public 
schools.419 It has also consistently opposed public funding for religious 
education, testifying against federal aid proposals and arguing in court 
cases involving aid to religious schools.420 
While the Baptist Joint Committee remains one of the most active 
groups on church-state issues,421 it has lost its largest constituency. In 
the early 1990s, the Southern Baptist Convention severed all ties with 
the Joint Committee. In consequence, the Committee lost the largest 
part of its membership and its main source of funding.422 It also lost 
(any pretense of) the ability to speak for all Baptists. In two of the 
Court's most recent Establishment Clause cases - Lee v. Weisman 
and Agostini v. Felton - the Baptist Joint Committee and the South­
ern Baptist Convention filed amicus briefs presenting diametrically 
opposed views.423 
brief in Helms arguing that successor legislation was unconstitutional. Id. For a description 
of the Committee's stance on tax exemptions for churches, and the decision by the Commit­
tee to file a brief in support of this position in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), 
see Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 135-36. 
418. QUEEN, SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 381, at 102-110; 
SO RAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 314. 
419. E.g. , Brief Amicus Curiae of Baptist Joint Comm., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
579-80 (1992). 
420. E.g. , Private Education: A Tax Break, supra note 372, at 43 (noting Committee's 
opposition to 1978 bill that would provide tuition tax credits); see also Brief of Amicus Cu­
riae Baptist Joint Committee, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648) (oppos­
ing federal program that provides educational and instructional materials, including comput­
ers, to private religious schools); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress et al., 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553) (opposing federal program that 
sends public school teachers into parochial schools for remedial instruction and supporting 
Aguilar); Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee et al., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids 
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990) (opposing state program that sent public school 
teachers into parochial schools); Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee, Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (No. 82-195) (opposing state income tax deduction for tuition). 
421 . FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 ,  at 213-14. 
422. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 67-68; see also Walfred 
Peterson, Religious Pressure Group: An Examination of the Baptist Joint Committee on Pub­
lic Affairs, 15 J. Church and State 271, 273, 287 (1973) (reporting that in 1970 Southern Bap­
tists accounted for over half the membership of the Baptist Joint Committee and that the 
Southern Baptist Convention contributed 90% of the funds for the Committee's budget). 
423. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae American Jewish Congress et al., Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553), and Brief of Amici Curiae American 
Jewish Congress et al., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014), with Brief of 
Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-
552, 96-553), and Brief of Amicus Curiae Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Com­
mission, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Baptist Joint Committee at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648) (noting 
that "the Baptist Joint Committee does not purport to speak for all Baptists"). 
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Just as the Baptist Joint Committee lost the ability to speak for all 
Baptists, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State 
failed to maintain a united position for Protestants generally. The 
twisting fate of Americans United over the last four decades provides 
a fascinating glimpse of the upheavals in Protestant thinking on church 
and state. Born in the bosom of the Baptist Joint Committee in 1947, 
Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State ("POAU") aimed to counteract the growing political power 
of the Catholic Church.424 POAU originally drew support from main­
line Protestant groups as well as from evangelicals. During the 1960s, 
however, POAU's anti-Catholic vigor and unswerving devotion to 
separation drove away many mainline Protestant groups, including the 
Baptist Joint Committee and the National Council of Churches.425 The 
thaw in Protestant-Catholic relations made mainline Protestants un­
comfortable with POAU's anti-Catholic rhetoric.426 The fight over the 
inclusion of religious schools as beneficiaries of the 1965 Elementary 
and Secondary School Act widened the split when the Baptist Joint 
Committee and National Council of Churches somewhat grudgingly 
supported the Act. The POAU harshly criticized them for doing so427 
and in tum found itself attacked as inflammatory.428 The Baptist Joint 
Committee effectively ended its working relationship with POAU 
when the Committee's representative resigned his position on 
POAU's board of directors.429 
Evangelicals and fundamentalists, by contrast, were less uncom­
fortable with POAU's anti-Catholic baggage. By the mid-1960s, 
POAU's core support had shifted to conservative, rural, evangelical 
Protestants.430 But while conservatives shared POAU's strident hostil­
ity to school aid, they soon parted company over school prayer. When 
POAU endorsed the Supreme Court's decisions in Engel and 
Schempp, conservative evangelical groups jumped ship.431 As a result, 
POAU's membership and revenues declined dramatically. By 1969, 
424. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 77; SORAUF, WALL OF 
SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 33; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 
42-43. 
. 
425. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 403-21. 
426. Id. at 414, 501-17. 
427. For descriptions of the involvement of the Baptist Joint Committee and the Na­
tional Council of Churches in the passage of the ESEA, as well as the POAU's criticism in 
response, see Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 501-06; and Peterson, 
Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 131-33. 
428. See Editorial, P.0.A .U. Should Fight Hard but Fair, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 
Feb. 5, 1964, at 167. 
429. Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 133-35. 
430. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 507. 
431. Id. at 509-10. 
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POAU had lost backing from both mainline denominations and con­
servative evangelicals.432 
Over the last three decades, POAU has managed to remain active 
by reinventing itself. It now relies chiefly on non-Protestants, including 
atheists, Jews, and humanists, a switch that prompted the group in 
1971 to shorten its name to Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State ("AU").433 AU continues to file amicus briefs advo­
cating strict separation, but it rarely teams up with Protestant organi­
zations. Instead, it usually appears alone or with liberal Jewish 
groups.434 AU also continues to advance its views publicly, through its 
Journal of Church and State, and to involve itself in legislative battles 
involving church-state issues,435 but its identity has been transformed 
and its influence curtailed. Where POAU once represented mainline 
Protestant thought before the Supreme Court, AU now operates as a 
liberal interest group, a junior cousin to the American Civil Liberties 
Union with only 60,000 members nationwide.436 
Although the National Council of Churches ("NCC") has not ex­
perienced the dramatic upheavals of the Baptist Joint Committee and 
AU, it has long been hampered by a schism between the liberal lead­
ers of the NCC and their more conservative members. Created in 1908 
as the Federal Council of Churches, the NCC has sought to promote 
unity among non-Catholic Christians, representing, at least nominally, 
the bulk of mainline Protestants. In 1963, the NCC sponsored its first 
conference on church-state issues; which was attended by delegates 
from twenty-four Protestant and Orthodox denominations.437 In pub­
lished "findings," the delegates recognized that religious pluralism in 
American society raised "crucial questions concerning both the sepa­
ration and interaction of church and state."438 They answered those 
questions with a broadly separationist response. Specifically, they en-
432. Id. at 532-40. 
433. Id. at 541. 
434. Americans United filed solo amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 
(1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 403 (1985), Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373, 374 (1985), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 389 (1983). It filed amicus briefs 
with Jewish groups in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 
756 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 
822 (1995). 
435. Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411 (describing AU's efforts to defeat 
Religious Freedom Amendment). 
436. See Brief of Amici Curiae AU et al. at 1, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) 
(No. 98-1648). 
437. National Council of Churches, Separation and Interaction of Church and State, 6 J. 
OF CHURCH & ST. 147 (1964) [hereinafter NCC, Separation and Interaction] . 
438. Id. at 148. 
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dorsed the Supreme Court's school-prayer and Bible reading decisions 
and opposed funding for religious schools.439 
Whereas POAU's stance on church-state separation arose princi­
pally from opposition to Catholics, the NCC's stance on church-state 
separation in the 1960s seems to have stemmed from devotion to pub­
lic education "as a major cohesive force in our pluralistic society."440 
The conference delegates justified their opposition to school aid on 
precisely this ground. Aid to religious schools, the delegates argued, 
"may well have the result of further fragmentation of the educational 
system and weaken the role and position of the public schools. "441 
Published in 1963 by the Board of the NCC, a policy statement enti­
tled "The Churches and the Public Schools" confirms the importance 
of public education in the formulation of the NCC's position on 
church-state separation. In that statement, the Board reaffirmed its 
support of the public school system and called on Christian churches 
and Christian parents, including those who send their children to pri­
vate schools, "to strengthen and improve the American system of 
public education."442 The Board also expressed its belief that neither 
official prayers nor the devotional use of the Bible were necessary to 
promote either "true religion [or] good education,'' but said it wished 
to leave local school boards discretion as to whether prayers would be 
offered on special occasions.443 
Over the next four decades, the NCC became, if anything, more 
separationist. In 1992 the NCC argued in Lee v. Weisman that prayers 
at graduation should be disallowed, a position at odds with the more 
relaxed view expressed in 1963. Like the Baptist Joint Committee and 
AU, the NCC fought school aid and opposed legislative attempts to 
amend the Constitution to allow school prayer.444 Although the NCC 
still nominally represents a large constituency of mainline Protestants, 
estimated in 1998 to number nearly fifty-two million,445 it has become 
progressively less active in recent debates about public schools and the 
439. Id. at 148, 151-52. 
440. National Council of Churches, The Churches and the Public Schools, 6 J. OF CH. & 
ST. 176, 177 (1963) (policy statement of Board of NCC) [hereinafter NCC, Churches and 
Public Schools]. 
441. NCC, Separation and Interaction, supra note 437, at 151-52. 
442. NCC, Churches and Public Schools, supra note 440, at 176-79. 
443. Id. at 178. 
444. E.g., SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 314 (describing opposi­
tion to school prayer amendments); National Council of Churches, The Churches and the 
Public Schools at the Close of the Twentieth Century: A Policy Statement (Nov. 11 ,  1999), at 
http://www.ncccusa.org/about/edpol.html (stating that, "as a general rule, public funds 
should be used for public purposes" and cautioning against further government aid to paro­
chial schools) [hereinafter NCC, Policy Statement] . 
445. Steve Kloehn, Protestants Take Aim at Vouchers, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 11 ,  1998, at 
lN. 
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funding of private alternatives.446 In a 1999 Policy Statement on 
Churches and the Public Schools, the NCC recognized that "in recent 
years the voices of our churches have been largely absent from the on­
going debate about the meaning and future of our nation's schools."447 
The NCC's silence stemmed in part from the continuing disagreement 
among member churches on the propriety of vouchers. Indeed, in 
1997, the General Assembly of the NCC rejected a proposed policy 
statement that would have reaffirmed the traditional position that 
"public moneys should be used only for public schools." Every 
speaker at the meeting criticized the statement, prompting one ob­
server to comment that he felt like he "was attending a meeting of the 
National Association of Evangelicals."448 
NCC's intramural controversy over funding religious schools sig­
nals a decline of faith in the public schools among mainline Protes­
tants. The strictly separationist position of the NCC in the mid­
twentieth century was tied to a strong belief in public schools; as that 
belief has faltered, some NCC leaders have begun to rethink the ques­
tion of funding. As the NCC admitted in its 1999 Policy Statement, 
some NCC members "understandably feel" that minority students are 
unfairly trapped in failing urban schools and will remain so without 
some public funding to help them attend private schools.449 Instead of 
attempting to resolve its differences over this issue, the NCC simply 
stated its "conviction that, as a general rule, public funds should be 
used for public purposes. "450 This statement reflects a weakening of 
the NCC's traditional opposition to school aid,451 a shift replicated 
among public secularists, as described below. 
The disagreement among churches within the NCC over aid to re­
ligious schools also suggests a larger failure of mainline Protestant 
leaders to maintain cohesion among their followers. In the 1950s and 
1960s, many Protestant leaders embraced the ideal of the social gospel 
446. It has filed amicus briefs in the Court, although its appearances in this venue have 
been more sporadic than those of other pro-separation groups. The NCC joined amicus 
briefs, for example, in Ball in 1985, arguing against a program that sent public school teach­
ers into parochial schools, and in Lee in 1992, arguing against allowing prayer at school 
graduations. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80 (1992); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 374 (1985). It has not filed or joined briefs, however, in the two most re­
cent parochaid cases, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997). 
447. NCC, Policy Statement, supra note 444, at 1 .  
448. Michael M .  McManus, Church Council Moderates Positions, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 22, 
1997, at A13. 
449. NCC, Policy Statement, supra note 444, at 2. 
450. Id. 
451. Cf. NCC, Separation and Interaction, supra note 437, at 152 (stating unequivocally, 
in 1963, that "government funds should not be authorized or appropriated for overall sup­
port of [parochial] schools" and that the state has no obligation to support parental choice of 
religious schools). 
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and worked to address society's injustices, including poverty, racism, 
and sexism.452 While the mainline clergy largely retain a liberal orien­
tation, their flocks are often more conservative.453 They are also dwin­
dling. In 1960, more than 40% of all whites claimed membership in 
mainline denominations, compared to 27% who belonged to evangeli­
cal churches.454 Today, thanks partly to the changing character of the 
Southern Baptists, evangelicals and fundamentalists outnumber main­
line Protestants. White evangelicals constitute one-fourth of the 
population, while mainline Protestants comprise only about one-fifth. 
Additionally, one-tenth of the population are African-American Prot­
estants, and a majority of this group are evangelicals.455 
The cleavage between mainline Protestant leaders and their fol­
lowers has weakened the political influence of mainline clergy and of 
the groups that they dominate. Mainline clergy are thus depicted as 
"generals without armies."456 At the very least, they are generals with 
often indifferent or rebellious troops and no clear mandate to lead. As 
a result, while mainline Protestants continue to tilt toward the Repub­
lican Party, as they have for more than a century, that party has be­
come noticeably less responsive to the demands of their leaders.457 
Politicians "often discount the pronouncements of mainline clergy be­
cause they know few of them have lay support. "458 The inability of 
mainline clergy to influence the Republican Party and the corre­
sponding success of evangelicals are demonstrated by Republican po­
sitions on restoring prayer in public schools and providing aid to re­
ligious schools - both measures that mainline clergy generally oppose 
and evangelical leaders support. 
3. New Alliances 
As the Protestant consensus on church-state relations fell apart, 
different elements of the Protestant majority allied with other groups. 
The result is a radically new landscape of church-state politics. At one 
452. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 42-43, 65-67; 
HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11 ,  at 166. 
453. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 43, 67-68. 
454. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 97. 
455. Id. at 34-39, 97. In addition, as church attendance is much lower in mainline 
churches than in evangelical ones, the membership figures for mainline Protestants exagger­
ate the numbers who are actually involved in church life. Id. at 97. Given the connection be­
tween participation in church activities and political activism, see Verba study, cited in id. at 
32, the greater church attendance rates among evangelicals also helps explain why they have 
been relatively more active in politics in the last few decades than have their mainline coun­
terparts. 
456. Id. at 43. 
457. Id. at 43, 104. 
458. Id. at 43. 
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end of the spectrum stands a broad coalition of accommodationist 
opinion. It is opposed by a similar, though smaller, coalition of separa­
tionists. In between are public secularists, a characterization that in­
cludes both those without religious affiliation and those (probably 
more numerous) who merely seek to confine religion to a private 
sphere. 
Accommodationists include white evangelicals, most Roman 
Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and a growing number of African 
Americans. With a shared interest in obtaining school aid, fighting 
abortion, and restoring school prayer, evangelicals and Catholics 
shelved their mutual antipathy and began to work together.459 As early 
as 1984, the New York Times reported a dramatic shift among Catho­
lic and Protestant allegiances since 1960, the most important feature of 
which was the agreement among conservative Catholics and funda­
mentalist Protestants on such issues as abortion and aid to private 
schools.460 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, evangelicals and Catholics 
collaborated on aid to religious schools. In 1988 the Catholic League 
for Religious and Civil Rights joined the National Association of 
Evangelicals in forming Americans for Educational Choice, a group 
dedicated to securing government assistance for parents who send 
their children to religious schools.461 In five of the Supreme Court's 
most recent Establishment Clause cases, conservative evangelicals and 
Catholic organizations have appeared as amici advocating accommo­
dation.462 Indeed, in the 1997 case of Agostini, the Catholic League 
joined the amicus brief of the Christian Legal Society, along with the 
Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission and the National Asso­
ciation of Evangelicals.463 That same year, Catholic Bishops, evangeli­
cal Protestant leaders, and religious-right luminaries - such as Gary 
Bauer, Ralph Reed, and James Dobson - issued "A Statement of 
459. John Swomley, One Nation Under God: National Council of Bishops Seeking to 
Influence Policy, 58 THE HUMANIST, May-Jun. 1998, at 6-7 (1998) (describing successful ef­
forts of Catholic Bishops to form alliances with "the Southern Baptist Convention, the 
Mormons, and numerous other groups led by Protestant evangelists, including Pat 
Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and James Kennedy, and lay leaders, including Missouri Senator 
John Ashcroft of the Assemblies of God"). 
460. Herbers, Activism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9; Herbers, Church Issues, supra 
note 401, at B9. 
461. Goetz, Parental Choice, supra note 395, at A2. Catholic school associations and 
evangelical school associations, including the Association of Christian Schools, have also 
joined together in the Council for American Private Education ("CAPE"), a group that ac­
tively supports vouchers. See CAPE website, at http://www.capenet.org/member.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2001). 
462. See Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 
(1997); Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80 (1992). 
463. Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553). 
360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:279 
Christian Conscience and Citizenship," criticizing the Supreme 
Court.464 While "strongly affirm[ing] the separation of church and 
state,'' the statement attacked the Court's "specious interpretation" 
under which "our public schools are denuded of moral instruction and 
parents are unjustly burdened in choosing a religious education for 
their children. "465 
Orthodox Jews add to this pietist alliance. The Jewish proportion 
of the United States population is quite small, roughly two percent, 
and the majority of Jews are politically liberal and strongly committed 
to separation of church and state.466 In recent years, however, Ortho­
dox Jews have begun to assert views at odds with those of liberal Jews 
and consistent with those of evangelical Protestants and conservative 
Catholics, especially on abortion, gay rights, and public prayer. In par­
ticular, the Rabbinical Council - a national organization representing 
Orthodox congregations - has become outspoken in support of aid to 
religious schools.467 Additionally, Orthodox Jews have filed amicus 
briefs supporting prayer at school graduations, aid to religious schools, 
and the right of states to create school districts for a single, religiously 
homogeneous (Hasidic Jewish) community.468 
African Americans are the final constituency in the accommoda­
tionist camp, and they are particularly significant in the debate over 
vouchers. African Americans are overwhelmingly Protestant and gen­
erally more devout than any other ethnic group: nine out of ten report 
that religion is very important in their lives, and over half say that they 
464. We Hold These Truths: A Statement of Christian Conscience and Citizenship, FIRST 
THINGS, Oct. 1997, at 51-53, available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9710/articles/ 
documentation.html [hereinafter Statement of Christian Conscience]. Conservative Catholic 
leaders, to cite another example, also supported the Istook Amendment. See, e.g. , John Dart 
& Lee Romney, High Court's Ruling May Give Proposed Amendment a Boost, L.A. TIMES, 
Jun. 28, 1997, at B4; Letter from Deacon Keith A. Fournier, President, Catholic Alliance, to 
Rep. Ernest Istook (Apr. 23, 1998) (on file with authors). Not all Catholic leaders, however, 
supported the Amendment. The Interfaith Alliance, for example, which includes one Catho­
lic Bishop on its Board, opposed the Amendment. See Clergy Speak Out Against /stook 
Amendment, Talking Points Prepared by Interfaith Alliance (Jul. 22, 1997) (on file with 
authors). 
465. Statement of Christian Conscience, supra note 464. 
466. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 48-49, 75-76; Dena S. 
Davis, Religion in the Public Arena: Black Political Leaders and Jewish Voters, in 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH & STATE 52-54 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993). 
467. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 49, 76, 1 10. Two of the 
cosponsors of 1997 bill that would have provided vouchers to low-income students in 
Washington, D.C. were Floyd Flake, a black Protestant minister and Democratic Represen­
tative from New York, and Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew and Senator from 
Connecticut. See VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 88-89. 
468. The National Jewish Commission on Legal and Public Affairs filed amicus briefs in 
Lee, Kiryas, Joel, Agostini, and Helms. See Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000); 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997); Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 689 (1994); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
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pray several times a day.469 Although black voters . are more liberal 
than white Protestants on social welfare and economic issues, they 
tend to be conservative on issues such as abortion, gay rights, and 
school prayer.470 Most importantly, a growing number of African 
Americans support school vouchers. This represents a dramatic 
change from the 1950s and 1960s, when African Americans were 
heavily invested in public schools as the vehicle of societal desegrega­
tion and deeply distrustful of private alternatives. Recently, however, 
black support of public schools has waned in light of the harsh realities 
of many poor urban schools, such that today African Americans sup­
port school vouchers more strongly than whites.471 A recent poll indi­
cated that 72% of black parents supported school vouchers, compared 
to only 48% of the general public.472 That fact has helped reshape the 
voucher debate, which increasingly concerns not only the propriety of 
government funding for religious schools, but also the question of 
whether vouchers will improve the educational opportunities of disad­
vantaged students.473 
On the other side are the committed separationists. They include 
mainline Protestant clergy and many of their followers, most Jews, and 
those we call "ideological secularists." We offer that term to describe 
those persons, usually with little or no personal religious commitment, 
whose opposition to school aid stems from a broader ideological 
commitment to a secular society. Examples include members of the 
ACLU, the National Committee for Public Education and Religious 
Liberty ("PEARL"), and People for the American Way ("PF AW"), 
three politically liberal interest groups that actively oppose aid to re-
469. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 1 1 1 .  
470. Id. at  39, 1 11-12. 
471. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 65-66; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION 
AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 111 ;  VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 
88. 
472. See James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting survey results); NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 2001 (back-page adver­
tisement for African-American group supporting school choice). 
473. E.g., VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 209-13 (describing "the 
growing consensus that seems to be emerging among people of different political persua­
sions . . .  that supports a policy of targeted choice designed specifically to benefit economi­
cally disadvantaged children"); William Galston & Diane Ravitch, Scholarships for lnner­
City School Kids, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at A23 [hereinafter Galston & Ravitch, Schol­
arships] (arguing for a national experiment with means-tested vouchers); Olsen, Voucher 
Victory, supra note 379, at 6 (reporting that Charles Glenn, Professor at Boston University's 
School of Education and a minister, has suggested that voucher supporters should "argue the 
justice side of school choice" and point out that " [s]chool choice already exists, but not for 
the poorest students"); William Raspberry, Let's At Least Experiment with School Choice, 
WASH. POST, Jun. 16, 1997, at A21 [hereinafter Raspberry, Let's Experiment] (arguing that 
vouchers should be tried for the sake of poor students in central cities). 
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ligious schools.474 These three groups often team up with liberal Jewish 
organizations, including the American Jewish Committee and the 
American Jewish Congress, as well as with Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, to contest government financing of 
religious schools.475 
Between these two poles lie the public secularists. Though secu­
larists comprise only about 15% of the electorate, they have exerted a 
strong influence over public policy since World War 11.476 In the 1950s 
and 1960s public secularists strongly supported public education. They 
opposed aid to religious schools chiefly out of fear that government 
support for private education would undermine the assimilative and 
democratizing mission of public schools.477 Over the last two decades, 
however, many public secularists have lost confidence in the public 
schools.478 This loss of faith seems tied to numerous factors, including 
474. The ACLU described itself, in an amicus brief in Helms, as "a nationwide . . .  non­
partisan organization with nearly 300,000 members dedicated to the principles of liberty and 
equality embodied in the Bill of Rights, including the separation of church and state." Brief 
of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. at 1, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648) 
(hereinafter ACLU Helms Amici Brief]. PFAW, in the ACLU's amicus brief in Helms, de­
scribed itself as founded "by a group of religious, civic, and educational leaders devoted to 
our nation's heritage of tolerance, pluralism, and liberty," and consisting of over 310,000 
members nationwide. Id. at 4. In another amicus brief in Helms, PEARL described itself as a 
"national coalition of organizations sharing the objective of preserving religious freedom 
and the separation of church and state," and listed among its members the American Hu­
manist Association, the American Jewish Committee, United Church of Christ, and the 
Council for Secular Humanism. Brief of Amici Curiae PEARL et al. at 1 ,  Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648). 
475. An amicus brief filed in Helms provides a perfect illustration. Joining a single brief, 
which argued against allowing federal assistance to religious schools, were the ACLU, the 
American Federation of Teachers, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish 
Congress, AU, the Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, and 
PFA W. See ACLU Helms Amici Brief, supra note 474, at 1-4. 
476. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 92, 107-08. 
477. See supra text accompanying notes 205-211;  see also ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120-51 (1970). Bickel argued that the 
Supreme Court's prohibition of funding religious schools - like the Court's unwillingness to 
tolerate tuition grants to support secular segregation academies - rested on the notion that 
public schools served the unique function of assimilating and Americanizing a diverse range 
of students. Id. The notion was that only public schools could properly prepare students to 
become responsible American citizens. Bickel also foresaw that "the insistence on the as­
similationist mission of public schools which are unable to perform it cannot be maintained," 
and he further suggested that once this assimilationist mission is abandoned, decisions pro­
hibiting religion in public schools or financial support of religious schools "must also go." Id. 
at 149. 
478. E.g. , CAROL ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND 
PRIVATIZATION 1 (1996) (hereinafter ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS] (stating, in the first 
line of the book, that "[m]any Americans have lost faith in public schools"); COOKSON, 
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 1-9 (describing loss of faith in public institutions, in­
cluding public schools); MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 16-20 (de­
scribing various groups who have lost faith in public schools). It is worth noting that all three 
of these books defend public schools and that the authors depict themselves as arguing 
against the popular grain. 
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disappointment over the limited success of desegregation, the contin­
ued existence of poorly performing, racially isolated, and by any 
measure dismal urban schools, and evidence that Catholic parochial 
schools often outperform their public counterparts, even when edu­
cating racially and economically diverse students.479 The loss of faith in 
public education also appears tied, at a more fundamental level, to a 
loss of faith in the civic purposes of public schools. Today, many public 
secularists appear to believe that the primary purpose of schools is not 
to assimilate students and prepare them for citizenship, but to teach 
them skills and prepare them for the workforce.480 As public secular­
ists have come to doubt that public schools are performing these tasks 
well, they have become open to alternatives.481 
As a result, an increasing number of public secularists have aban­
doned their opposition to school aid. The shift is most visible in the 
fight over vouchers. Although only a few voucher programs exist as 
yet, voucher programs enjoy much stronger and more widespread 
support than they did two decades. ago.482 That support comes not only 
479. E.g. , ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS, supra note 478, at 2-3 (describing various 
causes of dissatisfaction with public schools); MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST supra 
note 87, at 129 (suggesting that "today's loss of faith in public schools" is tied in part to 
"large and anonymous" city schools); VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 
80-86 (describing how the literature on the academic performance of Catholic schools 
"would prove to have a great bearing on the question of educational equality" and school 
choice). James Coleman has conducted the most well-known research comparing public and 
private schools, including Catholic parochials schools. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET 
AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
COMPARED (1982); JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987). Research by Coleman and others on 
Catholic schools has not gone unnoticed by members of the popular media. E.g. , James 
Traub, What Can Public Schools Learn?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, sec. 7 (book review), at 
13 (describing data demonstrating that "impoverished minority children were significantly 
likelier to graduate, and to go on to college, if they attended Roman Catholic rather than 
comparable public schools"). 
480. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 16-26 (describing the ar­
guments of various supporters of school choice). As Macedo observes, "[w]hat is striking in 
debates over public school reform is that the emphasis on markets, choice, and cultural di­
versity often seems accompanied by a profound loss of faith in civic purposes." Id. at 16. See 
generally COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 4-9. 
481 .  Peter Cookson captured this view when he described how Americans traditionally 
shared a "firm belief that public schools are the mediators of merit and the cradles of de­
mocracy. With the weakening of the consensus [on this point], traditional methods of educa­
tional reform appear inadequate" and more and more people become open to market-based 
alternatives. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 9; see also Stephen Macedo, 
Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal 
Public Values, 75 CHI .-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000) (expressing qualified support for vouchers); 
Galston & Ravitch, Scholarships, supra note 473 (offering qualified support for vouchers); 
Raspberry, Let's Experiment, supra note 473 (same). It is especially telling that Macedo sup­
ports vouchers, given that his impressive book, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, is dedicated to 
establishing that schools should still attempt to forge a shared civic culture. See MACEDO, 
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87. 
482. See generally COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE; supra note 376 (describing history of 
school choice movement). E.g. , VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 80-116 
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from religious groups, but also from a politically diverse array of pub­
lic secularists. Supporters thus include not only libertarian and conser­
vative groups and individuals, such as the Manhattan Institute, the 
Heritage Foundation, the Institute for Justice, William Bennett, 
Robert Bork, and Ed Meese.483 They also include more politically lib­
eral individuals such as former Clinton Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, 
former Clinton Domestic Policy Adviser William Galston, Washington 
Post columnist William Raspberry, Martin Luther King III, and 
Howard Fuller, an African American who was the superintendent of 
the Milwaukee schools and "the father" of its voucher program.484 Bil­
lionaire Theodore J. Forstman, a strong voucher proponent, has en­
listed Bowles, King, and Fuller, among others, to form the "Campaign 
for America's Children," which advocates school choice through both 
newspaper and television advertising.485 The television advertisements 
typically feature minorities and depict the question of vouchers as 
largely one about equalizing educational opportunities.486 This view of 
vouchers has been endorsed by other politically liberal secularists, in­
cluding Robert Reich, Clinton's former Labor Secretary, who wrote 
an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal making the case for what 
he termed "progressive vouchers. "487 
This is not to say that all public secularists now favor aid to private 
schools. Vouchers are opposed by powerful secular organizations, 
such as the teachers' unions, as well as by traditional civil rights 
groups, such as the ACLU and the NAACP.488 But the shift in opinion 
among public secularists, who at one time almost uniformly supported 
public schools and opposed religious alternatives, is both real and im­
portant. It also stands in sharp contrast to what has (not) occurred on 
the issue of religion in public schools. Although many public secular-
(describing various school choice initiatives undertaken since 1980); Jodi Wilgoren, School 
Vouchers: A Rose by Any Other Name, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Wil­
goren, School Vouchers] (noting that " [p]ublic opinion polls have registered a growing inter­
est in vouchers in recent years" and describing existing voucher programs and proposals). 
483. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 30-33; Boston, Congressional Alert, 
supra note 410; Getz, Parental Choice, supra note 395, at A2. 
484. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 91-92 (describing support of 
Raspberry and Galston); Wilgoren, School Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al (describing sup­
port of Bowles, King, and Fuller). 
485. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 91-92; Wilgoren, School 
Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al. 
486. Id. at 91-92; Wilgoren, School Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al. 
487. Robert B. Reich, The Case for 'Progressive' Vouchers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at 
A26. Although vouchers remain associated largely with conservative Republicans, registered 
Democrats, according to a 1998 poll, are actually more sympathetic to vouchers than are 
Republicans. The Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll indicated that 51 % of Democrats endorsed 
vouchers, whereas only 48% of Republicans did. Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll, The Public's 
Attitudes Toward the Public Schools 1998, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2000. 
488. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 101-10, 171-72. 
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ists have softened or abandoned their opposition to funding religious 
schools, their hostility to religious exercises in public schools has not 
decayed.489 We see no movement among secularists to reintroduce 
prayer into public schools. We see no wealthy entrepreneurs, for ex­
ample, bringing together a collection of prominent and diverse indi­
viduals to advocate returning religion to the classroom. Nor do we see 
the conservative foundations and think-tanks that advocate vouchers 
simultaneously working to restore school prayer. Even personally de­
vout intellectuals, such as Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter, who 
argue that religion should be taken more seriously in public life and 
who support school vouchers, do not advocate a return of school 
prayer.490 
Today, it seems likely that the alignment of these groups is pro­
ducing a new political majority in favor of school aid. Although we 
cannot attach precise numbers to those who belong to one faction or 
another, estimates are possible. The current electorate is roughly 25% 
Catholic, 25% white evangelical Protestant, 20% mainline Protestant, 
15% secular, 10% black Protestant, 2% Jewish, and the remaining 3% 
Mormons, Muslims, and others.491 Catholics and white evangelical 
Protestants combined thus represent about half the population of the 
United States. Not all of them are committed accomrnodationists, but 
they are joined by Orthodox Jews, many black Protestants, and some 
secularists. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that today, in sharp 
contrast to the situation at the time of Everson, well over half of the 
current citizens in the United States support greater accommodation 
of religion.492 
489. E.g. , VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 195-96 (arguing against 
religion in public schools and for providing funds to parents to send their children to private, 
religious schools). 
490. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LA w AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 15 (1993). 
491. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11 ,  at 34-35, 75, 92, 111 -12. 
492. Polls on religious issues support this estimate, as they reveal majority support for 
prayer in public schools and majority support for the use of vouchers at religious schools. 
For polling data on prayer in public schools, see supra note 482. Polls on vouchers are nu­
merous and often tell contradictory stories, depending on how the question is posed. They 
also indicate that the public at this point knows very little about vouchers, making current 
polls even more unreliable. See STEVE FARKAS ET AL. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE: 
How ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS COULD MISREAD THE PUBLIC'S VIEWS ON VOUCHERS 
AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 9-12 (1999); see also Carl Campanile, NYers Support School 
Choice, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25, 2000, at 20 (reporting results of recent poll indicating that about 
75% of city residents familiar with school vouchers support them, but that only 55% of those 
polled were familiar with the use of vouchers). With those caveats in mind, the Phi Delta 
Kappa/Gallup Poll revealed that, in 1998 and 1999, 51 % of those asked supported allowing 
parents to send their children to private schools, including church-related schools, with 
the government paying all or part of the tuition. In 2000, however, that percentage 
dropped to 45%.  See Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, 32nd Annual Phi Delta 
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, at 
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kpol0009.htm. Stronger support for vouchers was found in a 
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C. Looking Back, Looking Ahead 
We think it likely that the seismic shift in the politics of church­
state relations will, sooner or later, have a profound effect on Estab­
lishment Clause doctrine. The emerging majority in favor of school aid 
is a major new fact in American politics, and one that we think will 
eventually influence the Supreme Court. Moreover, other factors rein­
force the new majority's support for school aid. Today, religious 
schools are no longer invariably Catholic, and school aid no longer fa­
vors one religion. It can no longer be understood (or misunderstood) 
as bringing public policy into the orbit of a particular church. In these 
changed circumstances, any set of justices, whatever their backgrounds 
and predispositions, would find it easier to tolerate public funding of 
religious schools than did their predecessors of 1947. 
Also easing the path toward accommodation is the declining faith 
in public schools. In recent years, the public schools have undergone 
intense and not undeserved criticism for failing to prepare students 
adequately for higher education or the workforce. At the same time, 
the hope of using schools to achieve the social goal of desegregating 
American society has faded, as has the belief in the public-school mis­
sion to inculcate democratic virtues. In this more critical and less op­
timistic atmosphere, the idea of seeking alternatives to public schools 
has become more attractive not only to white, conservative evangeli­
cals, but also to African Americans and to many public secularists, 
both conservative and liberal - including, importantly, the secular 
elite, the class from which most justices hail.493 As alternatives to pub­
lic schools have become more appealing, secularist opposition to pri­
vate school aid has declined. 
The stage seems set, therefore, for a transformation in the Court's 
approach to the issue of funding religious schools. The changes that 
began in the late 1970s have been compounding ever since. As one 
would expect, given the age of the justices and the pace of judicial ap­
pointments, the Supreme Court did not respond immediately as the 
political ground shifted. Through the 1980s and the early 1990s, the 
Court continued along a twisting path of prohibiting all but incidental 
aid to religious schools. The Court's two most recent aid decisions, 
survey done in 1999 by Public Agenda. In that poll, 68% of parents, 57% of the general pub­
lic, and 51 % of community leaders endorsed vouchers. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE, at 
13-14. Perhaps the most revealing poll, however, asked respondents to assume that their 
state government were starting a voucher program, and then asked whether the vouchers 
should be limited to nonreligious schools or should be available for religious schools as well. 
A remarkable 78% of those surveyed stated that parents should be able to use the vouchers 
at religious schools as well. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE, at 17-18. This last poll indicates 
quite clearly that, while there is still a division of opinion about whether to institute a 
voucher program, there is a great deal of support for the principle that any voucher program 
adopted should include religious schools. 
493. See supra text accompanying notes 471-472, 478-481 .  
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however, suggest a change of direction. Decided in 1997 and 2000, 
Agostini v. Felton494 and Mitchell v. Helms495 reveal four justices willing 
to allow even pervasively sectarian institutions to receive government 
aid, whenever that aid is also available to secular institutions on the 
same terms. Two other justices refuse to go that far but appear willing 
to tolerate substantial aid that certainly would have been prohibited 
ten years ago. Both Agostini and Helms, moreover, depart from the 
Court's earlier practice of distinguishing, often in plainly unpersuasive 
ways, unfavorable precedents. Instead, Agostini and Helms expressly 
repudiate prior decisions. 
Of course, Agostini and Helms do not prove that the Court will 
embrace a major restructuring of Establishment Clause doctrine,4% but 
they may well signal that the Court is beginning to rethink its ap­
proach. Our prediction of a coming revolution does not, however, de­
pend primarily on what the Court has already said. More important, in 
our view, are the shifting fundamentals - the emergence of a strong 
new coalition in favor of school aid, the proliferation of religious di­
versity among the potential recipients of that aid, and the declining 
confidence in the monopoly of public education. Based primarily on 
these factors, we predict that the use of vouchers at private, religious 
schools will, sooner or later, be upheld. 
While these factors suggest radical change on the question of aid to 
religious schools, they do not support any comparable prediction of 
radical change for religious observances in the public schools. That 
branch of the modern Establishment Clause remains intact, and the 
Supreme Court has made no move toward reconsideration. Several 
factors suggest that the Court likely will maintain that position in the 
foreseeable future. For one thing, the politics of this issue are different 
from those regarding school aid. The political alignment regarding re­
ligious exercises remains the same as it was when Engel and Schempp 
were decided: Protestants remain split on the issue, with conservative 
evangelicals joining Catholics and Orthodox Jews in support of prayer, 
while both ideological and public secularists, most Jews, and mainline 
clergy oppose it. To be sure, conservative evangelicals have acquired 
more political influence during the last generation, but the weight of 
elite opinion continues to oppose them on this issue. 
More importantly, our nation's ever-increasing religious pluralism 
has very different implications for the two branches of Establishment 
Clause doctrine. The growing religious pluralism among private 
494. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
495. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
496. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which recently struck down the 
Cleveland voucher program by a divided vote, did not read Helms and Agostini as estab­
lishing the constitutionality of vouchers. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d. 945 (6th 
Cir. 2000) cert. granted, No. 00-1751, 2001 WL 576235 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001). 
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schools bolsters the case for government funding by removing the 
taint of state aid to a particular church. And given the fact that aid 
would also flow to nonreligious schools, of which there are a healthy 
number, school aid may also be seen as neutral as between religion 
and irreligion. In contrast, the growing religious pluralism of 
American society makes it less likely that our nation will return to of­
ficially sponsored religious observances in public education. In a na­
tion of many faiths and none, it is hard to square officially sponsored 
school prayer and Bible reading with any viable conception of neu­
trality. It may be true, as some argue, that excluding prayer from pub­
lic schools implicitly supports antireligious or nonreligious viewpoints 
as against the religious,497 but reinstituting prayer would do precisely 
the reverse. In this context, no meaningful opportunity for complete 
neutrality as between religion and nonreligion exists. More impor­
tantly, officially sponsored school prayer would threaten the ideal of 
government neutrality among religions. Any religious exercise or 
statement would be offensive to some. Today, even more than in the 
1960s, officially sponsored prayer or Bible reading in the public 
schools would necessarily favor some beliefs over others. The prohibi­
tion of religious observances in public school therefore functions as a 
prophylactic against coercion of religious minorities and nonbelievers. 
As such, the Supreme Court's policy against school prayer and Bible 
reading responds to diversity of belief, and diversity of belief has only 
increased in the years since Engel and Schempp. 
We believe, therefore, that the two propositions that make up the 
modern Establishment Clause are beginning to diverge. The ban 
against aid to religious schools is already fraying and may well col­
lapse. The purging of religious observances from public education, in 
contrast, seems secure. Both predictions arise not from the internal 
logic of Establishment Clause doctrine but from consideration of the 
underlying political and sectarian forces that gave that doctrine birth. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article offers an external, or "political," account of the mod­
ern Establishment Clause. Our analysis differs from most existing 
scholarship in the field in at least three respects. First, it does not serve 
any normative agenda. Most investigations of the history of the Estab­
lishment Clause construct the past to support some vision of the fu-
, ture. This conjoining of the positive and the normative is invited, if not 
coerced, by the Supreme Court, which has consistently cast its Estab-
497. E.g. , Stephen Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 
1627 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
115,  122 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal lllusions: Establish­
ment Neutrality and The "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 278 & n.60 (1987). 
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lishment Clause decisions in historical terms. A lawyer or scholar who 
wishes to engage the justices on their own terms must therefore speak 
the language of history, even if doing so merely disguises a normative 
argument. Our analysis, in contrast, is entirely positive. We have tried 
to understand what has happened and to predict what will happen 
with as little regard as possible for normative concerns or implications. 
We do not pretend to have achieved some ideal of objectivity or 
"truth," but that has been our aim. 
Second, our analysis differs from existing literature in the relative 
weight it gives to various periods of history. As the Supreme Court's 
reliance on the past stems from some version of original intent, atten­
tion is focused on the late eighteenth century. Indeed, many accounts 
of the history of the Establishment Clause take a direct flight from 
James Madison to the present, with perhaps a brief detour to buzz the 
airport of Reconstruction. These accounts pass over the long stretches 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as featureless terrain of little 
interest. Our understanding is precisely the reverse. Neither the Bill of 
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment had much to do with the es­
tablishment of religion. The origins of the modern Establishment 
Clause lay not in the late eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth and 
twentieth. Accordingly, any attempt to understand where we are and 
how we got here must focus on exactly those periods that conventional 
history neglects. 
Most important, we have not focused on the internal structure and 
logic of Establishment Clause doctrine. Instead, we have charted the 
broad correspondences between that doctrine and the history of 
church and state in America. We believe that this external perspective 
provides a richer and more informative account of the modern Estab­
lishment Clause than any analysis that resides within the decisions of 
the Supreme Court. We do not wish to be understood, however, as 
suggesting that internal factors played no role. Reasoning, doctrine, 
and precedent matter, and they have certainly figured in the history of 
the Establishment Clause. 
The interplay between external and internal factors is especially 
vivid in the case of Everson. We think it plain that the separationist 
project begun in Everson did not result from legal analysis. Neither 
the constitutional text nor demonstrable original intent nor pre­
existing doctrine or precedent determined that decision. To under­
stand Everson, one must seek an external account. There is no other 
choice. But the decision, once rendered, surely influenced future cases. 
Everson traced a line backward from the mid-twentieth century to the 
framing and projected future controversies along the same trajectory. 
Justices who came to the Court without ironclad commitments on 
church and state found the direction of decision clearly marked. The 
disagreement between the Everson majority and dissent was so trivial, 
as compared to the questions deemed settled, that a justice who took 
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his cue from prior decisions would have found the area of choice quite 
constrained. Absent some fundamental shift in perspective or social 
context, debate over small-scale disagreements within the existing doc­
trinal framework might continue indefinitely, as Everson survived 
without serious challenge for almost fifty years. Radical change awaits 
the conviction that existing doctrine is radically wrong and that the 
right response is not refinement but repudiation. 
We have not tried to follow the paths by which such convictions 
reach the Supreme Court. To do so would require a massive excursion 
into judicial biography. The broad outlines of that process, however, 
are not obscure. Part of the story turns on presidential elections and 
on the array of political opinion to which presidents respond. Part of it 
- especially in recent decades - turns on the disposition of the 
Senate and on the likelihood that particular commitments will arouse 
support or opposition. The choice between one presidential candidate 
and another, or between one Supreme Court nominee and another, 
obviously influences the course of constitutional law, and indeed often 
is made on just that basis. 
Part of the story, however, turns on political choices over time. 
Supreme Court justices chosen from a younger generation will have 
experiences and perceptions different from their predecessors, re­
gardless of political party or inclination. We do not suppose that sit­
ting justices routinely change their minds to conform to new political 
alignments or social realities, but neither do we believe that justices 
chosen in an era of changed political alignment or altered social reality 
will be unaffected by it. 
Thus, for example, no Supreme Court justice chosen in 1900, 1930, 
or 1950 would have doubted that aid to religious schools meant aid to 
Roman Catholic schools. The correspondence was nearly exact and 
was everywhere so perceived. In contrast, no Supreme Court justice 
chosen in the year 2000 could see aid to religious schools as favoritism 
to one religion. The previously controlling assumption is no longer 
tenable. The social reality has changed, and the social and political 
content of Everson separatism has changed with it. 
The story of the changing social reality of church and state in 
America and the corresponding changes in constitutional doctrine is 
the political history of the Establishment Clause. This history, we be­
lieve, is a far better guide to understanding the modern Establishment 
Clause than anything actually said on its behalf in the opinions of the 
Supreme Court. 
